[MD] What does Pirsig mean by metaphysics?

[John Carl]

Steve, DmB,



> > In the Dewey quote above, the emphasis on the term "moral" is emphasized
> in
> > the original. By contrast, Rorty thinks our hands are tied morally and
> the
> > best we can have is "groundless social hope".
>
>
>
> Steve:
> Rorty doesn't think "our hands are tied morally." He thinks we should avoid
> cruelty. He just doesn't think that philosophy will ever make good on its
> promise to provide an ahistorical foundation for our belief that we should
> avoid cruelty.
>

John:

Did you mean "ahistorical" Steve?  Or was that a typo?  Either way I
disagree, and I haven't even read him.  Even if philosophy is no good at
anything, it makes more sense to pretend that it does and gives support to
the elimination of cruelty.

That is, a philosophy which encourages kindness is pragmatically better than
one that does not.  For without kindness, philosophers are not fed.


DMB:
>
> > So which version of metaphysics do you suppose the MOQ is?
>
>
> Steve:
> I don't think that Pirsig claims that the MOQ is that sort of foundation
> either.
>
>
John:  I disagree.  I think Pirsig claims a philosophical foundation for the
existence of good, and I agree with his rhetorical arguments.  I also
believe Royce makes a dialectical argument for the same thing.



> DMB:
>
> > In that sense, I think, they'd view Rorty's stance as part of the
> problem,
> > as a particular version of the problem. In both cases, radical empiricism
> is
> > part of the solution, the pragmatic theory of truth is part of the
> solution,
> > reintegration of the affective domain is part of the solution and all of
> > this is grounded in experience. Experience becomes the common denominator
> in
> > this reconstructed naturalistic metaphysics.
>
>
John:  Hear hear.  Well said.  I like the "common denominator" approach to
understanding experience and Quality.  Why go through life with one hand
tied behind your back?  This is what Pirsig helped me see  - the use of
intellect's full tool set, where appropriate and how.


Steve:
> Experience can't serve as the sprt of foundation that philsopher's of the
> past have promised. It can't give us any to the question, "why be kind?"
> can
> it?
>
>
John:  Dude, if your experience doesn't teach you the virtue of being kind,
your experience sucks.  Get a better one.



> DMB:
>
> > I think metaphysical assumptions are the sort of thing you always have
> > whether you think about it explicitly or not. They're like opinions.
> > Everybody has them and most are just unexamined inheritances. For a
> > pragmatist, the question is not about whether or not our assumptions
> > correspond to the way reality really is but rather how well do our
> > assumptions work in experience. How well do the ideas function in
> explaining
> > the past and guiding the future?
>


John:  I like pragmatism.  It's a handy tool.



>
> Steve:
> We all certainly make assumptions. The question is, what makes an
> assumption
> metaphysical? For Rorty, the claims that he calls metaphysical are the ones
> that you agree that pragmatists don't want to make. It sounds like you and
> Rorty don't so much disagree here but are just using the word to mean
> different things.
>
>
John:

"Metaphysics" - that branch of philosophy concerned with basic questions of
self and reality

 "Assumption" -  an unstated premise necessary for an argument.

Seems simple enough.

DMB:
>
> > As the moral concerns discussed above show, pragmatic truth is not just
> > about bald expediency of course. But we really do need ideas that don't
> > paralyze us with respect to basic things like promoting kindness and
> > preventing cruelty. As I see it, if your stance won't allow that, then it
> > isn't any good and it's time to get a new idea.
>
>
> Steve:
> Of course we can and should promote kindness and oppose cruelty, and we are
> in no way paralyzed if we follow Rorty anymore than Pirsig is promoting
> relativism when he says,
>
> "I've concluded that the biggest improvement I could make in the
> Metaphysics
> of Quality would be to block the notion that the Metaphysics of Quality
> claims to be a quick fix for every moral problem in the universe. I have
> never seen it that way. The image in my mind as I wrote it was of a large
> football field that gave meaning to the game by telling you who was on the
> 20-yard line but did not decide which team would win. That was the point of
> the two opposing arguments over the death penalty described in LILA.That
> was
> the point of the equilibrium between static and Dynamic Quality. Both are
> moral arguments. Both can claim the Metaphysics of Quality for support.
> Just
> as two sides can go before the U.S. Supreme Court and both claim
> constitutionality, so two sides can use the Metaphysics of Quality, but
> that
> does not mean that either the Constitution or the Metaphysics of Quality is
> a meaningless set of ideas. Our whole judicial system rests on the
> presumption that more than one set of conclusions about individual cases
> can
> be drawn within a given set of moral rules. The Metaphysics of Quality
> makes
> the same presumption."
>
>
John:  Cool quote.  One additional point is that the judicial system never
specifically addresses the metaphysical underpinnings of its value system,
but the MoQ does.

I'd say that additional frisson of introspection is what makes it such a
Quality way of viewing things.

And sometimes Rorty does seem to come close to Royce's philosophy of
Community, but Royce was more optimistic about logic's ability to "get
there" than Rorty, evidently.


John