[MD] The Quality/MOQ meta-metaphysics

[Ham Priday]

Hi Dan --

[Ham, previously]:
> Platt is using "perception" as synonomous with direct
> "experience", while Pirsig is talking about "consciously
> defined" experience.
>
> Perception is defined as; "a RESULT of perceiving;
> observation (concept); a capacity for comprehension."
> Experience is defined as "the conscious perception
> (apprehension) of reality; direct participation in events."
> Clearly "perception" is somewhat ambiguous in the context
> of experience, which is why I prefer "sensibility" when
> speaking of primary or "undefined" perception.

[Dan]:
> Hello Ham. I'm sorry, but I fail to see the contradiction.
> Could you spell it out more clearly, please?

I'll try, Dan.  But since the semantic arguments presented by you and Platt 
may have different connotations than they do for me, my explication will be 
clearer if I do it conceptually, rather than attempting to interpret the 
language of Pirsig.

Fascination, attraction, and a sense of awe or "wonderment" have sometimes 
been expressed by the word "agape".  Here's how Wiki's encyclopedia defines 
it:

"Agápe (αγάπη agápē) means 'love' in modern day Greek, such as in the term 
s'agapo (Σ'αγαπώ), which means 'I love you'.  In Ancient Greek, it often 
refers to a general affection or deeper sense of 'true love' rather than the 
attraction suggested by 'eros'.  Agape is used in the biblical passage known 
as the 'love chapter', 1 Corinthians 13, and is described there and 
throughout the New Testament as sacrificial love.  Agape is also used in 
ancient texts to denote feelings for a good meal, one's children, and the 
feelings for a spouse.  It can be described as the feeling of being content 
or holding one in high regard."

What is "valued" is also "desired", and I view 'agape' as the subjective 
component of 'desideratum', which is "the object desired as essential."  In 
existence, the dynamics of desire always takes the form of a dichotomy (eg., 
self/other, subject/object, sensibility/beingness).  Sartre expressed this 
phenomenon as "wanting the being of the other for oneself."  I would not 
have associated this valuistic affinity with quality, except for Pirsig's 
equation: Quality = Value.  I'm also aware that Pirsig refers to 'Arete', 
the Greek term for “virtue” which in the Aristotelian sense is a measure of 
how well something fulfills its intended use (Ergon).

I believe all these terms relate to what Pirsig means (but refused to 
define) in his Metaphysics of Quality.  The difference in Essentialism is 
that what Pirsig regarded as primary or direct "experience" I call 
"value-sensibiity".  This sensibility is not the experience one feels by 
sitting on a hot stove.  Rather, it's the attraction (or repulsion) of the 
individual psyche to the otherness surrounding him at any given moment or 
position in space/time.  This "undefined" value-awareness is always present 
as the subjective ground of experience, and it's what reveals discrete 
objects and events to us in terms of their relative virtues -- pleasure, 
goodness, contentment, worthiness, beauty, order, magnificence, 
meaningfulness, and so on.   In other words, we exist in constant awe of 
what we "attend to"; and what we attend to becomes our experience of 
reality.

> The MOQ states that subjects and objects are convenient
> shorthand for patterns of value. Dynamic Quality senses the
> individual, not the other way around.

Sorry, but I cannot buy into that epistemology.  As I do not impute 
cognizance or sensibility to Value (other than my own), it makes no sense to 
me.  Value is the desire we realize for what we as individuated creatures 
are denied -- namely, absolute essentiality.  Let me set this in large type, 
for I've stated it many times:  UNREALIZED VALUE DOES NOT EXIST.  The 
essentialist believes that the meaning and purpose of life is to realize the 
value of the "not-other" which is the ultimate source of all otherness.

> I think the MOQ states that Quality has Lila, not the
> other way around. The MOQ does subscribe to the
> notion that man is the measure but this doesn't refer to
> an individual man but rather man as in mankind (or
> humankind for those of the PC persuasion).

I think the phrase "Quality has Lila" was another of Pirsig's euphemisms, 
not to be taken literally.  You'll have to fill me in on the significance of 
"PC persuasion", but if the individual is rejected there is no subjective 
sensibility, hence no realized value.

> As for the "individual," Robert Pirsig states:
> "It’s important to remember that both science and Eastern
> religions regard “the individual” as an empty concept.
> It is literally a figure of speech. If you start assigning a
> concrete reality to it, you will find yourself in a philosophic
> quandary." [LILA'S CHILD]

I don't consider self-awareness or subjectivity "concrete", nor do I find 
myself in a "philosophic quandary."  The ontological problem I do confront 
in these discussions, however, is that the only divisions the MoQist accepts 
are his own intellectually-defined levels and patterns, whereas the 
Essentialist acknowledges difference as essential to value realization.

Incidentally, you can ignore the point I made about Pirsig making Quality 
its own standard, as it pales in comparison to his rejection of the 
subjective self.

Thanks for your clarification of the official doctrine, Dan.  I'm sorry that 
my worldview is problematic for the Pirsigians, but as you say, "we [each] 
have a different way of viewing reality."  However, I continue to search for 
issues where some measure of accord is possible.

Essentially yours,
Ham