[MD] Experience, essentialism, physicalism

[Ham Priday]

Scott --


> So let me reformulate my question as: what is the *concept*
> of Essence that leads you to call ultimate reality 'Essence'?
> What does "the essence of ultimate reality is Essence" tell me?
> Why is it obvious that no other term is needed (which follows
> the question: why is *any* term needed, that is why not just
> call it "ultimate reality").

My concept of Essence is that of an absolute 'Sensibility' with the
potential to deny or negate its Self (i.e., identity) infinitely and
infinitesimally to actualize conditional awareness (the negate) which
becomes the subject of a differentiated otherness (essent).  Essence is the
primary source of actualized beingness and nothingness which define
space/time existence.  As such, Essence is ultimate reality.  It is also
'sensible', 'immutable', and 'unconditional'.  However, because it is
necessary in metaphysical dialectics to name this referent, 'Essence' seemed
the most logical term.

Scott said:
> I said "an idea...before it is "expressed"" is non-existent
> (though I later qualified this with the notion of inchoate,
> vague idea). And I should add that this only applies to
> our relative consciousness. Here's Wolff again:
> "At the deepest level of discernible thought there is a
> thinking that flows of itself. In its purity it employs none
> of the concepts that could be captured in definable words.
> It is fluidic rather than granular. It never isolates a
> definitive divided part, but everlastingly interblends with all.
> Every thought includes the whole of Eternity, and yet there
> are distinguishable thoughts. The unbroken Eternal flows
> before the mind, yet is endlessly colored anew with unlimited
> possibility. There is no labor in this thought. It is unrelated
> to all desiring, all images, and all symbols." [p. 308]

Inasmuch as Consciousness is Wolff's "essence", it is natural that he would
explain the dynamics of existential reality in terms of "conceptual
thinking".  This is not unlike my philosophy, except that Wolff's use of
Consciousness (which I assume equates to Intellect or Intelligence) to
define the nature of the Source makes it contingent upon existence.  In
other words, if there were no existence, Consciousness would have nothing to
apprehend.  This is why I prefer not to name the Source by such hypothesized
attributes as 'Potentiality', 'Value', 'Sensibility', or 'Intentionality'
but, rather, by its ontological function as the necessary root source, i.e.,
'Essence'.

Ham asked:
> Why is an idea "inchoate" before it is expressed but
> cogent after it is expressed?

 Scott answered:
> I can agree that there might be something like an inchoate
> idea, some vague presentiment that hasn't been expressed.
> But the reason for trying to express it, and what is
> accomplished by expressing it, is to make it a concept.
> This is why one says "all language is metaphorical",
> because the first expression must employ metaphors
> (using old concepts in new ways). After a while, they
> become dead metaphors.

Well, to this I'll return your criticism of "nit-picking".  A concept is a
concept, whether it's conceived intellectually or imparted to others through
language.

Scott continued:
> For me, yes, semiotics has the characteristic of 'essence
> of everything' ...But of course in saying it is the 'essence
> of everything' I am not saying that it exists independently
> of everything.  So I prefer to just say 'everything is semiotic'.

But if everything is semiotic, where is the essence?  It seems to me that
saying "everything is semiotic" is another way of saying that existence is
illusory.  Still, there must be a source behind the illusion.  That is, the
symbols and words must be derived from some primary source or nature.  If
you are a follower of Wolff, that source is Consciousness.

Scott continued:
> To avoid confusion, I said I was distinguishing 'language'
> (as in English or Swahili) from 'semiotics', yet here you are
> reintroducing that confusion by restricting 'semiotics' to
> 'language'. If an action of mine expresses some moral
> position, then that moral position is the meaning of my act
> (at least partially). I may not be able to put that meaning into
> words, but it is still a semiotic act: an observer treats the act
> as a sign of some moral position, that is, does not just
> evaluate its physical components. The act is semiotic.

> Ham asked:
> Does the author suggest a better way to participate in
> objective reality?  Can you?

> Scott replied:
> Yes, cease thinking of objective reality *as* objective
> reality (that is, understand it as a creative projection,
> not as "just there", as signs to stimulate self-consciousness,
> not dead objects to be passively perceived.)

This is an espousal of "subjectivity" (as opposed to objectivism), as I see
it; and it is not incompatable with Essentialism as far as it goes.
However, as a philosophy of life, it leaves much to be desired.  For
example, what is the meaning or purpose of this "projection" of existence?
Is man a "special" creature?  Can or does he transcend this proprietary
world of being-aware?  Does Value have any role in your ontology?

Or do we just accept this illusory existence for what it appears to be,
without cause, rhyme or reason?

--Ham