[MD] Experience, essentialism, physicalism
Ant McWatt
antmcwatt at hotmail.co.uk
Wed Apr 5 05:52:51 PDT 2006
Matt,
Here are a few more answers and a lot more questions
I mentioned Northrops concepts by intuition and postulation as they put
more detail in Chalmers criticism of Dennetts conflation of seem in the
psychological sense and seem in the phenomenal sense. You appear to brush
this criticism off by stating that Dennett and some others do sometimes, in
their less careful and more scientistic moments, sound like they are using
the distinction and saying the latter psychological seem but, as far as I
remember, Chalmers thought this conflation largely undermined Dennetts
theory on consciousness especially as it appears in a critical part of
Consciousness Explained i.e. Chapter 12 where Dennett is trying to
disqualify qualia (or what you portray as an explanation of _why_ we
believe in qualia). Id also say that it is wrong-headed to think that you
can believe in qualia. Its an inane project as _why_ we believe that we
breathe and is no doubt an epiphenomenon of an SOM frame of mind.
Even before you get past the first page of Consciousness Explained,
Dennett asserts that there is a mystery to be explained about why Cartesian
mind substance can fit in the same world with the nerve cells and molecules
that [make] up my brain. And, of course, the answer is
(drum roll)
there isn't a mystery unless youre buying into SOM (or at least some of
its assumptions).
F.S.C. Northrop (The Meeting of East & West, 1946, p.452-53) explains the
difficulties with the mystery below:
The concatenation of factors which is an awareness of a rose as red is not
a result of an unaesthetic material substance by some mysterious activity
jumping out of space across a metaphysical gulf to act upon an equally
unaesthetic blank mental substance which in some mysterious way projects out
of itself the color which is observed, as a mere appearance; instead all
occurrences in human awareness and in human knowledge are a result of
natural relations between entities which in their aesthetic character and in
their theoretic character are in the same world of discourse.
The color of the rose is, to be sure, a function of the observer, but it is
equally surely a function also of the character of the rose
. it is a
function, not of any hypothetical mental substance with which the observer
is supposed to be identified, but
of the observers bodily sense organs
.
for it is not by altering the mental substance but by altering the effect
upon the rods and cones in a normal persons eye that he can be made to see
a different color upon the rose than the one he normally sees.
The Cartesian mystery can only be avoided by Descartes' assumptions
concerning mind and matter being dropped completely (which Dennett isnt
doing!) and by employing a completely different ontology such as that found
in Taoism or Mahayana Buddhism. I think you not only avoid the unlikely
conclusions of behaviourism etc with such systems, you get better accounts
of how qualia and consciousness relates with other aspects of reality. The
real mystery in this regard - is the length of time it took Western
philosophers to catch-up with their East Asian counterparts.
Unfortunately, if one does not become familiar with East Asian philosophy
before approaching the usual analytic suspects (such as Dennett, Putnam,
Sellars & Quine) found in the contemporary Anglo-American philosophy
department then youre usually heading for a metaphysical mess (and a
headache). The analytic game is already loaded within a particular
physicalist/behaviourist frame of reference so solutions based on East Asian
philosophy dont get a look in unless you bring them in yourself. From what
Ive read so far, John Searle is probably the best of this bunch but even
he is miles away from where Northrop and Pirsig are coming from.
Anyone with some interest in the philosophical background of Pirsigs work
will know that Northrops ontology is also based on the East Asian tradition
rather than, for instance, a Kantian one (though Northrops concepts by
intuition and by postulation, of course, arent a feature of the MOQ). As
such, I do suspect that Quine's attack on the analytic/synthetic distinction
and Sellars' attack on the Myth of the Given (that you mentioned), are both
attacking some forms of Cartesian SOM and, as such, are irrelevant to
Northrops conceptual framework. (However, if you do think their
respective critiques dismiss the Tao/Dynamic Quality altogether, it would be
interesting to hear why).
An explanation of why you replied I can accept it looking like hubris to
David E. Coopers point that there is the issue of hubris that philosophers
such as Rorty and Dennett are engaged in denying (or at least, denying the
importance of) the non-linguistic source of all (static) things would also
be of interest. Are you saying that a correct recognition of the Tao in a
philosophical system is not a desirable thing? Or are you declaring that
Dennetts and Rortys work only appears to be implying this? Im also not
sure the worshipping of mystery should be just discounted without
explanation. Im not saying that I necessarily disagree with your sentiment
but I do wonder where your dismissal is coming from.
I do think philosophers should at least be concerned with mystery though not
the Cartesian mystery which Dennett thinks (on page one of Consciousness
Explained) is the last genuine one remaining! Rather, I think the central
mystery remains the aesthetic component found in the world and human nature.
As Northrop (from The Logic of the Sciences & Humanities) discusses in
the following:
[For instance], the primary task of poetry, arising out of art in its first
function, is to convey the aesthetic component of reality in and for itself
apart from all postulated doctrine and theory. Put more concretely, it must
keep men continuously aware of the freshness and the ineffable beauty and
richness of the immediately apprehended. This is a function which must be
provided. Otherwise we lose the riches and values of life which are
immediately before our senses.
One of the most deadening influences upon human living arises out of the
need to move on beyond the aesthetically immediate to postulated
common-sense objects for the purposes of practical life and to postulated
scientific objects and philosophical systems for the satisfaction of our
intellectual curiosity and the attainment of more complete and manageable
human knowledge. Both of these movements are necessary and good.
Nevertheless, by themselves they tend to cause us to treat the ineffable
beauty and the soul-sustaining freshness of the aesthetically immediate
merely as a means to an end, thereby overlooking the contemplation of it in
and for itself. As we hurry down the street of an evening the worries of
practical living so overwhelm us, or, - if we are more scientifically and
philosophically minded - we become so engrossed in our theories of the
internal molecular constitution of the stars that we do not see and become
refreshed by the beauty of the sunset which is immediately before our eyes.
Unless we are protected by poetry and the other arts functioning purely in
and for themselves, reality in its theoretical aspect is sought at the cost
of losing its equally real aesthetic component, and the mind of man becomes
overstimulated while his spirit dies.
There is a factor of the nature of things which can be known only by
science and by theory with its recourse to concepts by postulation, and
there is another important part pressing on the very threshold of our senses
denoted by concepts by intuition which is equally essential for calm and
complete living. The tragedy of the neglect of poetry and its sister arts
treated in and for themselves is that we lose those riches of life which are
available to everybody, rich and poor alike, immediately before our ears and
noses and eyes. It is as if a man has part of the riches for which he is
searching, present in his own yard and being so concerned about what is on
the other side of its fence, goes off seeking in a far country.
The character of anything immediately apprehended merits more meticulous
examination. Any item which is immediately felt or sensed is ineffable. One
can look at a blue for hours and not quite intuit all its depth and
richness. Also, if one's friend has never sensed a blue, no amount of
discourse by the poet or the scientist can convey that datum to him. This is
the character of anything immediately apprehended that it has to be
immediately experienced to be known. If to be unstatable and hence ineffable
is the characteristic of the mystical, then, contrary to popular opinion,
the mystical and the ineffable is not off in some far distant speculative
heaven, but in immediately apprehended fact directly before our eyes.
(Northrop, 1947, pp.175-77)
Northrop also discusses the aesthetic component of reality in some depth in
The Meeting of East & West and emphasises here that it is important that
we take proper account of it in learning to deal with the different
(intellectual and social) values held by the various cultures in the world.
Northrop argues that since the creation of nuclear weapons this _isnt_ a
luxury that can be conveniently divided from other philosophical concerns.
First, the aesthetic component is an irreducible and essential component in
mans nature. Second, this aesthetic component is in part indeterminate
As cultivated by the Orient, the indeterminate aesthetic continuous
component in mans nature and in the nature of all things has demonstrated
itself to be a factor which pacifies men, giving them a compassionate
fellow-feeling not merely for other men but for all natures creatures, and
serving to keep them more at peace with each other, rather than to send them
off on wild, ill-considered and ill-grounded aggressive private,
nationalistic, or religious military escapades. (Northrop, 1946, p.471-72)
As such, it sounds like a good idea that everyone should become Zen
Buddhists or Taoists with strong interests in fine art, nature conservation
and politics as soon as possible. What do you reckon?
Best wishes,
Anthony.
www.robertpirsig.org
[Santa Claus] and I think alike and of course we are both, by our own
accounts, fictional characters of a sort, though of a slightly different
sort. (Dennett, 1991, p.411)
.
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