[MD] What Bo Doesn't Get

[KAYE PALM-LEIS]

Krimel
> [Krimel]
> So you agree that DQ is simply change and uncertainty?

Mati: Well more like I don't think we are at point to argue this
point.  DQ is alot things but defining it at this point seems a bit
like putting the horse before the cart.  There is a lot of
disagreement as to what the static levels mean and how they operate.
To jump to DQ to build consensus seems a bit premature.

> [Krimel]
> Right, everything you can think of and everything anyone has ever thought of
> are potentially part of the intellectual level. To actually be part of the
> intellectual level as such, it must be a pattern. That is it must persist or
> have extension in the temporal dimension.

Mati: I think of the early primitive art in which animals were drawn
on the cave wall, from my perspective they certainly were thinking
about the animals and were conveying them in a temporal interpretation
of the animals themselves. Based on what you suggest they must have
been intellectual.  I would suggest they were displaying behavior that
had an intelligence, but they were not intellectual.  Intellect
requires a metaphysical basis.  That basis did not exist in a capacity
to sustain itself as a level until Aristotle's S/O divide. I think
there is a common agreement that intelligence existed long before
intellect.


> [Krimel]
> I don't think it is possible for intellect to precede society but if that
> were the case it would indeed be a problem for the MoQ. However, we see that
> the social level is primary in almost all primates and most mammals.
> Intellect on the other hand only begins to show up in the great apes.

Mati: I will respectfully suggest that your premise that thinking is
intellect then indeed MoQ has a problem.  That has been the Achilles
heal that Bo has been pointing out so persistently for so long.

> [Mati]
> The point is when we discuss something that can defined metaphysically has
> always come home to the S/O reality.
>
> [Krimel]
> That does seem to be Bo's oft stated notion. It is so clearly wrong that it
> is a wonder that anyone buys, much less repeats it.

Mati: It is not clearly wrong from my humble perspective, based on
what you believe is the metaphysical value of intellect. It seems that
some other might have come to the same conclusion as Bo has suggested.
 The problem is SOM has created a messy web which tangles our notion
of who we are.  Bo's notions rids the tangles and puts intellect in
it's proper place and allows MoQ to be the next possible level.
Otherwise MoQ seems fail to gather any meaning with any legitimacy.

>The MoQ is an
> intellectual pattern that alleges not to be SOM as are eastern religions,
> and work of any number of philosophers.

Mati: I understand the need to suggest that MoQ is an intellectual
pattern. And I agree that SOM and MOQ are two distinctive different
patterns.  But if MoQ is a pattern of intellect of sorts it is
completely separate entity from SOM(intellect).  I have privately
discussed this issue at length with Bo. They function similarly in the
same metaphysical discussion but MoQ is radically different from SOM
in that provide a far more clearer understanding of all values that
are defined.  Pirsig suggests, and I think correctly, that accounts
for the meaning of all values, that was the shortcoming of SOM.  I
know Bo will cringe at my suggestion that MoQ might be considered a
Neo-Intellect, but that is an entirely different discussion.

> [Krimel]
> Well "T"ruth is itself an intellectual pattern. Any talk of a social Truth
> is just intellectualizing about the social. Social patterns are patterns of
> interaction among con-specifics. Discourse about these patterns, for that
> matter discourse itself, is at the intellectual level. Discourse can be
> "about" anything and from any platform.

Mati: Truth is based on the prospective that is based on. Walk into
any church and ask were truth resides, they won't give you an answer
that is neccessarily intellectually based.

> [Mati]
> The metaphysical path of "encoding of experience into concepts" is a
> dead end that gets nowhere metaphysically speaking in the same manner
> as SOM.  Bo's simply points that out.
>
> [Krimel]
> Saying it is a dead end does not make it so. This issue of encoding and
> decoding experience into concepts is fundamental to perception and
> discourse. It is what we are biologically and socially equipped to do and
> without it we have nothing to say no capacity to say it.

Mati: Encoding and Decoding of experience is done at the biological,
social and intellectual level. The conceptualization is experience is
done at both the social and intellectual level, and some might suggest
it even happens at the biological level.  Again encoding and decoding
of experience of concepts seems to be part of the capacity having
intelligence not intellect, though it should be suggested that one
needs a capacity of intelligence to allow intellect to function.

Krimel,
> BTW, metaphysics, like physics, is mainly a matter of finding the smallest
> set of concepts to account for the largest amount of experience. Static and
> dynamic are two such concepts that account for a wider range of phenomena
> than do subjects and objects or mind and matter.

Mati:  I find it interesting that of all the metaphysical phenomena
that you had to chose from to contrast MOQ, you chose SOM to make your
point.  Pirsig did the same thing. That is why, in part, I believe SOM
defaults to Intellect.  There isn't any other metaphysical construct
to default to in the same capacity, or any capacity for that matter,
as the static value of intellect.

Respectfully,
Mati