[MD] Metaphysics

[Krimel]

[Mark]
I think the concept of intelligent design depends on the definition
of intelligence.  We have been through this before so I won't 
belabor it, but doesn't the trial and errors and learning that
occurs in evolution represent a form of intelligence?  Semantically
at least?

[Krimel]
When atmospheric conditions produce a hurricane, is that a form of
intelligence? After all how does each new storm know which way to spin and
where to put its eye? Is it "like" intelligence? In some ways, yes, but to
identify it "as" intelligence ignores the myriad of ways it is nothing at
all like intelligence. For example, there is no agency, purpose, intention
or reflection involved; all of which seem to me at least to have some
barring on intelligence.

[Mark]
Thermodynamics is a self-contained system in physics which defines all terms
with reference to each other.  There is no possible way for it to be wrong.
 If I set up a system of definitions, it cannot be wrong because I make the
definitions.  

[Krimel]
Here I think you are highlighting the difference between inductive and
deductive reasoning. Deductive reasoning begins with its definitions and
proceeds to make sense from there. For the most part this is the kind of
closed system the Gödel claims must contain elements that cannot be proven
within the system.

Deductive reasoning is our gift from the Greeks. Inductive reasoning, which
is the foundation of scientific thought, doesn't work that way. When we use
it, we are seeking to build our definitions from our observations. In a
sense the system we are trying to build is entiring composed of elements
brought into the system from outside.

This method demands that when those outside elements fit, we assimilate
them. When they don't fit we must adjust the way we account for them, we
accommodate to them.

[Mark]
This is similar to the notions that math cannot be wrong.  Of course it
can't.  If I say The sun is hot, because heat comes from the sun, that can't
be wrong either.

[Krimel]
The notions of math can't be wrong if you accept the assumptions that the
mathematician specifies at the outset. However, as a mathematician you are
free to offer other premises, like Lobachevsky and Riemann. But again I
would see this as a problem for the deductive method that does not
necessarily apply to the inductive method.

Saying "the sun is hot" seems to me, at least, to be derived from
experience. It is what Kant would call synthetic truth. The math examples
reveal analytic truth.