[MD] MD Quality, DQ and SQ

[Scott Roberts]

Ian,

> Ian said:
>
> Scott, if you're using materialism as a broad naturalism /
> physicalism, then no problem. But the word has narrower "substantial"
> connotations for most people, in common usage.
>
> Scott:
> I assume you are not referring to the non-philosophical meaning of
> materialism (as in, seeking happiness by having lots of material goods),
> since that certainly isn't dead. So I still don't know what you are
> referring to when you say "materialism is dead". Most people are
> mind/matter
> dualists.

[IG] I know, and I think part of the problem is the "substantial"
connotation behind the word material in any of it's uses, even in
carefully guarded philosophical ivory towers. It's the word that needs
killing off. Language evolves. Meanings are never usefully reserved
for long. Materialism is dead in the sense it no longer has any value.

Scott:
Well, I see the problem in that there are two meanings to the word 
'material' and to the word 'physical' -- but since they are often used 
interchangeably, I'll focus on the latter. The first meaning, call it 
physical[1] means what we sense with bodily sense organs (to leave out, say, 
'sense of value'). The second, physical[2], is what physics has formulated 
as models to explain and predict what happens in physical[1]. The thing is 
that before quantum physics these were pretty much the same, that 
hypothesized atoms, for example, were taken to be the same sort of thing as 
dust particles, just much smaller. They existed in spacetime in the same 
way, for example. And of course all that changes with quantum physics.

The thing is, when you conclude with statements like

"Evolved forms of consciousness and living-socio-cultural-intellectual 
patterns have both emerged together - in fact consciousness and intellegence 
etc, are just such evolved patterns. The MoQ is spot on, Where's the 
problem?"

the problem is that this whole mind set of emergence came to be when 
'physical' meant 'physical[1]'. But with quantum physics, one cannot assume 
the Newtonian view of space and time as being an objective basis for 
understanding origins. That is, if, as you quote Deutsch: "but Deutsch 
addresses that - time and causality are the seriously weird issues getting 
in the way of common sense explanations here", all the Darwinian business 
becomes questionable as well. Granted, that does not in itself provide 
license for the sort of thing I am espousing, but it does highlight that 
Darwinist explanations of consciousness have no evidential basis either. 
(For more on why I do espouse what I do, see the companion post).

Scott said:
> Out of curiosity, since you seem sympathetic to Dennett, does
> this mean you reject Chalmers? I ask, since Dennett seems to me to be the
> most prominent example of someone who Chalmers would accuse of "not taking
> consciousness seriously".

[IG] - My main project at the moment is to resolve Dennett / Chalmers
differences. I have a lot of time for both of them. Dennett for me
falls far short of explaining consciousness (what it is, how it
works), despite staunchly supporting the neo-Darwinist explanation of
how it evolved naturally. His best explanation (like Blackmore) seems
to be that what we call consciousness is just an "illusion". That I
don't buy.

Scott:
Good.

Ian continues:
Chalmers on the other hand - I agree with the proposition that the
"subjective aspect" of consciousness remains to be explained (the
so-called hard problem). I also agree with him (like Deutsch) that a
high-quality explanation may not look much like the traditional
reductive logical causal chains of reasoning some conservative people
would hope for. What I don't buy from Chalmers are his Zombie thought
experiments - I'm still struggling with "supervenience" and with
"possibility" (metaphysical, conveivable, logical and physical) (also
considered by Deutsch) - but for me Chalmers' thought experiments beg
all the key questions in their initial assumptions, so I believe they
simply mislead.

Scott:
The thing I would question about Chalmers is: if the problem is so hard, why 
not question the presupposition that makes it a problem in the first place? 
That presupposition, of course, is the belief that consciousness is an 
addition to a world that existed without it (and would revert to a world 
without it if all life forms were extinguished). Hence the need on Chalmers' 
part for diving into supervenience and such.

Ian continued:
Interestingly, I'm just reading Dennett's "Sweet Dreams". Unlike me
Dennett is very anti what he sees as "new-age physics" providing
answers to ancient philosophical questions. He's right in the sense
that anyone claiming that uncertainty or non-locality or entanglement
explains the mysterious mental-stuff amidst all the matter-stuff. What
I think Dennett has missed, is that this stuff is gradually explaining
that there is only one stuff of nature underlying all evolved levels -
mental or material - I call it "information" (after Deutsch and all
the latest Dirac interpretations). (Hence my aversion to the
misleading word material...)

Scott:
Yes, QM does not explain consciousness. But then Dennett and Chalmers both 
start from the position that consciousness needs explaining, an attitude 
that originated back when materialism was NOT dead, that thought that the 
perceptual contents of consciousness (physical[1]) were the the one true 
objective reality.

- Scott