[MD] Experience, essentialism, physicalism

[Matt Kundert]

Anthony,

I'm not sure the conversation is going to move forward if we focus on 
Dennett.  Like I said, I think Dennett still has his more scientistic 
moments, but by and large his work helps us break free from the Cartesian 
mold.  You don't think so.  The stumbling block is that I think we need to 
talk about this distinction between concepts of postulation and intuition to 
figure out where we are and where we are going.  You said that I appear to 
brush Chalmers' "criticism off by stating that 'Dennett and some others do 
sometimes, in their less careful and more scientistic moments, sound like 
they are using the distinction and saying the latter psychological "seem,"'" 
but that is not where I responded to Chalmers.  My response to that kind of 
criticism was to side-step it by denying the distinction between concepts of 
postulation and intuition, which you identified with the two kinds of 
"seem."  The piece you quoted from me is where I admit that Dennett, in his 
less careful moments, is subject to that criticism.  The position I think 
Dennett has to occupy (the position I think Rorty does occupy) is one in 
which we deny a philosophically useful distinction between the two senses of 
"seem".

The conversation will also not move forward unless you stop simply assuming 
that any tools created in the Western traditions have no bearing on what's 
going on in the Eastern ones.  Just because Northrop isn't using Western 
ontologies doesn't mean that Eastern ontologies don't fall into similar 
traps.  If it were that simple to see and dismiss, then Eastern philosophy 
wouldn't have anything to say to Western philosophy on the same 
grounds--they're doing different things.  I simply have to point to the work 
Paul is doing in trying to create conversational bridges between strains of 
Eastern Buddhism and strains of neopragmatism (Rorty, specifically) to help 
us see that the West might not be all that bad.

The conversation will also not move forward unless you dispense with saying 
things like, "However, if you do think their [Sellars and Quine's] 
respective critiques dismiss the Tao/Dynamic Quality altogether, it would be 
interesting to hear why."  Such framing makes it sound like my intentions 
are to dismantle things Pirsig has created, like I _want_ to dismiss a 
central concept of Pirsig's (and Eastern philosophy's).  Nothing could be 
further from the truth.  I can't make bridges like Paul can, but I do want 
to marry the fruits of both traditions together.  I do not think the West is 
sterile.  I think from a Western philosophical perspective, and I think 
there are certain things we ought not to say and use in philosophy, and I 
simply want to create inroads between the two that don't accidently take us 
a step back from what we've learned in the West.  I think Pirsig has good 
things going for him.  I'm not trying to _dismiss_ DQ, but I am trying to 
formulate it in better ways than some of the ones I see.

With the distinction between concepts of postulation and concepts of 
intuition, DMB took up an answer, so I'll try and explain how I see it 
working.  In answer to the question of "Is the distinction between concepts 
of postulation and intuition a concept of postulation or a concept of 
intuition?", DMB said, "the verbal distinction itself is static, but it is 
asserted on the basis of experience."  This, by itself, is the alternative I 
gave earlier: the distinction is a concept of postulation, which produces 
paradox, though it can be massaged out by roughly saying that distinctions 
we make are made to help us better deal with experience.  I take that to be 
the force of "asserted on the basis of experience."  The distinctions help 
us, they are reached by pragmatic trial and error.  However, DMB continued 
by saying, "The deductions and descriptions have to be static, of course, 
but these distinctions do not create or produce that experience."  I'm not 
sure exactly how to read that caveat.  It sounds like we have a determinate 
experience and the distinctions we make to help us deal with experience are 
getting better and better because they are getting closer and closer to the 
experience that produced them.

I know neither of you wants to say that, because that _would_ be flirting 
with the Myth of the Given, but DMB saying that also fits with what you said 
a couple posts earlier: "I think there can be construed a static 
intellectual truth (corresponding to the pragmatists’ 'what works is true' 
idea) and a Dynamic artistic truth." (Mar 23)  Static is something we toy 
with on pragmatic grounds (which is the first response I isolated from DMB), 
but Dynamic is something that punches you in the face (which is the 
caveat)--much like "the Given."  But saying those things switches the answer 
given earlier, that the distinction is a concept of postulation.  The 
"deductions", "concepts of postulation", "intellectual static patterns" 
(three ways of saying the same thing) are produced by the "experience" 
(which sits opposite the "deductions" from the above passage from DMB), 
"concepts of intuition", "Dynamic Quality" (which are also three ways of 
saying the same thing).  That means that the distinction between Dynamic 
Quality and static patterns is produced by Dynamic Quality.  This all makes 
perfect sense given Pirsig's writings, but that also means that we are given 
the distinction by DQ punching us in the face--just like "the Given".

If you say that the distinction is produced by DQ, then I think you are 
making the mistake of calling the distinction a concept of intuition, for 
why else is the distinction there other than to demarcate what we are 
punched in the face with (like pain and color) and what we make up on our 
own to deal with being punched.  However, once one looks at it that way, 
that means _all_ concepts are concepts of intuition because DQ in Pirsig's 
philosophy creates _everything_, it all follows in DQ's wake, its all an 
effect of being punched.  And once you say that, the distinction becomes 
completely useless because concepts of postulation have shrunk down to 
nothing.

To keep the distinction, one cannot identify it with DQ and static patterns. 
  I think that is the lesson drawn from both avenues of identifying the 
distinction as a concept of postulation or a concept of intuition.  Either 
it leaves nothing in the "concepts of postulation" box or it produces a 
paradox which is evaded by pragmatic tactics (which effectively relieves it 
of its original capacities).  That, to me, suggests that it isn't a useful 
distinction for philosophical work, though it can be useful for 
commonsensical distinctions between crap that effects the rods and cones in 
your eyes and junk that doesn't (like a philosophical system).

On hubris-----

Anthony said:
As Professor David E. Cooper argues in his text “The Measure of All Things” 
(2002) there is also the matter of hubris that philosophers such as Rorty 
and Dennett are engaged in denying, or at least, denying the importance of, 
the non-linguistic source of all (static) things.  The MOQ re-centres 
metaphysics from being human-centric to Quality-centric which entails a 
correct recogniiton of the Tao (unlike, for instance, some human invented 
language game).

Matt said:
I can accept it looking like hubris and note that Pirsig in ZMM has the same 
hubris when he sides with Protagoras against Plato.  I think any difference 
between being human-centric and Quality-centric is much smaller and minimal 
compared to the difference between being human-centric (like Protagoras) and 
reality-centric (like Plato).

Anthony said:
An explanation of why you replied [as you did] ... would also be of 
interest.  Are you saying that a correct recognition of the Tao in a 
philosophical system is not a desirable thing?  Or are you declaring that 
Dennett’s and Rorty’s work only appears to be implying this?

Matt:
I should've been more specific.  I am indeed suggesting that Dennett's work 
only appears to imply the rejection of the Tao (Rorty's work appears to 
imply it less so).  I don't think they are denying the "non-linguistic 
source of all (static) things".  How we unpack that phrase is what might 
possibly be at issue (and probably also "correct recognition of the Tao"), 
though as I said, I think the difference minimal compared to both of our 
differences with Plato.  The hubris I see is the hubris all geniuses have 
when they buck common sense, like Socrates, Copernicus, and Darwin.

On mystery---

Anthony said:
Moreover, what is (philosophical) life without mystery?

Matt said:
Life will always have mystery, but I don't think we should make the mistake 
of worshipping mystery.

Anthony said:
I’m also not sure the "worshipping of mystery" should be just discounted 
without explanation.  I’m not saying that I necessarily disagree with your 
sentiment but I do wonder where your dismissal is coming from.

Matt:
It comes from my inability to grasp why we should worship the ineffable, or 
hold it up for praise.  The way I see it, mystery and ineffability are just 
things we haven't figured out yet.  There will always be more, as no 
paradigm for thought can be closed (as Ian said).  Every better paradigm we 
come up with, that shuts down more mystery and effs more things, will simply 
produce new mystery, new questions to be answered.  I think that's what it 
means to reject "closed Platonic metaphysics" for "open pragmatic 
metaphysics".  But saying that there will always be mystery doesn't seem to 
me to give us a reason to worship it or praise it.  It's something to stare 
in wide-eyed wonder about, and in that sense I agree with Aristotle, but I 
don't know how we move from there to full on worship.

On everyone becoming Buddhists-----------

Anthony said:
As such [with recognizing the aesthetic component of experience], it sounds 
like a good idea that everyone should become Zen Buddhists or Taoists with 
strong interests in fine art, nature conservation and politics as soon as 
possible.  What do you reckon?

Matt:
Well, you know what I think about that.  I still don't think becoming a 
member of any philosophical tradition is going to stave off war.  I mean, I 
could say that we wouldn't need to become specifically Buddhists, we could 
just become Deweyans (the "Art as Experience" Dewey), but I don't think that 
would make much difference either.  I don't think it would make us more 
predisposed to art, nature conservation, or political conversations.  I do 
think more of all three (particularly the last two) would help a great deal, 
but I don't see how that connects with philosophical disposition.  I am also 
very suspicious of the idea that philosophical disposition links to peace 
vs. war.  I think life and people are just far too complicated for it to be 
all that simple.

As an example, which tends to contradict Northrop and Pirsig's suggestion 
that (in Northrop's words) "as cultivated by the Orient, the indeterminate 
aesthetic continuous component in man’s nature and in the nature of all 
things has demonstrated itself to be a factor which pacifies men, giving 
them a compassionate fellow-feeling not merely for other men but for all 
nature’s creatures, and serving to keep them more at peace with each other," 
I would point out the work of Brian Victoria in his books _Zen at War_ and 
_Zen War Stories_.  I haven't read them, I only saw them pass through where 
I work (don't ask), but here's a few snippets from Amazon about the books:

Book description for _Zen at War_:
"Zen at War offers a penetrating look at the close relationship that existed 
between Zen Buddhism and Japanese militarism prior to World War II. Using 
the actual words of leading Japanese Zen masters and scholars, the author 
shows that Zen served as a powerful spiritual and ideological foundation for 
the fanatic and suicidal spirit displayed by the imperial Japanese military. 
At the same time, the author tells the dramatic and tragic stories of the 
handful of Buddhist organizations and individuals that dared to oppose 
Japan's march to war. He follows this history up to the recent apologies of 
several Zen sects for their support of the war, and the reemergence of what 
he calls corporate Zen in postwar Japan."

Book description for _Zen War Stories_:
"Following the critically acclaimed _Zen at War_ (Weatherhill Publishers, 
1997), Victoria now explores the intimate and supportive relationship 
between Japanese institutional Buddhism and militarism during the Second 
World War. He reveals for the first time, based on the wartime writings of 
the Japanese military itself, that the Zen school's view of life and death 
was deliberately incorporated into the military's programme of 'spiritual 
education' so as to develop a fanatical military spirit in both soldiers and 
civilians. Furthermore, it is revealed that D.T. Suzuki, the most famous 
exponent of Zen in the West, was a wartime exponent of this Zen-inspired 
viewpoint which enabled Japanese soldiers to leave for the battlefield 
already resigned to death. Victoria demonstrates how even champions of 
Japan's new religions strove to inculcate service to the state and loyalty 
to the emperor in generations of pre-war Japanese school children. The book 
also examines the relationship to Buddhism of Japan's seven class-A war 
criminals, hung by the. Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal. A highly controversial 
study, this book will be of interest not only to those studying the history 
of the period, but also to anyone concerned with the perennial question of 
the 'proper' relationship between religion and state."

Comments about _Zen at War_:
"Zen at War is a wake-up call for all Buddhists. Brian Victoria has shown in 
a passionate and well documented way that Buddhism is not immune to the kind 
of distortions that have been used throughout human history by virtually all 
of the worlds religions to justify so-called holy wars."
John Daido Loori, Roshi, Abbot of Zen Mountain Monastery Author of The Heart 
of Being

"Zen at War is a stunning contribution to our understanding of Japanese 
militarism and the broader issue of war responsibility as it continues to be 
addressed (and ignored) in contemporary Japan. Brian Victoria's great 
sensitivity to the perversion and betrayal of Buddhism's teachings about 
compassion and non-violence makes his indictment of the role played by 
Imperial Way Buddhists in promoting ultranationalism and aggression all the 
more strikingand all the more saddening."
Professor John W. Dower, Harvard University Author of War Without Mercy: 
Race and Power in the Pacific War

"In this carefully documented study, Brian Victoria discloses the incredible 
intellectual dishonesty of Japanese Buddhists who perverted their religion 
to a jingoistic doctrine of support of the emperor and imperial expansion 
during the period 1868-1945. Good job! We must face this dark side of our 
heritage squarely."
Robert Aitken, Roshi, Honolulu Diamond Sangha Author of The Mind of Clover 
and The Practice of Perfection

My point is that of Loori: "Buddhism is not immune to the kind of 
distortions that have been used throughout human history."  For Buddhism the 
same as Christianity.  Buddhists preach benevolence, real people fall short. 
  Christianity preaches love, real people fall short.  Life is just too 
complicated to think that if we all held a series of specific philosophical 
views life would be better.  We are creating better and better cultures for 
creating better and better people, people who will care about nature, art, 
and politics (and using politics to help people), but I don't think creating 
Buddhists will help anymore than creating Christians, Pirsigians anymore 
than creating Deweyans.  That kind of hope, when pushed too far, is what 
created Plato: if we all followed his philosophy, true justice would 
prevail.

I mean, just look at Platt.  You can say, as you and DMB and many other 
leftists here have, that he (and any other conservative) is distorting 
Pirsig's philosophy, but how far does that get you in convincing Platt that 
his political outlook is hurting people?  You get interminable debates about 
what Pirsig is really saying (which are good in themselves), but I would 
think it more efficient to debate the hurt caused by this or that political 
position, to have a political debate, not a philosophical or textual debate. 
  The latter debates _could_ help, but it also might just prove to be a 
distraction to what you really want changed anyway, what, in my opinion, is 
more important to be changed.

Matt

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