[MD] The Quality/MOQ meta-metaphysics

[skutvik at online.no]

Mary, Platt,  All. 

[dmb had said]
> > > I mean, the analytic knife has to cut somewhere so that even the
> > > DQ/sq distinction counts as a pair of opposites.

[Bo said] 
> > The great metaphysical revolution took place when everything became
> > Quality. Thus the DQ/SQ division is not anything like the S/O split
> > (mind you: the analytical knife always cuts S/O) but an internal
> > arrangement - the static levels are value levels - not like the S
> > and O that are worlds apart.

[Platt said]
> > If I understand correctly, you're saying that dualistic thinking
> > based on divisions and "cuts" is SOM. The MOQ revolution is the
> > transcendence of dualistic thinking by value understanding, not
> > another SOM (intellectual) theory.

At least "the knife" that P. speaks of in ZAMM was cutting S/O-ishly, 
i.e. intellectually, while intelligence in MOQ's service will cut DQ/SQ-
ishly. It may be dualistic, but without SOM's bleak and paradox-
inducing  consequences.      

> > In other words, the MOQ perspective reveals a world not of observers
> > and observed as seen from the dualistic viewpoint, but a world of
> > values..

Exactly.
 
> > In the value world, distinctions are made on a vertical/horizontal
> > axis whereby the vertical axis is the evolutionary value hierarchy
> > and the horizontal axis is a high-low value spectrum. In addition,
> > there's a creative force of dynamic value.

Sounds good. Regarding the vertical (diagram) I have maintained it 
regarding the MOQ. No "Reality=Quality" box that splits into DQ and 
SQ, merely "DQ " on top and "SQ" (connected with a line) under it, the 
latter may be internally and horizontally partitioned.  

> > In this way, the MOQ releases us from an illusory dualistic reality
> > to a value- experience reality where one does not automatically see
> > and say, "That's a small dog, or a brown and white dog, or a mixed
> > breed dog," but "That's a good dog," or better yet, simply "Ah, so."

Well, when on "the high metaphysical ground" this is may be so, but 
when back in the static realm - with intellect our base camp - we may 
speak/think like we used to, but the Q-knowledge remains.  

> > Am I on target?
 
[Mary Replies] 
> I think you are, Platt.  The so-called Dq/Sq split is not really a
> split for us at all since we cannot perceive DQ.  In the instant we do
> it has already become SQ, so there is no perceived split and no choice
> has been made.  It just is.  The analytical knife comes into play
> after the SQ has been perceived, at which point Pirsig is saying that
> the S/O split we choose to make is just that - a division we have
> chosen.  He tries to persuade us that there is another choice -
> perception as patterns of value. 

Even if DQ is ephemeral the DQ/SQ is the matrix when "on the high 
ground",  when back on the plains however our analysis may well be 
intellectual (S/O-ish) but no longer oppressed by SOM's metaphysical 
implications. 

Hope we - "the marvelous few" - agree here  ;-)    

> The S/O split devalues Quality, placing recognition of Quality as a
> lower form of perception than the recognition of the Subjects and
> Objects as entities in and of themselves.

Right SOM places qualities within the subjective realm and as such of 
secondary, dubious existence. Objectivity is its one sure criterion.    

> Pirsig points out that this is wrong, and has lead to our fundamental
> confusion on the whole subject.  When what is Quality is demoted to a
> subjective attribute then morals are relative, debatable, and no
> consistent 'opinion' can be hoped for.  When morals and value are
> demoted to the status of attribute, then the invention of the
> thermonuclear bomb had only 'relative' moral implications.  There was
> never a good reason not to do it.  If all the world is subjects and
> objects, then the discovery of any new 'object' is always "the good"
> since we live in a world where nothing has higher status than subjects
> contemplating objects. That's all there is.  It is only after the fact
> that we could debate the moral value of doing science in that
> direction, and this debate was weak from the start since it could only
> deal with a subjective, relative morality, not a universal one.

Wow! Quite "chautauqua" ;-) 
  

Bodvar