[MD] The Quality/MOQ meta-metaphysics

[Dan Glover]

Hello everyone

On Sat, Jun 19, 2010 at 9:54 AM,  <plattholden at gmail.com> wrote:
> On 18 Jun 2010 at 15:52, Dan Glover wrote:
>
>> Platt:
>> But, with all due respect, DQ isn't something we
>> > perceive. That's SOM. Seen from the MOQ perspective DQ is the both the
>> > perceiver and the perceived prior to becoming SQ. There is no separation
>> > between you and your experience. As Erwin Schrodinger put it: "The external
>> > world and consciousness are one and the same thing."
>>
>> Dan:
>> I think you've been reading Bo's posts for too long, my friend. SOM
>> this and SOL that. Very confusing. Rather, I tend to agree with Robert
>> Pirsig's simple and harmonious statements:
>>
>> "Dynamic Quality is defined constantly by everyone.
>> Consciousness can be described is a process of defining Dynamic
>> Quality. But once the definitions emerge, they are static patterns and
>> no longer apply to Dynamic Quality. So one can say correctly that
>> Dynamic Quality is both infinitely definable and undefinable because
>> definition never exhausts it." [Robert Pirsig, LILA'S CHILD]
>>
>> How could we define Dynamic Quality if we cannot perceive it?
>
> Hi Dan,
>
> DQ cannot be an object of subject's "perception" because DQ comes prior to all
> such S/O intellectual patterns. "Quality is a direct experience independent of
> and prior to intellectual abstractions." (Lila, 5)

Dan:
Dynamic Quality is not an object. You're doing little more here than
playing language games and grasping at straws.

>Platt:
> The only way to avoid the  S/O fall out from DQ is to understand (mystically)
> that there's no division between me and what I perceive, i.e., what I perceive
> is actually I-perceiving. Otherwise, all perceptions are something I have. Then
> I'm forced to say that I perceive myself. Now, who is this I that perceives
> myself? Another self -- a second self? And who has this perception of a second
> self? A third self? How many selves must I postulate?
>
> Yes, you're right to say that it's necessary to fall into SOM in order to
> define DQ. But, as Pirsig pointed out, "(SOM reasoning) doesn't tell us
> anything about the essence of the MOQ." (LC, Note 132). Likewise, perceiving DQ
> doesn't tell us anything about the essence of DQ.

Dan:

Okay, lets say we can't perceive Dynamic Quality. There are more no
surprises in life, nothing new under the sun. There is no hope for
better. There is no sense of awe at the sight of a sunrise, no
appreciation of art. No music. No poetry. Plenty of philosophy though,
and two plus two still equals four.

Now tell me, do you really want to live in that kind of world?

Thank you,

Dan