[MD] Aristotles Theory of Meaning

[X Acto]

Aristotles theory of meaning

Book Iota

I

"We have said before, in our explainations of the various 
meanings of terms, that "unity" means several things."

"Some things are units in one of these ways, being either
continuous or concrete wholes[ in experience];
others are united by their definition. Such unity exists
among the things comprehended by a single thought,
that is, an indivisible thought; it may be indivisible either 
in kind or in number.
 Numerically any individual is indivisible; in kind, things are
indivisible when they are unified in intelligibility or in knowledge.
Hence things are "one" in the primary sense when their unity
is the reason for the unity of some primary being."

"However, it must be thoroughly understood that the
question "what sorts of things are said to be one?" is
not to be taken as having the same meaning as the question
"what is it to be one?" or "What is the definition of unity?"

"In this sense "to be one" means "to be indivisible", that is,
to be essentially a "this", to be discrete in place or form or 
thought or also "to be a whole and indivisible". But it is especially
"to be a first measure within any kind", and chiefly a measure
of quantity; for it is from quantity that "unity" has been extended
to the other catagories. For a measure is that by which quantity
becomes known; and quantity as quantity becomes known either
by unit or by number, and any number comes from"one". 
Consequently, all quantity as quantity becomes
known by unity, and that by which quantities primarily become
known is unity itself; hence unity is the begining of number as
number.
"In all these matters the measure, or beginning, is something
one and indivisible; for even measuring lines by feet we treat
a one foot line as indivisible. Thus  we always seek as a measure
something one and indivisible, something simple either in
quality or in quantity. An exact measure is one from which
nothing can be subtracted and to which nothing can be added.
Hence, "number" is the most exact measure; for we assume
that a numerical unit is in every respect indivisible. Therefore
in other cases this sort of measure is imitated. For, in the
case of a furlong or a talent or anything relativly large, an
addition or subtraction might readily escape our notice than
in the relativly small measure. Consequently, it is the first
thing from which no appreciable quantity can be taken away
 that all men take for a measure, whether liquids or solids or
weight or of size ; and they think they know a quantity when
they know it by means of this measure."

"Similarly, we say that science and sense measure things,
because by them we get to know things; whereas they really
do not measure, but are measured."