[MD] MD Quality, DQ and SQ

[Scott Roberts]

Ian,

Ian said
I'm re-setting both threads here (this one and the "On Time" thread)
rather than carrying on infinite levels of nested inserts.

Scott:
Good.

Ian said:
In the other thread you said
We work within the concepts of causality, space, and time in going
about our daily business, and science is part of that daily business.
But that all breaks down if we start asking about value (or
consciousness or intellect). It also breaks down in quantum
physics.This means that we can't explain the appearance of the
macrocosmic world (that is, perception) in terms of spatiotemporal
causality. This means that science is the wrong tool for studying
perception.

In this thread you also referred (positively) to
Samuel Avery's "The Dimensional Structure of Consciousness: A Physical
Basis for Immaterialism."

I say you can't have it both ways. Our problem here is merely
linguistic. Elsewhere in these threads you are taking an arrogant view
that your mystical revolution in thought is more revolutionary than
mine. Have you read how to win friends and influence people :-)

Scott:
Avery's book is a description of perception working with the assumption that 
spacetime is produced by consciousness (in the act of perception), rather 
than consciousness/perception being something produced in spacetime. His 
"physical basis" is referring to working with "what is going on" in the 
quantum world: probability waves, non-locality, etc. What he says, as he 
acknowledges, is not science. It is an interpretation of quantum physics, 
showing how quantum physics, as opposed to Newtonian physics, does not 
conflict with an immaterialist philosophy, and indeed, supports such a 
philosophy.

On "arrogant view". Perhaps. The thing is, I am well acquainted with your 
view, having held it myself once upon a time, having read Dennett, studied 
cognitive science, and such. It is not at all clear to me that you have 
anything but a superficial acquaintance with my view. A couple of posts back 
you said:

"So you are saying you don't feel any obligation to explain the existence of 
consciousness. That's very brave of you. We're back to blind faith or 
suspension of disbelief again."

Which of us is more blind? Have you ever suspended disbelief in the view of 
someone like FM-W, for example?

Ian said:
A physical basis for immaterialism, is where I'm coming from. Why
can't physics (science) be the right tool to study perception and
consciousness and quality, and ... whatever. It just needs a
revolution in what science is about, and it's having such a revolution
starting a hundred years ago. the fundamentals of science are
ephemeral, ineffable interactions. I'm not "refusing to accept" the
mystical side, I'm just trying to describe it in a useful way (that
won't be rejected by unimaginative conservative scientists).

Scott:
Science cannot be the right tool because of DQ. Science requires form to 
work with, so it can only study SQ. When one brings DQ into the picture --  
as we do when considering awareness of form, or value -- science gets left 
behind (I know, I'm just repeating my 'taint to your 'tis). Of course, 
overall, it is highly relevant, since one does need to study SQ as part of a 
larger picture. Goswami's and Avery's books depend on what we've learned 
from physics (Goswami is a physicist). Of course, one could redefine science 
as any disciplined study whatsoever, but that reduces the value of the word 
'science'. It is useful to keep the distinction between what can be tested 
in the macroscopic world and what can't.

As I see it, any *useful* description of the "mystical side" is just going 
to be rejected by unimaginative conservative scientists. The revolution 
required is not one in science but in the most fundamental ways we think 
about things. After all, the quantum scientific revolution has happened. Our 
debates are over how much other rethinking that should lead to, and as I see 
it (here's that arrogance again), you're not rethinking enough. Neither is 
Pirsig, for that matter.

Ian said:
I'm agreeing with the ZMM Pirsig that this quality interaction is
ineffable. Obviously I'm interpreting the Lila Pirsig less
metaphysically and more pragmatically that he himself had aspired to,
but that's a given.

I still see a massive explanatory gap on your side if you see the
fundamental (pre-material) consciousness as something high-order
intelligent first person subjective awareness (which I know you
don't), rather than some prior-consciousness component (which I
suspect you do). And if you don't like proto-conscioiusness, gimme
your word to distinguish it from any possible misinterpretation I
might make of the general term "consciousness". As I say it still
seems the problem really is just linguistic.

You seem to want to claim the word consciousness for your particular
mystical flavour (denotation) of consciousness. I'm not denying this,
I'm just asking for your word for it - so we can keep talking.

Scott:
This is why I insist on using all three words: value, consciousness, and 
intellect. Combining them, I say that "the most fundamental" is semiosis, 
what Peirce calls 'thirdness', or signification. The problem I have with 
"proto-consciousness" is that there is no value at all in being 
proto-conscious (actually, I have no idea what 'proto-conscious' might mean, 
to me it sounds like "a little bit pregnant", but apparently it means 
something to you). There is only value when there is consciousness, which is 
to say that an interaction is appreciated (positively or negatively). And 
that can only happen if an interaction is appreciatively (consciously) 
valued as being a part of some pattern (or, one might say, information), 
that it manifests a pattern which might not have been manifested, or 
manifests it in one way and not another. All this, I claim, is best 
understood as semiosis. A SPOV is best thought of as a concept, and an 
interaction as a manifestation of that concept (yet -- and here one gets 
into the logic of contradictory identity -- the concept is not independent 
of its manifestations.)

Does that help?

On the explanatory gap: how much is that demand for explanation a 
consequence of SOM? Epistemology arose with SOM, and science's claim to fame 
is that  "science explains". But of course scientific explanations are 
inherently limited to being redescriptions of one set of physical experience 
in terms of another set, combined with mathematics in some cases. Beyond 
this, is it still proper to speak of explanations? I raise this as a 
pragmatic point, that "explanation" just amounts to redescription, and part 
of moving beyond SOM is to redescribe so that the "something to be 
explained"/explanation dichotomy becomes, if not erased, at least blurry.

- Scott