[MD] Language Games (was Theatre and Definitions)

[david buchanan]

Matt and all MOQers:

Matt said to dmb:
I describe myself as antimetaphysical because what I mean as "metaphysical" 
is "someone who thinks they know how things really are in themselves."  But, 
again, that's _not_ _how_ _you_ _define_ _the_ _term_.  So, me saying I'm 
antimetaphysical doesn't mean the same thing by you saying that you're 
antimetaphysical. ...Do you see how that works yet?  ...Again: until you 
agree that what you mean by "metaphysical" is what I mean by 
"philosophical", I refuse to continue the converation because it just means 
you're really not into it, but just blurting stuff out in a spastic free for 
all.

dmb says:
Ouch. OK. I think I see how it works. You're anti-metaphysical in rejecting 
systems that claim to know "how things really are in themselves", but you're 
not anti-metaphysical in the sense of merely claims to explain "how things 
hang together". And, as you see it, Pirsig and I are metaphysical only in 
the second sense just like you. Well, maybe not JUST like you, but close 
enough so that this distinction and your point is still valid. Have I got 
it?

I'm trying to be careful now, not spastic. See, the problem I have with your 
approach has to do with how you've framed the question. As I see it, the 
ultimatum to choose one or the other definition of metaphysics (how things 
REALLY are vs. how things hang together) is based on a whole bunch of 
assumptions about Platonism and a certain set of conclusions about the 
subsequent history of philosophy in the West. So I think the difference 
between us is exceedingly complicated and stem from issues that are more, 
um,... in the backgroud. Consequently, its really hard to talk about. See, I 
don't disagree with the distinction itself. I think we both really do reject 
the first kind of metaphysics and neither of us has a problem with the 
second kind. But what I've been trying to explain is that this distinction 
isn't relevant to the MOQ. Most especially, I've been trying to explain why 
the approach which entails that distinction is so misleading with respect to 
an understanding of Dynamic Quality. Apparently, yesterday's attempt to make 
a distintions bewteen hanging things together for practical purposes and a 
grand and sweeping world philosophy didn't cut the mustard for you. 
Fortunately, yesterday I also found a cyber-quote that may be of help on 
this point...

"The indeterminateness of the undifferentiated continuum is as important as 
its all-embracing intuited continuity. It is because of this indefiniteness 
that primary reality can never be positively described for the Oriental. 
...This follows because any positive attribute gives a differentiation of 
the otherwise indeterminate continuum rather than the indeterminate 
continuum itself. ...For this reason there is nothing in common between 
Brahman and ultimate reality as conceived by Democritus, Plato or Aristotle. 
The atoms of Democritus, the ideas of Plato and the forms of Aristotle were 
definite determinate things, the very antithesis of the unspecifiable 
Brahman. Also the Democritean atoms, the Platonic ideas and the Aristotelian 
Unmoved Mover were concepts by postulation, where-as Brahman, besides being 
indeterminate, is a concept by intuition."  F.S.C. Northrop PHILOSOPHY EAST 
AND WEST p196

dmb resumes:
Let me draw your attention to the line that really gets at my point; "there 
is nothing in common between Brahman and ultimate reality as conceived by... 
  Plato". I don't know if I can explain it all very well, but I'm convinced 
that if I can get you to see that Brahman has "nothing in common" with 
Platonic concepts, I'll be able to show you that DQ has nothing in common 
with anything like Platonic forms or Kantian things in themselves. As I 
understand it, this is where your ultimatum comes in and where I have to be 
very careful again...

I'm sure you remember the section is ZAMM where Plato is criticized for the 
intellectual encapsulation of DQ, for turning it into a fixed and rigid 
thing. As I understand it, we both really do reject the notion that we can 
make claims about how things REALLY are and we both look to that same 
Pirsigism as a cue to do so. The problem, I think, is that we are doing so 
for different reasons and with different consequences. Basically, I think 
that Pirsig is rejecting Plato's move in order to restore DQ as Brahman, not 
just to reject anything like Platonic forms. And I think you're having 
trouble seeing the difference because your approach is almost entirely 
Western. I think you're interpreting DQ through strictly Western eyes and, 
as a result, have the wrong idea about DQ. As I understand it, Pirsig's 
DQ/sq distinction is a lot like Northrop's intuition/postulation distinction 
which is in turn based on Eastern notions such as Brahman and the Tao. 
Again, this has "nothing in common" with the sort of thing we are both 
rejecting in terms of the first kind of metaphysics.

I think we agree about the distinction itself, but we disagree about its 
relevance to the MOQ.

Ant quoted Northrop:
"..This is the character of anything immediately apprehended that it has to 
be immediately experienced to be known. If to be unstatable and hence 
ineffable is the characteristic of the mystical, then, contrary to popular 
opinion, the mystical and the ineffable is not off in some far distant 
speculative heaven, but in immediately apprehended fact directly before our 
eyes."

Finally, I close with a quote from Kenneth Inada's NORTHROPIAN CATEGORIES OF 
EXPERIENCE REVISITED. The parenthetical stuff is mine...

"Northrop emphatically states that the West simply got caught up in the 
power of symbolic character (sq) and neglected the source (DQ), the 
intuitive or immediately apprehended nature; the East, on its part, rather 
than understanding the postulated nature arising from the symbolic 
character, turned to other means like Yoga or Buddhist negative dialectics 
to capture the undifferentiated aesthetic continuum (DQ) in its fullness. On 
both sides, there is a lack of understanding the complete nature and 
function of epistemic correlations. .....He emphasizes the fact that both 
the aesthetic (DQ) and theoretic (sq) components are required."

I'm sincerely trying to re-orient your ideas about DQ here Matt. I'm 
genuinely trying to locate the source of our disagreements. I don't know if 
this helps or not. You tell me.

Thanks
dmb

P.S. This same Eastern notion of DQ is also behind the MOQ's anti-theism and 
mysticism, etc.. That's why I addressed you at the top of yesterday's "False 
Messiah" post.

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