[MD] Theism and literalism

[Scott Roberts]

DMB,

dmb had said to Scott:
...All you've done is nakedly deny that this lab data counts as empirical
evidence for that conclusion. Why does it not count? Why does the
"preference" model not work better than the "causal law" model? Wasn't my
main point centered on the inadequacy of that model, AS IT IS REVEALED BY
THAT DATA? Yes.

Scott replied:
I agree that the data shows that mechanical, spatiotemporal determinism is a
bad model. But there isn't any data shows that 'preference' is a good model.
These aren't the only two possibilities.

dmb now says:
Who said there are only two possibilities? Oh yea, I remember now. It was Mr
Phony McStrawman. He's such a fool. We can easily knock his argument over
with a single, gentle push.

Scott:
You said that the empirical data shows that the preference model works 
better than the causal model. Strictly speaking, this is not so. The data 
shows that the spatiotemporal, single-universe, mechanical causal model does 
not work. There is no data to show that the preference model works better 
than a multi-universe, spatiotemporal mechanical causal model, or that it 
works better than a non-spatiotemporal, single-universe mechanical causal 
model. It is only by ignoring these other possibilities that you can say 
that that there is empirical evidence *for* the preference model. Evidence 
against A is evidence for B only if A and B are the only two possibilities. 
That is why I am asking for the empirical data -- and not some metaphysical 
assumption -- for saying that there is value in the inorganic.

dmb had said:
I don't think the MOQ is making any claims about what electrons are "really"
doing. The preference model is simply designed to describe the "behaviour"
of subatomic particles as they are revealed in scientific experiments.

Scott replied:
These two sentences contradict each other. The "preference" model is an
addition to the behavior revealed in experiment. That sure looks like a
claim about what they are "really" doing to me. As I said, the only way to
keep within the empirical is to say nothing.

dmb now says:
I think you are adding some kind of essentialist claim to this preference
model, one that does not belong in the MOQ. As I keep pointing out, this is
not a claim about how electrons think or that electrons have some kind of
subjective consciousness with which to make deliberate choices.

Scott interrupts:
which is why I try to be careful to state the claim as "there is value in 
the inorganic", and not in these S/O forms.

DMB continues:
 The
preferences model is simply a coherent and consistant way to explain the way
subatomic particles, its just one way to make sense of the data. I mean, you
have to keep in mind the MOQ's rejection of single, exclusive truths with
the flip side of that coin being, of course, that such truths are
provisional and are adopted until something better comes along. Am I saying
that this model is better than anything that the physicists have to offer?
No. I really wouldn't know. I'm just saying that the preference model works
to explain this data in such a way that it is consistent with the larger
structure of the MOQ.

Scott:
Fine. Just don't claim that the MOQ's claim that Quality is omnipresent (and 
hence in the inorganic) is empirical. The empirical evidence doesn't deny 
the MOQ claim. It just doesn't support it over other models.

DMB continued:
As to your claim that "the only way to keep with the empirical is to say
nothing", I don't know what that is supposed to mean. Silent philosophers
and physicists? Huh?

Scott:
It means: be like Bohr: say we can say nothing about what the quantum world 
is like, beyond the mathematical symbols used to predict observations. Do 
not say there is value there, do not say there is no value there, etc. To 
say either is non-empirical.

Scott said:
The data shows that the mechanical, spatiotemporally determinist claim is
wrong. It does not show that the preference claim is right. Show me the
experiment that verifies the 'preference' claim over the multi-universe
claim and the non-local hidden variable claim and you'll have yourself a
Nobel Prize.

dmb says:
Again, you're approach seems to add claims that nobody has made. The idea
here is simply that the preference model is better than the causal laws
model because it agrees with the data better. It works better within the
MOQ. I mean, you seem to be pretending that these are claims made outside of
the context of the MOQ, where the explainations of scientists are viewed as
works of art and not propostions about absolute truths or objective truths
or anything like that.

Scott:
To say there is value in the inorganic is to add a claim beyond the 
empirical evidence. It does not agree with the data better than, say, the 
non-spatiotemporal causal model. Yes, it works better within the MOQ. So 
what you are saying is: let's assume the MOQ, including its non-empirical 
claim that Quality is omnipresent (a non-empirical claim since the data just 
shows the reality of Quality in humans, and perhaps some biological), and to 
be consistent we will adopt the preference view of the quantum measurement 
problem over other views. Yes, that is all consistent, and works. It is just 
not empirical.

- Scott