[MD] The Greeks?

[Mary]

Hi Matt,

> 
> Hi Mary,
> 
> Mary said:
> Correct me if I'm wrong, but my sense is that you are in the
> DMB, et al, camp where the Intellectual Level is defined as
> symbol manipulation.
> 
> Matt:
> Stated as you have, I don't fall into a camp like that
> because of my insouciance about the Metaphysics of Quality
> as a systematic philosophy.  I generally talk about "Pirsig's
> philosophy" instead of "the MoQ" because I generally just
> like habits of thought and techniques when I do philosophy,
> not completed-looking machines like philosophical systems.
> I don't mean to be unduly eristical about it, but I'm wary
> about giving the wrong impressions.
> 
[Mary Replies] 
people here tend to fall into one of three camps.  There are those who feel
the philosophy fulfills a need in their lives or answers an important
question, another group views it as an academic philosophy to be evaluated
against its predecessors, while  a third rejects it yet finds value in
taking the time to ridicule or oppose.  No matter which group you are in,
you will find yourself offended by the point of view of the other two.  I
liken this to religion, where the most maddening thing you can say to a
religious person is that Jesus was nothing more than a wise man with
valuable insights to make.  Though certainly not an insult, those in the
first group will view you as a heretic beyond the pale while those in the
third will disagree that he said anything of particular value at all.  All
three groups are represented here and battle it out every day.


> But if we distinguish between "what Pirsig would say" from
> "what Pirsig should have said," a distinction between
> biography and philosophy, when I'm doing biography--when
> _anybody_ is doing biography--it isn't good policy to avoid
> what a person says because you don't like it.  Most people
> who write about Nazi Germany don't agree with what was
> done, but they try and get it right anyways.  So, Pirsig
> says "symbol manipulation," and perhaps he doesn't write
> a whole lot about it, but saying he "doesn't explain his
> reasoning" might be too strong a way of downplaying it.  I
> have no reason to be suspicious of its coherence with his
> philosophy because of what he did say about it (one reason
> why the historical narrative can be important to ferreting
> out its meaning, because of the dearth of exposition), and
> because of the way it integrates with most of the rest of
> what he said in Lila and Lila's Child.  But, on the other hand,
> I haven't read deeply into Pirsig's material in a long while (I
> haven't even seen the DVD), and am not currently
> concerned with writing biography about Pirsig, so I don't
> have a lot at stake in being right about that right now.  But
> I'll grant you, Pirsig's raised my hairs a few times.
> 
> Mary said:
> The question, though, is if so many firmly believe IPOVs are
> 'symbol manipulation', then at least one person should be
> able to explain how that makes the Intellectual Level differ
> from the Social.  What 'purpose of its own' does symbol
> manipulation serve?  That, at least, is where I would like to
> start.
> 
> Matt:
> Heh.  You sound like I did years ago when more concerned
> about Pirsig's levels. (Though I would avoid "one person
> should be able to explain..."  _Should_ someone be able to?
> How many people write here?  Does lack of cleverness or
> concern by those few tremulous souls who are here make
> one's own point?)  I'm not the dancing partner for you on
> this topic, but I used to rail on getting more clarification
> about where language fits in Pirsig's schematic, and how
> fitting it causes turbulence in the system once you realize
> how social it is (though I think Krimel's allusion to Pirsig's
> computer analogy is the right place to start).
> 
[Mary Replies] 
And herein lies the rub.  The crux of my question goes right to the heart of
the differences between the three groups I've described.  Depending on where
you are in your journey, you either will or will not find value in seeing
the nature of SOM as an insidious destroyer of equanimity.  If you find
personal meaning in the MoQ, the purpose of the Intellectual Level looms
large for this reason.  It is perhaps the central concept you have
attachment for.  You think that everyone should feel the enormity of
Pirsig's insights that you see, and are offended that they do not.  But this
is a mistake.  To rail against others who have not is unfair.  Would I be
understanding of that which I had not experienced?  If not, why should I
expect that of others?  The MoQ can be understood on many levels, and any of
them are better than none.  

> I'm not saying being systematic about it can't be done (I
> have my own ways of being systematic, but the first thing
> I do is not think about levels), but "what purpose of its
> own" is a nice challenge.  However, I'm not sure it would
> be directed towards "symbol manipulation," but rather the
> level as a whole--what is symbol manipulation the
> mechanism for?  Because if, say, "cellular replication" is
> the mechanism of the biological level, it doesn't make
> sense to wonder what its purpose is for--its replication.
> Purpose, I think, can only be determined at a higher level
> (which Pirsig implies, I think, in his reinterpretation of
> Darwin in Lila).
> 
[Mary Replies] 
A nice observation and a correct one.  It's unlikely that anything can
comprehend its own purpose within its own context.

> If I remember correctly, we talked about the levels in
> January.  And I wasn't very stimulating then, either.  The
> trouble I have, as I think I said then, is that once you start
> tinkering, the more I want to just wipe the slate and begin
> a different way.  But here's the last account I still find
> interesting enough to keep pasting into posts when people
> challenge me about levels:
> 
> Inorganic level - non-replicating persistence (e.g., rocks)
> Biological level - replicating persistence (e.g., cells)
> Social level - non-linguistic semiotic behavior (e.g., tigers)
> Intellectual level - linguistic semiotic behavior (e.g., humans)
> 
> And a fifth level for good measure:
> 
> Eudaimonic level - autonomous behavior (e.g., citizens of democracies)
> 
> You'll notice that since I call the social level "semiotic," I've
> dropped "symbolic" down into the social.  You'll also notice
> I've (successfully?) avoided mentioning subjects or objects.
> Or the ability of differentiation, for that matter now that I
> look at it.  If I thought hard enough about it, I think I could
> probably come up with a purpose for all of the levels, but I
> can only think of an interesting one for the fourth and fifth:
> "production of true sentences" and "happiness" respectively.
> And when you take in what I said about purpose above,
> that means we didn't know what the production of true
> sentences was for until relatively recently, probably not
> even in Greece at the time.  It's only in the last 200 or so
> years that we've figured out that we've been producing all
> these true sentences all these years to produce democracy
> (I think that was John Stuart Mill's answer).  And what is
> happiness for?  I believe that is what I would refer to as a
> "bad question."
> 
[Mary Replies] 
And so you have revealed yourself to lie within the second camp, Pirsig as
academically interesting.  No doubt you will satisfy some and infuriate
others, but as Pirsig said, "It's all Good", and I, for one, would not wish
upon you the burdens necessary to fall within the first camp.

Best,
Mary

> Matt