[MD] MD 4th level - The more autonomous level

[Arlo Bensinger]

Platt,

You make an interesting claim in your last post (in this thread). Namely 
that "consciousness" is categorically distinct from "it's contents". Into 
the category "contents" you place what I referred to as "the shared 
experiences of culture, appropriated as the individual gains the ability to 
manipulate symbols", and I would imagine (you can clarify) that you also 
place the symbolically represented experiences of the specific individual.

In doing so, you seem to place "consciousness" as an attribute of biology 
(if not specifically genetic). You say, "consciousness is the same for 
Arlo, Ham, me, the beautiful Dihi, and the man over there behind the tree". 
You do seem to state outright that "consciousness" is a function of 
genetics saying it is the "ability to symbolize and create patterns of 
meaning through symbols is characteristic of the human brain, a highly 
developed bundle of nerve tissue."

To sum, "consciousness" is something we are born with, is a function of the 
genetic neurobiological makeup of the human brain, and matures in parallel 
to the physical maturation of the brain.

Neanderthal man, Arlo, and the DIHI would all have the same (meaning 
equivalent) consciousness by virtue of our human DNA. Is this correct so far?

The "contents" of our consciousness, which differ then from said 
Neanderthal, Arlo and that beautiful DIHI, differ so because of the 
cultural system and social latches they are surrounded with, including 
language, tools, books, and the way they apply these tools to their own 
unique proprietary experience. Would that be an adequate statement?

A couple of questions, to begin, in the evolutionary MOQ, the 
"intellectual" level Pirsig describes as mediated by the social. In direct 
terms, Pirsig says the social evolves out of the biological, and the 
intellectual evolves out the social. In your call to rename the 
"intellectual" level the "individual", would it not make more sense given 
the above (consciousness emerges directly from biology, and is then filled 
with "contents" somehow derived from social patterns), to place the 
"intellectual level" above the biological level, and then the social level 
on top? If not, why? Your position states clearly that "consciousness" 
comes directly from biology (neurobiological structures), and it is only 
afterwards that this consciousness is "filled with contents" based on the 
specific social-cultural mediated experiences of the individual. Indeed, in 
your post you say (about consciousness), "[I] think this ability [symbolic 
represenation] comes naturally to human beings because it is this specific 
ability that enabled them to survive and form societies in the first 
place." Human consciousness, that which is independent of social-cultural 
happenstance, is biological and predates the emergence of social level 
patterns. Therefore the "individual" level would be more apt to be between 
the biological and the social. Yes? No?

Or, would it not be more appropriate to rename the "biological level" 
itself the "individual level", since it is at the level of biology that 
"consciousness" exists? If it is NOT at the biological level that 
consciousness exists, how could the Neanderthal, Arlo and the stunningly 
attractive DIHI all have the same (equivalent) consciousness?

Finally, in response to Pirsig's assertion that ""The mythos-over-logos 
argument points to the fact that each child is born as ignorant as any 
caveman. What keeps the world from reverting to the Neanderthal with each 
generation is the continuing, ongoing mythos, transformed into logos but 
still mythos, the huge body of common knowledge that unites our minds as 
cells are united in the body of man. To feel that one is not so united, 
that one can accept or discard this mythos as one pleases, is not to 
understand what the mythos is", you reply, "What is now common knowledge or 
"mythos" developed from the striving of creative individuals -- one 
inspired idea at a time."

You continue to miss, perhaps deliberately, the point made by Pirsig. 
Namely that your so-called "striving individuals" do not strive in 
isolation from the collective consciousness, the huge body of common 
knowledge that unites our minds. Indeed, that "striving" is (1) made 
possible by the collective consciousness (without the collective 
consciousness, the huge body of common knowledge uniting our minds, Pirsig 
would not have had the ability to formulate the MOQ. He was able to 
formulate the MOQ by virtue of his appropriation of the collective 
consciousness at a point in the historical dialogue where it became 
possible to say what he says. A Neanderthal, for example, would be 
completely unable to formulate the MOQ, because the MOQ is an outgrowth of 
a historical-social evolution). If Edison, for another example, were born 
200 years earlier, we would not have had the telephone earlier. If Edison 
were killed as a child, we would not still be relying on horse delivered 
correspondences. At any given point in the historical-social dialogue of 
the collective consciousness, there is potentiality. That potentiality is 
fulfilled by individuals, to be sure, but individuals are not "free" to act 
irrespective of this potential.

Arlo