[MD] MD 4th level - The more autonomous level

[Platt Holden]

Arlo,

This instant messaging Horse has provided is great. We can carry on a more 
realistic "conversation" this way. All that's missing is the beer.

> Platt,
> 
> Have some free time this afternoon, so I get to respond to this pretty
> quickly.
> 
> First, to clarify, you are suggesting that "consciousness" is an attribute
> of existence, that all things have consciousness. Would you then state that
> the difference between the consciousness of "Platt" and "Platt's cat" is
> strictly one of "contents"? As you say, "Everything has consciousness to
> one degree or another" would seem to imply that differences have to do with
> content, yes?

The differences also have to do with the size of the "window" to 
consciousness, yours and mine being larger than my cat's, and much larger 
than an atom's. 

> Or restated, is your consciousness greater than your cat's "in kind" or "in
> content"? If "in kind", is that difference genetic-neurobiological, owing
> to the genetic differences between cat's brains and Platt's brains? If "in
> content", what about the content of your consciousness makes it greater
> than your cat's?

The size of the window to consciousness is related to the size & 
complexity of the brain. So, yes. 

> You say, "We all have the same "window on" consciousness, i.e., we all
> experience", does this include your cat too? Does he "experience"? Or is it
> a different "kind" of experience?

He experiences, too. I guess he experiences differently due to 1) the 
narrowness of his "window" and 2) the things that are of value 
particularly to cats. 

> If I understand correctly, you answer this when you say, "Experience exists
> at all levels. Consciousness exists at all levels. My cat experiences. He
> is conscious, but I dare say the content of his conscious is somewhat less
> than mine. But regardless, he doesn't belong at the intellectual level
> because he's unable to form ideas, i.e., symbols that stand for patterns of
> meaning."
> 
> So, this gets back to the crux of the question at hand. I attribute the
> greater content of your consciousness to social mediation (as does Pirsig),
> you attribute it to genetic neurobiogical structures that create and use
> symbols apart from any contact with other people whatsoever.

Well, I would say it's partly because of my brain size, partly because of 
social contacts, and partly because of memories of my personal experiences 
that contribute to my greater content of consciousness.

> For Pirsig, remember, the content your consciousness is dependent on the
> collective consciousness. He says, "The mythos-over-logos argument points
> to the fact that each child is born as ignorant as any caveman. What keeps
> the world from reverting to the Neanderthal with each generation is the
> continuing, ongoing mythos, transformed into logos but still mythos, the
> huge body of common knowledge that unites our minds as cells are united in
> the body of man. To feel that one is not so united, that one can accept or
> discard this mythos as one pleases, is not to understand what the mythos
> is."
> 
> That is, without the "huge body of common knowledge that unites our minds
> as cells are united in the body of man", Platt would be no different than a
> caveman.
> 
> To my question, In your call to rename the "intellectual" level the
> "individual", would it not make more sense given the above (consciousness
> emerges directly from biology, and is then filled with "contents" somehow
> derived from social patterns), to place the "intellectual level" above the
> biological level, and then the social level on top? If not, why?
> 
> You answered, "Because Pirsig is speaking in generalities, not about the
> particular proprietary experience of individuals."
> 
> I'm not sure I understand this. Your opinion is that he's "saying"
> intellect emerged out of social patterns, but this is a generalization that
> really means "intellectual patterns" emerged out of... what? Biology? Since
> you've stated that no social mediation is necessary for the development of
> intellectual patterns (something opposite of what Pirsig has said), from
> where do intellectual patterns arise? Are you suggesting a hierarchy that
> removes the social pattern layer altogether?

Not at all. I think a person's intellectual patterns arise from 1) her 
brain's innate ability to create symbols and arrange them in patterns of 
meaning, and 2) her unique personal experiences. When those experiences 
include contact with others, they are bound to affect the intellectual 
patterns she creates. Pirsig, speaking in generalities as all philosophies 
must do, sees that most people experience living in groups which affect 
the intellectual patterns they hold. Keep in mind that intellect began 
when humans began and was around during the entire period when the mythos 
ruled. If is only recently that intellect grew to dominate the "mythos" 
and become the fourth level.   

> You continue, "The contents of an individual's consciousness is derived
> mostly from memories of unique personal experiences, not from generalized
> social patterns such as language."
 
> This is patently false. Helen Keller, for example, had describe her
> pre-linguistic state as an unformed black mass, nothing but sensation after
> sensation. Her unique experience was that she was linguistically oriented
> before she lost her sight and hearing, and she lost the ability to think
> (her description). Not until she was given social symbols, through and with
> interactions with others, was she able to orient her thought with symbols.

I hate to disagree with Helen Keller but most people are not deaf, dumb 
and blind. 

> Pirsig's "green flash of the sun" story is one more example of how a
> cultural milieu (which includes but is not limited to language) structures
> the individual to "see" certain things, and to reprent them in culturally
> meaningful ways, while ignoring other things. Another example, studies done
> among rural farming villages in southeastern Russia revealed that when
> given the following pictures (a saw, a hammer, an axe and a log) the
> villagers were unable to see a categorical distinction among them. The
> classic "one of these things is not like the other" failed because THEIR
> conceptualization did not separate "tool" from "use". The log, they said,
> had to be included in that list because what good is an axe if there is no
> wood.
> 
> The point is that language just doesn't provide neutral names for things
> the individual might experience, it provides the ability TO represent
> experience symbolically, while at the same time structuring this process
> into culturally meaningful (socially oriented) representations.

I don't doubt for a minute that culture influences people's thoughts. All 
I'm saying is that I have experiences which are uniquely mine as an 
individual that neither you nor anyone else can possible have in exactly 
the same way.   

> You have obviously bought into the myth Pirsig describes as such, "Science
> and reason, this myth goes, come only from the objective world, never from
> the social world. The world of objects imposes itself upon the mind with no
> social mediation whatsoever." Obviously Pirsig is wise enough to see that
> the world of objects imposes itself on the mind through social mediation.
> Thought comes from social mediation, not from the world of objects. I think
> Pirsig is right about this, you do, of course, disagree.

No, I agree that others affect me and the way I think. But it is the 
individual who thinks something different and unlike anybody else that 
creates the mythos. You look at its static aspect.  I prefer to look at 
its dynamic aspect which comes only from individuals, one new intellectual 
pattern at a time.

> Finally, you say, "My point all along has been that the mythos exists only
> because at each and every step of development, someone was first, followed
> by another and another."
> 
> And my point all along has been that at each and every step of development,
> that "someone" did not walk alone. If s/he did, s/he'd be walking like a
> caveman. And that from all these "steps" emerges a trail, that no "one"
> person could've forged, or conceived of, or contain. A trail, such as
> "calculus", that is greater than any "one" the same way a symphony is
> greater than any "note".

Like I said, you look at the static trail. I took at the trail blazer that 
creates the trail. 

Are we getting anywhere, I just having fun -- not that there's anything 
wrong with that. :-)

Platt