[MD] Choosing Chance

[Arlo Bensinger]

[Steve]
On the one hand it sounds like you are using "chance" as 
"opportunity" or a range of possibilities yet to be settled, but on 
the other hand as randomness and probability.

[Arlo]
I see "chance" as probability, yes. I contrast this with "certainty". 
And I base this in the notion that all things are "free" to respond 
to Quality (choice/preference) within their agenic sphere. I am not 
sure how you use the term "randomness" if you are equating it with 
"probability" in the above statement. Its a problematic term in 
discourse as it has many distinct meanings. (See Wikipedia: 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Randomness).

[Steve]
... but I think the latter is problematic for the MOQ since 
randomness can't be the explanation of anything.

[Arlo]
Here, again, it depends on what you mean by "randomness". I certainly 
agree that there is choice/preference as the visible enactment of 
"chance" (or if you prefer "potentiality" or "probability"). What I 
am arguing against is the notion of coersive or orchestrated 
"certainty", a sort of forced machination of an external "will" or 
"plan". If by "random" you refer to something like a person walking 
down the street who hears a song from a passing car that leads 
her/him to a certain act, then yes, our value responses often are 
shaped by "random" events. Some external "will" did not force you and 
the passing car to be there in that moment, because if there was then 
neither you nor the driver were acting freely.

[Steve]
We get there by saying that metaphysically, everything is 
preferences, but there is no over-arching entity that guides all 
preferences. There are instead just preferences based on preferences 
based on preferences and so on without additional metaphysical 
properties that entities either do or not have such as choice or randomness.

[Arlo]
I think we are saying the same thing, maybe disputing the way we are 
using certain words. I am not disputing "preference", I am merely 
highlighting that without the potential of differing outcomes, there 
can be no "preference". A "preference" is only possible if more than 
one outcome has probability of occurring.