[MD] MD Quality, DQ and SQ

ian glendinning psybertron at gmail.com
Sun Dec 18 04:40:20 PST 2005


Scott, inserted again ...

On 12/16/05, Scott Roberts <jse885 at localnet.com> wrote:
> Ian,
>
> > Scott:
> > Well, I see the problem in that there are two meanings to the word
> > 'material' and to the word 'physical' -- but since they are often used
> > interchangeably, I'll focus on the latter. The first meaning, call it
> > physical[1] means what we sense with bodily sense organs (to leave out,
> > say,
> > 'sense of value'). The second, physical[2], is what physics has formulated
> > as models to explain and predict what happens in physical[1]. The thing is
> > that before quantum physics these were pretty much the same, that
> > hypothesized atoms, for example, were taken to be the same sort of thing
> > as
> > dust particles, just much smaller. They existed in spacetime in the same
> > way, for example. And of course all that changes with quantum physics.
>
> [IG] Agreed. Let's not get pedantic. 2 meanings, multiple meanings,
> whatever - all I'm saying for the fourth time is that despite the
> arrival of quantum physics the very root of the word material carries
> ancient and mis-leading connotations of something substantial. That's
> all.
>
> Scott:
> And I'm saying that you haven't overcome all the ancient and misleading
> connotations.

[IG] Jeez. Of course I have, that's why I'm very sensitive to the
misleading arguments that arise. But please let's stick to the
subject.

>
> >Scott said:
> > The thing is, when you conclude with statements like
> >
> > "Evolved forms of consciousness and living-socio-cultural-intellectual
> > patterns have both emerged together - in fact consciousness and
> > intellegence
> > etc, are just such evolved patterns. The MoQ is spot on, Where's the
> > problem?"
> >
> > the problem is that this whole mind set of emergence came to be when
> > 'physical' meant 'physical[1]'. But with quantum physics, one cannot
> > assume
> > the Newtonian view of space and time as being an objective basis for
> > understanding origins. That is, if, as you quote Deutsch: "but Deutsch
> > addresses that - time and causality are the seriously weird issues getting
> > in the way of common sense explanations here", all the Darwinian business
> > becomes questionable as well.
>
> [IG] - It might provide such doubt, true, but there has been plenty of
> stuff since that simply re-inforces the evolutionary fundamentals - so
> the doubt is dispelled. I buy ths idea that time and causation may be
> seriously more weird than our folk-views, but I don't buy the idea,
> that all ideas of process of change over time will therefore be
> totally invalid. Disbelief remains suspended (for now), but as you go
> on to say, that would be no argument anyway. I can't believe your
> prior-consciousness-based arguments would be any less undermined by
> such a twist of time and causality than my natural physics ?
>
> Scott:
> But I don't say that consciousness is "prior". That's Ham-talk. What I say
> is that evolution is the evolution of consciousness (/value/intellect). The
> forms that result are SPOV, including the form called spacetime.

[IG] Good, so do I, if we're using the words Value / Quality. My
physics inlcudes Pirsigian quality. If we're using consciousness /
intellect in this fundamental sense - then as I pointed out weeks ago
we need some clearer (working) definitions of these terms. I cannot
(easily) buy that something like
self-aware-reflective-awareness-and-simultaneous-thought-processing
arose in one fell swoop prior to any other physics evolving. Which
bits (I'm scared to say building blocks) components, features,
aspects, of "consciousness" are we talking about here. You choose the
words, don't argue with mine, and just to humour me avoid "material"
:-)

>
> > Granted, that does not in itself provide
> > license for the sort of thing I am espousing, but it does highlight that
> > Darwinist explanations of consciousness have no evidential basis either.
>
> [IG] Says who ??!!?? Are you denying Darwinian evolution per se ? Are
> you suggesting homop-sapiens didn't arrive later in evolution than say
> dinosuars ? Are you suggesting humans don't have any higher level
> qualities of consciousness than dinosaurs. None of it conclusive or
> perfectly explained (nothing ever is) but don't deny evidence
> entirely.
>
> Scott:
> Within the spacetime SPOV, one says that humans arrived later than
> dinosaurs. A human has much more of the dynamic inside (under his or her
> control) than a dinosaur (as does a 4th level human compared to a 3rd level
> human). What I take this to mean (speculatively) is that a dinosaur is not
> an individual in the way that a human is, that the comparable thing to a
> human might be the species dinosaur. So I am not denying evidence. I am
> denying an interpretation of that evidence.

[IG] OK, it's gonna be difficult to continue if spacetime concepts are
excluded from our debate, but for example, simple question - if a
dinosuar didn't have that kind of self-aware-identity what kind of
"consciousness" existed anywhere at that time. (As I keep saying I'm
making small evolutionary quality steps from accepted physics of
spacetime - if you're gonna exclude space and time as valid concepts -
you're the one with the majority of the explaining to do - or to
deliberately avoid it seems.)

>
> > Scott:
> > The thing I would question about Chalmers is: if the problem is so hard,
> > why
> > not question the presupposition that makes it a problem in the first
> > place?
> > That presupposition, of course, is the belief that consciousness is an
> > addition to a world that existed without it (and would revert to a world
> > without it if all life forms were extinguished). Hence the need on
> > Chalmers'
> > part for diving into supervenience and such.
>
> [IG] Doh !!! So let me get this right. A philosopher would not have to
> explain consciousness if he he could sleep happy with the idea that it
> pre-existed anything else ? Sounds like the God sky-hook to me. (The
> whole problem with this is there is no "it" to use in the above
> sentences - as we've stumbled across many times elsewhere in this
> correspondence - there are many varieties / sub-types and components
> of consciousness - we're using a very broad loose word here covering a
> wide range of concepts. Anyone suggesting the whole of this
> pre-existed anything else seems to have a lot of explaining to do. A
> lot more than any humble physicist. I though we were having a serious
> debate ?
>
> Scott:
> It is only a sky-hook if one assumes that it is something that needs
> explaining, something one should have a theory about. Instead, I take it as
> that which explains, that which makes, maintains, and breaks theories. It's
> not a matter of consciousness pre-existing anything else. It is a matter of
> explaining existence in terms of consciousness. (More pedantry needed on
> 'existence', however: what exists "stands out", and it is consciousness (aka
> quality) that makes things stand out. So of consciousness itself (or value),
> one cannot say it exists, one cannot say it doesn't exist, one cannot say it
> both exists and doesn't exist, and one cannot say it neither exists nor
> doesn't exist. My point in this pedantry is that in interpreting what I am
> saying as being a claim that consciousness "pre-exists", and so acts like a
> "sky-hook", you are still locked into a view of consciousness as a
> "something" distinct from "something else" -- physical building blocks, for
> example. Again, do you see Pirsig as employing Quality as a sky-hook? --
> Well, actually, in some ways I think he does employ DQ as a sky-hook, but
> that's one of my complaints about the MOQ).

[IG] Some good things in here. So you are saying you don't feel any
obligation to explain the existence of consciousness. That's very
brave of you. We're back to blind faith or suspension of disbelief
again.

OK so Pirsig resists explaining or defining quality as long as he can,
but I still buy it. A good question. Why do I buy it ? Because it fits
well with existing (modern) scientific explanations, and a zillion
scientists are working very hard to find it's explanation. In doing
so, science is having to overcome prejudices about the subjective
matter under investigation. The history of science to date is that it
will gradually find the necessary explanations - I refer to my "elan
vital" comments earlier. I'm merely suspending disbelief in the
meantime. (Platt would call it faith in science - but well founded
"faith" I say.)

Better than reaching for a sky-hook, whose existence is based on
mystical faith only. Surely ?

>
> Your last statement "I thought we were having a serious debate" just means,
> as far as I can see, that you insist on your vocabulary. That is, unless I
> learn to think in your terms, you will not consider me as being serious. We
> are betting on different horses: me on mysticism and the logic of
> contradictory identity as a way of getting a philosophical grip on mysticism
> and on consciousness/value/intellect, you on physicalism.

[IG] It's not the vocabulary. It's now clear (for the first time for
me) that yours is a mystical world, a superanatural world beyond
physics. That is where I find the rug pulled out from under me - it
ceases to be a serious debate - if you are allowed to bring in
elements that are immune from explanation. (Unless you clearly flag
them as the basis of a thought experiment, rather than reality.)

What to you is
> "not being serious" is to me quite serious. What to me is "stuck in a
> useless modernist way of thinking (about consciousness)" is to you being
> serious.

[IG] Useless modernist - is just your rhetorical label. What's uselss
about it, would be an argument.

>
> > Scott:
> > Yes, QM does not explain consciousness. But then Dennett and Chalmers both
> > start from the position that consciousness needs explaining, an attitude
> > that originated back when materialism was NOT dead, that thought that the
> > perceptual contents of consciousness (physical[1]) were the the one true
> > objective reality.
>
> [IG] Agreed, as a statement of historical fact. But the fact that the
> felt-need to explain consciousness pre-existed even Newtonian physics
> is not changed by the fact that modern physics has arrived, even if
> the potential explanations available may have changed - a total
> non-sequitor. And that's why the MoQ moves the combination of
> Evolution and GoF Physics onward and upward.
>
> Scott:
> I question your "fact that the felt-need to explain consciousness
> pre-existed even Newtonian physics". There was a lot of discussion about how
> souls and bodies relate prior to the 17th century, but no sense that the
> existence of consciousness needed explanation. It was just part of reality,
> as was the body, both created by God. There was no attempt to explain
> consciousness in terms of body or any other way that I am aware of -- except
> among the atomists, but they were the crackpots of their day.

[IG] All I can add is that the crackpot explanations of one era,
oftent turn out to be the accepted reality of a later one.

>
> {IG] Do you have any interest in the MoQ Scott ?
>
> I've explained many times my agreements and disagreements with the MOQ.
> Among the latter is that the MOQ retains too much modernist thinking, in
> particular a nominalist/materialist view of the succession of the levels of
> SQ. To me, its explanation of their emergence amounts to materialism plus
> DQ. I am not saying that the MOQ is materialist, just that it is still
> infected with some materialist notions, such as the notion that there is a
> need to explain consciousness.

[IG] That's just disparaging rhetoric again. To say it's just a
materialist notion to explain. Surely only mystical schools would
exempt themselves from any need to explain ?

Ian

>
> - Scott
>
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