[MD] MD Looking for the Primary Difference

[Scott Roberts]

Case,

<skip -- on regulating/regualted by misunderstanding>

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[Case]
You offered up this from Chalmers on "what is consciousness":

"[Consciousness] is perhaps best characterized as "the subjective quality of
experience". When we perceive, think, or act, there is a whirr of causation
and information processing, but this processing does not usually go on in
the dark. There is an internal aspect; there is something it feels like to
be a cognitive agent. This internal aspect is conscious experience.
Conscious experience ranges from vivid color sensations to experiences of
the faintest background aromas; from hard-edged pains to the elusive
experience of thoughts on the tip of one's tongue;..."

Since this is appears to be a description of individual consciousness you
offer this for Consciousness with a big "C":

Scott: "As I see it, what characterizes it in general is its dynamic/static
(formlessness/form, continuity/change, etc.) contradictory identity, which
is also to be found in value and intellect."

These seem to me at least, to be two very different things. Which is why I
have problem with labeling the central undefined. Each term you slap on it
seems to spin it differently. When you say, "I've said that Consciousness,
Quality, and Intellect are three names for the same (non-)thing, which of
course also goes by the name of Tao."

Are you really saying that these terms are equal and synonymous or that they
describe different aspects of the same "non-thing"? And please don't get me
started on the definitions of static and dynamic again.

Scott:
They refer to different aspects.

On the two "definitions" (Chalmers' and mine) I don't see them as referring 
to two different things. The Chalmers' description is, as you noted, just 
attempting to identify what is referred to by 'consciousness' 
pre-philosophically. My big 'C' remark is how I think of consciousness 
philosophically. That is, I am saying that this dynamic/static contradictory 
identity is "what is going on" in each of Chalmers' examples, and of course 
in every perceptive, conceptual, affective, and conative event.

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Back to the talk of Brains and Consciousness:

Scott:
I'm not so sure it is analog. A neuron fires or doesn't -- as far as I am
aware, there is no gradation of strength of firing that matters. But
supposing there is a pattern of neuron firings that is an analog (from our
perspective). [...]

[Case]
I think it is pretty clear that the brain computes in analog rather than
digital fashion. However things get stored or processed, it would seem there
is some direct correspondence between the thing and the thing stored. For
this to be digital there would have to be coding and decoding taking place.
Secondly, while neurons do seem to fire or not fire in binary fashion,
strength of firing may be relevant. Current of varying strength would effect
the neurotransmitters in the synapses differently and neural activity is
chemical as well as electrical. Neurotransmitters are mysterious critters.
We have only identified and studied a handful of them and each of them seems
to play a roles in whether or not neurons fires. It is possible for example
that actual encoding is on the chemical level rather than the electrical
level. Since this would be a relatively more static model that sounds likely
but then I am not a neuroscientist.

Scott:
Ok, let it be analog (I really don't know). This does not affect my 
argument, however (repeated here):

My question is: how is that pattern perceived. Well, the first
bit goes to one neuron, then the next to another, and so on. But there is no
grasping that the two (or a zillion) are connected into some whole, since
the result of the first transmittal is separate from the result of the
second, and so on. To combine them, the first two (or zillion) have to send
their data (one bit at a time) somewhere, which just repeats the initial
situation. Note that nothing changes in this argument by considering
parallel versus serial transmission, or whether the basic "unit" is
something other than a firing neuron, and so on. Given spatio-temporal
separation there can be no perceiving of anything larger than the output of
the basic unit.


Case continued earlier:
Among the brain's capabilities is the ability to record and recall
experiences from the past. That is sensory experience occurs as a result of
electo-chemical activity inside the neural network. These patterns of
electro chemical activities are preserved inside the network and can be
replayed or perhaps they resonate continuously inside the network.

Scott responded:
I strongly suspect that 100 billion nerve cells with 1000 to 10,000
connections isn't enough to store all that data. One would need several
nerve cells to store one bit so that it can also be retrieved more than
once. In any case, I recommend (if you can find it, maybe in a university
library) a book called "Dismantling the Memory Machine" by H. A. Bursen, to
see how dubious is the idea that all the sensory data is simply stored and
retrieved as it is in a computer.

[Case]
Empirical analysis! I see progress...

Here is an interesting take on cerebral processing power. I trust you are
better able to evaluate it than I:
http://www.geocities.com/rnseitz/The_Great_Gray_Ravelled_Knot.htm

The attempt to translate brain activity directly into bytes seems to be
stretching the analogy a bit. But it is interesting. For purposes of a more
direct comparison: Dolphin brains are larger than human brains. The dolphins
brain to body weight ratio is very similar to that of humans. One
explanation for the difference in cognitive ability between the two species,
beyond the obvious environmental differences, is that dolphins rely
primarily on sound and humans on vision. It is likely that visual data can
be processed and stored more efficiently in wetware than sound.

Scott:
I'll retract the suspicion on processing power, since it is not relevant to 
my objection. Say a past event is stored in synapses, or whatever. To 
perceive it (e.g., in recalling the past event), something has to read it. 
That something is made up of synapses. Where is the big picture seen?

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Scott replied:
This does not answer my objection. The "mingling" you mention has to happen
one bit at a time (or separated by space). How is there consciousness of
anything bigger than a bit?

[Case]
As I said talking about bits in the brain is pushing the analogy too far.
What you are really talking about is whether or not time is continuous or
discrete. I pruned that from this discussion and you rightly put it back. I
have turned it into a new thread.

Scott:
It's related -- will discuss in the other thread.

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Case continued:
After all inside the neural network, space and time are recreated, replayed,
sorted, and shuffled. I would say that we as individuals are restricted to
the interior of this network as homunculi. Our access to the world of
objects is limited to their persistent knocking on our doors.

Scott said:
In other words, you haven't solved the homunculus problem. Further, you have
reinstated Kant. And in that vein, how do you know that the "world of
objects" is spatio-temporal, or indeed, that it consists of objects (one of
which is the brain that is supposedly modeling itself).

[Case]
I have said on several occasions that I don't think the homunculus problem
is solvable. I must of have missed the memo where Kant was uninstated. As
for this spatio-temporal thing I have said constantly in this thread that I
do not regard the matter as settled or necessarily limiting. You continue to
present it as a stumbling block, why? I thought the comment below put it
pretty succinctly. But again your objection seems to center on Time.

Scott:
I don't recall your saying it -- and I think I would have noticed if you 
had. I say this because that is the whole issue. My objection ("how can 
there be awareness of anything bigger than...") IS the homunculus problem. 
It was created by Cartesian dualism. It persists in materialism, but not in 
idealism. So now you are telling me that it is unsolvable IN YOUR 
METAPHYSICS. So why not change your metaphysics?

You uninstated Kant by saying that the brain copies external objects into 
internal representations. Kant denied this, holding that the internal 
representations are determined by the subject, that the objective world is 
unknowable. And it looked like you were reinstating it when you said "Our 
access to the world of objects is limited to their persistent knocking on 
our doors", but I guess not.

Case continued:
But transcendence of space and time are the result of the brain's ability to
allow multiple temporal representations to exist simultaneously. The result
is space in no-space and time in no-time or "the color blue."

Scott said:
They may well exist simultaneously, but what is "seeing" them as a whole?
And are you after all this now agreeing with me that it is perception that
creates space and time? If so, why do you need a theory of emergence?, and
more important, why are you trying to explain perception in terms of
spatio-temporal objects?

[Case]
I don't think perception creates space and time I think it records it. What
is created is a representation of "world of objects." A theory of emergence
is needed in order for consciousness at this level to occur. You need
something sufficiently complex to create the recording.

Scott:
Well, you're back at expounding what Dennett calls the "Cartesian Theater". 
That's the source of the homunculus problem.

Case continued:
You might answer that at some early stage in cosmology entire contents of
the universe performs this function and that what we have at the current
level of complexity is a ripple of the over all process. Or that
consciousness is self similar across scale and at this scale this is what we
get.

If that were your position I would have to say maybe. But one could as
easily say consciousness could not exist at until matter became sufficiently
complex to allow the recording and playback to occur.

In either case the "what is seeing" is the nexus were these multiple
representations collide or are in phase with each other.

Scott:
Recording is not the problem. It is being aware of what is being recorded 
that is the problem. And -- once more -- if the nexus is a system of bits 
(synapses, atoms, whatever) each separated from all the others, how is 
awareness of anything larger than a bit possible?

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Case continued:
You seem to be saying that consciousness causes this complex set of
interactions to occur and pushes nature in this evolutionary direction. Or
that once brain stuff is here consciousness jumps on board rather like a
hermit crab snags a shell for a home. I see it as property that emerges
because our environment supports complex interactions.

Scott said:
I'm not saying the second (I don't like dualism). Nor is the first workable,
as I don't distinguish between consciousness and "nature". I would say that
consciousness (or Consciousness) evolved so that it could express itself in
the language of space, time, and mass. This isn't some final achievement,
though, as there are no doubt many other ways it can evolve.

[Case]
How does this notion of consciousness evolving differ from consciousness
emerging. Typically folks who talk about consciousness say it is eternal and
unchanging. While I see a difference between evolving and emerging I can't
see at as a very big difference.

Scott:
Because as consciousness evolves, so does nature. The original participators 
lived in a different world than we do. It is only when it evolved to the 
state where nature appeared to us to be void of spirit that one could 
imagine that there was a time without consciousness, and hence the need to 
invent a theory of emergence.



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Case continued:
After all I am the only being in the universe that I am certain has blue
sensations. I have to take your word for it when you say that you do. If
someday Commander Data says he sees blue who am I to argue. The Turing test
and all that.

Scott said:
The Turing test wouldn't answer the question -- the computer could be
regulating, not producing, consciousness.

[Case]
Granted but I thought you denied the possibility of a digital consciousness
in principle.

Scott:
I do. I very much doubt that anything will ever pass the Turing test. But 
for the sake of argument, I was just pointing out that even if something 
did, it wouldn't settle anything.

- Scott