[MD] The difference between a Monet and a finger painting

[Steven Peterson]

Hi Ham,

Ham:
Sometimes I think the Pirsigians are led to believe that Value exists
independently of subjective sensibility or experience.

Steve:
Sometimes???? Geez, Ham. How long have you been around here? This is what we
"Pirsigians" say ALL the time, not just sometimes. This is the fundamental
premise that this forum was created to explore! Pirsig challenged us to
suppose that Value exists prior to notions of objectivity or subjectivity
and to see where that idea would lead us.

I keep asking you to try it out and see how it works, and you keep saying
that trying it out doesn't make sense since it just isn't true. It isn't
true for you because you are reasoning from premises that presuppose that
subjects and objects precede Value.

I don't know how we can possibly get passed this impasse if you are
unwilling to see what reasoning is like based on Pirsig's premises.


Ham:
Since epistemology does not support such a concept, why should a philosophy?
As I have repeatedly said, unrealized Value is an oxymoron.
Steve:
Maybe you can explain how "epistemology does not support such a concept." I
think that this is just an assumption that you make, which happens to also
be common sense, but it is still just an assumption, a prejudice.

 Your point that if before there were subjects and objects there could be no
experiences and Pirsig's point that if there were no experiences there could
be no subjects and objects have a "chicken and egg" sort of relationship
that epistemology can't settle unless you have finally discovered the way we
can step outside of our historical and cultural context and the method
for determining which statements correctly correspond with reality. I think
that there is about as much hope in settling the matter through arguments
focused on this single point as in settling that old chicken-egg dilemma.
Rather I think the idea here is that both notions (experience preceeds
subjects and objects and vice versa) are reasonable postulates, so to decide
between them we should look to the consequences of choosing one postulate or
the other.

Pirsig notes that the construction where subjects and objects are primary
has a tough time accounting for values. It leads to the question, is value
in the
subject or the object? Since choosing either horn of this dilemma is
inconsistent with other commitments we have (i.e. that quality is real is is
not merely subjective but is also not measured objectively), we might favor
the alternative Pirsig offers where "the subject who experience" is viewed
as a deduction from experience rather than presupposed.

You think Pirsig has it all backwards, but is no big incite. That is
precisely the point. Pirsig says, suppose we've had it all upside down all
along. Pirsig is *deliberately* turning everything on its head.

>From LC:
58. ...in all subject-object metaphysics, both the observed (the
object) and the observer (the subject) are assumed to exist prior to
the observation. In the MOQ nothing exists prior to the observation.
The observation creates the intellectual patterns called “observed”
and “observer.” Think about it. How could a subject and object exist
in a world where there are no observations?

To your usual question, "who or what is having the experience?" you might
consider that if there were no experiences this question could not be asked.
So while it is common sense to think that there must be a subject that
existed prior to the experience, Pirsig points out that this entity that is
supposed to be having an experience, this subject, is just an idea.  And
(for empricists anyway) ideas arise out of experiences rather than the other
way around.

I suggested previously that you try a different perspective in your
engagement with Pirsig's philosophy. My suggestion is that you don't view
your exploration of Pirsig as a competition between two philosophical
systems (Essentialism and the MOQ) but rather that you examine these two
intellectual realities the same way you examine paintings in an art gallery,
not with an effort to find out which one is the real painting or even the
better painting, but simply to understand and appreciate the accomplishment
of a fellow artist.

What I don't see is any attempt for you to understand and appreciate what
Pirsig is saying because you won't take the first step which is simply to
accept, if only for the sake of argument, the premise that you keep saying
simply cannot be true and what you just now noticed we Pirsigians seem to
be sometimes asserting. Without the will to imagine such possibilities there
is just little to talk about with respect to Pirsig's philosophy. It is like
trying to discuss theology with someone who refuses to accept even just for
the sake of argument that God exists.

Best,
Steve