[MD] Are there Bad Questions?

[Ham Priday]

Hi Matt:


> You say (later) that neither Steve nor Pirsig want to
> "confront metaphysics head-on," but Steve's saying
> confronting "metaphysics," as you've construed the discipline,
> head-on is like confronting a mist head-on: what you should
> do is blow it off to see the ground.

Nice analogy, Matt.  But if fundamental reality is a "mist", quality can't 
be more than angel dust.

Mr. Pirsig, the philosopher, didn't like the word "spirit" and claimed that 
his MoQ is "anti-theistic".  Referring to Caird's three stages in the 
development of religion, he says: "The MOQ would add a fourth stage where 
the term 'God' is completely dropped as a relic of an evil social 
suppression of intellectual and Dynamic freedom."   But he wanted to have it 
both ways: "The MOQ is an atheistic religious outlook that solves rather 
than bypasses religious problems. ...The MOQ is not just atheistic in this 
regard.  It is anti-theistic."  [Copleston notes]

Instead of trying to turn religion against God with "radical empiricism," 
Pirsig would have benefited by developing a metaphysical ontology on a 
non-deistic primary source.  His disdain for metaphysics is only partially 
due to the belief that definitions destroy the concept being defined.  He 
also feels, mistakenly, that empirically unprovable propositions are 
faith-based: "The MOQ does not rest on faith.  In the MOQ faith is very low 
quality stuff, a willingness to believe falsehoods."

But metaphysical hypotheses do not rest on faith, dogma, or religion.  They 
are reasoned conclusions based on logical deduction and intuitive insight 
that, when thought through, can lead to a plausible and coherent theory of 
reality.

After describing Bradley as a "mystic" because he maintained that the 
reality of the world is intellectually unknowable, Pirsig attempted to 
reconcile himself with Bradley's idealism in his last annotation:

"A singular difference is that the MOQ says the Absolute is of value, a 
point Bradley may have thought so obvious it didn't need mentioning.  The 
MOQ says that this value is not a property of the Absolute, it is the 
Absolute itself, and is a much better name for the Absolute than 'Absolute.' 
Rhetorically, the word "absolute" conveys nothing except rigidity and 
permanence and authoritarianism and remoteness.  'Quality,' on the other 
hand conveys flexibility, impermanence, here-and-now-ness and freedom.  And 
it is a word everyone knows and loves and understands - even butcher shops 
that take pride in their product.   Beyond that the term, 'value,' paves the 
way for an explanation of evolution that did not occur to Bradley.  He 
apparently avoided discussing the world of appearances except to emphasize 
the need to transcend it.  The MOQ returns to this world of appearances and 
shows how to understand these appearances in a more constructive way."  --  
[Copleston: RMP final note]

Regrettably, Pirsig couldn't see that ultimate reality does not reside in 
this "world of appearances", but that one must "transcend"--another word he 
didn't like--experiential existence in order to reveal it.

Essentially speaking,
Ham