[MD] The difference between a Monet and a finger painting

[Ham Priday]

Mark --

I have some issues with your second post (9:47) which I plan to address 
later.

This one, however, impresses me as a genuine effort to clarify our 
differences and bridge the gap between the fundamentals of Essentialism and 
the MoQ.  (I shall try to
comment in the same spirit.)


> I have an understanding where you are coming from.
> The difference between essentialism and quality is the source.
> For you, the source of quality lies in the individual, for MoQ,
> the source lies beyond, and we are an expression of such
> quality. Either of these are near impossible to rectify in terms
> of understanding. I can see the value of both. Is there a way
> in which we can combine the two?

I earnestly hope so, for it's been my reason for hanging on here these many 
years.

Let me make a minor correction in your statement of my ontological position. 
The source of quality (can you humor me with Pirsig's equivalent term 
Value?) does not lie in the individual, as Essence is the Absolute Source. 
What the individual does is realize Value incrementally and differentially 
and convert this realization into experienced phenomena.

> For example (and this is not new), our interpretation of value
> creates such.  This interpretation however is from a larger system
> within such value exists, we are privy to its interpretation.
> I don't want to sound religious, because I do not have such
> leanings. However, some of these disciplines have been
> developed over thousands of years by pretty intelligent people.
> So an analogy of such combination is, that a god placed us here,
> but gave us the choice to see him or not.

Your theistic analogy is useful in this context, and I agree that man's need 
for spirituality  is an expression of his sensibility to Value.  That we may 
choose to believe in a "higher power" or not is a demonstration of our 
individual freedom.

> Once you define a subject, I immediately try to break that down
> into its physical components. That is, what makes up the mind?
> If I relegate it to an interconnected and highly adaptable group of
> neurons, then such subjects exist elsewhere, and do not need
> neurons to be such.

I assume the "subjects [that] exist elsewhere" are animals, since plants and 
single-cell organisms do not possess neurons.  It's unclear to me whether 
animals can legitimately be called "subjects', inasmuch as, except for 
domesticated pets, the behavior of most species is instinctual (i.e., 
genetic) and limited to the collective habits of swarms, flocks, herds, 
schools, and the like.  Also, I see little evidence of  free ("valuistic") 
choices made by animals, apart from food or mating preferences determined by 
their species.

> If you take the subject outside of that framework, then we are
> dealing with that which cannot be substantiated, at least for now.
> I have no problem with this, but it places it in the realm of relativism.

The problem you present has nothing to do with "relativism", as I've 
maintained all along that existence and its apprehended values (morality, 
goodness, beauty, etc.) constitute a relational system.  What troubles 
me--and it is an impediment to our mutual understanding--is your need to 
"break subjectivity down into physical components."
I do not regard the subjective 'self' as a physical entity.  The capacity 
for self-awareness and cognitive experience has biological corollaries, such 
as the brain and its neural network, but consciousness (sensibility) is 
neither organic nor physical.  You should also be aware that in my ontology 
"physicality" (beingness) itself is a value construct.

You see, Mark, I also acknowledge Value as the ground of experiential 
existence.  Unlike Pirsig, however, I do not equate existence with ultimate 
(metaphysical) Reality.

Are we any closer to reconciliation?

Cheers,
Ham

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Hey, Mark --

> For some (MoQ?), reality is: being in the presence of a greater
> power. This is not unfounded since gravity seems to be pretty
> widespread (at least so I'm told). If such a force is used as a basis,
> then one seeks to describe such a force, Ie. Quality. Once such a
> thing is described, everything else is fit in. Pirsig would be the
> first to say, that it cannot be described, only experienced.
> However such belief still requires some outside force.

Okay, I know you want to be conciliatory towards Pirsig. But Quality (as
Value) is not a "force", so your gravitational analogy is misplaced.
Quality doesn't create anything; it's a measure of a thing's worth or value
to the sensible subject. We (as subjects) immanently sense the value of
whatever we experience relative to everything else. If quality were not
relative it would be meaningless. Take away the objects of our experience
and value (or quality) disappears. Experiential existence is designed so
that a sensible agent can realize the value of its Source on a comparative
scale from bad to good, mundane to magnificent, etc. To realize value
(quality) a cognizant subject must relate to an ordered system of
representative objects. The universe is such a system, and we are its
sensible agents.

> I haven't felt that Pirsig denies the subjective agent, but only that
> this subjective agent is part of a much larger plan (without
> intelligence).
> If indeed, the denial of essence is used as the fundamental building
> block, one still has to ascribe to a larger plan, since we all seem to
> negate essence in the same way.

A subjective agent without intelligence (cognitive awareness) is a misnomer.
"Subject" is defined as "the mind, ego, or agent that sustains or assumes
the form of thought or consciousness." So, again, unless the terms
"quality" and "subject" are strained by capricious definitions to suit the
author's purpose, their common epistemological meaning is inconsistent with
the MoQ thesis.

> The tail wagging the dog is accurate, if one supposes that individual
> sensibility is part of a much larger thing. That is, our ultimate
> expression
> is under the rule of certain laws. Quality attempts to explain what those
> rules are from the standpoint of morality. So indeed, we are being
> wagged, but this does not deny personal responsibility.

I beg to differ, Mark. If personal responsibililty embraces valuistic
judgments such as moral decisions, integrity, justice and compassion, the
individual must be free to exercise these judgments. But when you say we
survive and behave "because those are the demands of Quality", you are
suggesting that we're predetermined to act in accordance with the fixed laws
of Nature. This is a denial of the freedom that makes personal
responsibility possible.

Essentially speaking,
Ham

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

On 1/26 at 8:38PM, you said to Krimel:


> I may be wrong, but I believe Pirsig would answer the question
> of "why survive?" by saying "because those are the demands of
> Quality".

I'm afraid that's how he would have to answer it. And such an answer
reduces human sensibility to a tail wagged by Quality. The absurdity of
this convoluted ontology seems to have escaped Krimel. If Quality (Value)
"evolves to goodness" for its own sake, morality is fixed by Nature and man
is only an anomalous "pattern" in the evolutionary process. This makes the
individual life an automaton of the Source and denies meaning or purpose for
the life experience.

For the life of me, I fail to see how a philosophy that rejects the
subjective agent can offer spiritual or moral guidance to mankind. The best
moral axiom that can be drawn from the MoQ is "some things are better than
others". Since, in the last analysis, Quality's progression to Goodness is
automatic, the implied "directive" of a self-serving universe would seem to
be simply: "Go with the flow." Why do Pirsigians continue to parse the
"levels" of Quality for a more meaningful answer when no other analysis is
possible?

--Ham