[MD] Static latching & faith

[Ham Priday]

Ant --

After confirming my surmisal that "oaths" were exclamations -- as the author
says, "generated to describe this low value" -- you quoted an abridged
version of a paragraph from Chpt. 5 of LILA.  Let me requote it filling in
the missing lines.  (Bear with me: there's a purpose to my madness.)

"The value is *between* the stove and the oaths. *Between* the subject and
the object lies the value. This value is more immediate, more directly
sensed than any 'self' or any 'object' to which it might be later assigned.
It is more *real* than the stove.  Whether the stove is the cause of the low
quality or whether possibly something else is the cause is not yet
absolutely certain.  But the the quality is low is absolutely certain.  It
is the primary empirical reality from which such things as stoves and heat
and oaths and self are later intellectually constructed."  [Pirsig, LILA -- 
my paperback page 76]

Now, as an Essentialist, I think Phaedrus was in error by way of
counterpositioning his terms.  For me, Value is what you assess or measure
when quantifying or making comparative judgments about a thing, whereas
Quality, as in "quality merchandise" or "the quality of mercy", is by
definition "qualitative" and non-comparative.

Indeed, I have always maintained that the MoQ confuses the common
understanding of these terms, as it also does in applying the word  "static"
to the evolutionary, transient world and "dynamic" to the unchanging,
immutable source or essence of reality.  This contradiction in terms is part
of the reason Pirsig's theory doesn't lend itself well to a logical
ontology.  It is why the author was compelled to say earlier in that
chapter: "A metaphysics must be divisible, definable, and knowable, or there
isn't any metaphysics.  Since metaphysics is a kind of dialectical
definition and since Quality is essentially outside definition, this means
that a 'Metaphysics of Quality' is essentially a contradiction in terms, a
logical absurdity."

Of course metaphysics must define: that IS how it is made knowable.  But so
does a moral thesis founded on a metaphysical theory.  And why should
Quality be "outside definition", particularly as it is the author himself
who is responsible for the "contradiction in terms"?

That's my criticism of Pirsig's explication.  As for the theory itself -- 
that is, the concept of pre-intellectual value -- I am in general agreement.
(Which is why I'm still "connected" here.)  I find the presentation you've
quoted from ZMM to be much more in line with my own description of pre-natal
awareness as "the sensation of 'difference' interrupting the serenity of the
amniotic environment".  I can also understand where you're coming from on
the cardinal awareness epistemology.

However, my metaphysical ontology is based on a primary source and the
terminology is foreign to that of the MoQ.  I've been working on the Value
concept lately, and have briefly outlined it as follows for you or anyone
else who may be interested in comparing Essentialism with Pirsig's
philosophy:

Essence is the immutable, undifferentiated Source of all that is or that can
be made aware.  Since existence is essentially the "appearance of an
otherness," the source of that appearance must possess Sensibility.
Proprietary awareness, the subject of existence, is a microcosm of absolute
Sensibility that is conditionally separated from Essence.  It is actualized
as a negation or denial by Essence of its antithetical otherness.

In actualized existence, Essence is perceived by the cognizant subject in
three different ways: experientially, intellectually, and desideristically.
Experience is the perception (qualitative sensibility) of objective
beingness; Intellection is the negational abstraction of "thingness"
(particular space/time phenomena differentiated by nothingness); and Desire
is the psychic sense of Value (the essence of otherness).  All of these
perceptual functions operate concurrently in the process of becoming-aware.
The universal appearance of existential reality that is "constructed" by
these neuro-sensory functions is metaphysically intrinsic to actualized
Essence.

Since proprietary awareness (being-aware) is a function of organic
beingness, it is not indigenous to Essence.  Value, however, is essential in
that it is the actualized representation of the Source.  Which is why I
believe the individual's sense of value connects him to Essence and defines
his essential reality, and why I claim that Essentialism is a "valuistic"
philosophy.

Thanks, Ant, for answering my questions so extensively and for demonstrating
the "qualitative thrust" in Pirsig's writings.

Essentially yours,
Ham