[MD] Static latching & faith

[david buchanan]

SA, Ant, Ham and anyone else who might be confused by Scott:

SA observed April 22nd:
“There seems to be on the one hand Ant talking and on the other hand Scott 
talking and two paradigms are talking as a crosswind where something behind 
the assumptions of both are being missed by the other.  Not to say one is 
wrong or right, at this moment, it just seems that Scott and Ant are 
bringing up something that are somehow in the same dialogue, and at the same 
time in a different dialogue.”

Ant replied:
SA, I would certainly agree with that.  Possibly it’s because I stick fairly 
closely to clarifying Pirsig’s work (which is partly derived from Northrop’s 
philosophy) while Scott puts more emphasis on introducing other writers 
(such as Magliola or Owen Barfield) who he argues are an improvement on 
Pirsig; certainly in some fundamental respects.  Both projects have their 
merits but I wouldn’t read Scott’s posts if you are simply looking for 
clarifying what Pirsig is saying.  Scott’s posts are more useful for looking 
at alternatives and related references (especially regarding mysticism).

dmb says:
I think both of you guys are being far too generous, although I'd certainly 
agree that its a bad idea to read Scott's posts if you're looking for 
clarity. Yikes! I wish I had the time and energy to untangle some 
substantial portion of the confusion he's wrought here, but that could take 
weeks. Instead, I'll just pick a few examples...

Scott said to Ant:
But of course more germane is the question: just because I have a concept by 
intuition, doesn't make it empirical (or true).

Ant replied:
On the contrary, Scott.  Concepts by intuition are the only things which are 
purely empirical and we know to be true (irrespective of whether we are 
dreaming of the colours and sound that correlate, for instance, to Ham’s 
cardinal bird on a tree branch or seeing them “for real”). [As Northrop puts 
it,] “All that the senses convey are colors and sounds and odors, pains and 
pleasures. These are not external material objects.  They are ineffable, 
aesthetic qualities, the kind of thing which the impressionistic artist 
rather than the physicist gives one. Thus again we come to the same 
conclusion. Pure fact is a continuum of ineffable aesthetic qualities, not 
an external material object.”

“Consequently, if one prefers to be thoroughly hard-boiled with respect to 
one's beliefs, rejecting all inference and theory as belonging to 
soft-minded speculative philosophers sitting in arm chairs, and if one forth 
with proposes to restrict oneself to facts only, then it is not with the 
belief in external material objects or the other persons of common sense, or 
with the electrons, protons, electromagnetic waves and other unobservable 
scientific objects of the physicist that one can have anything to do. For 
all these common-sense and scientific objects are theoretically inferred 
objects; they are not purely empirically given, immediately apprehended 
facts. Instead, it is to impressionistic art with nothing but its sense 
impressions that one must restrict oneself.”  (Northrop, “Logic of the 
Sciences & Humanities”, 1947, p.41)

To which Scott replied:
I see nothing but a spinning of arguments to convince oneself that something 
that one is already convinced of can have the word 'empirical' attached to 
it. I see nothing here that rules out the old mechanistic Newtonian 
worldview

dmb says:
Nothing but spin? Its almost had to believe that you're sincere, Scott. I 
mean, its hard to see how you could miss the point or otherwise fail to 
understand what "empirical" means here. Looking at the two quotes we see the 
use of terms and phrases such as "colors, sounds, odors, pleasurs, pains, 
aesthetic qualities, purely empirically given, immediately apprehended fact 
and sense immpressions." How could anyone fail to see how all of these refer 
to experience, to raw empirical data? And the terms and phrases refering to 
raw empirical experience are contrasted with CONCEPTS about "theoretically 
inferred objects" and "external material objects". Within a SOM framework, 
the objects of material reality are supposed to be the cause of that raw 
empirical data, but Northrop and Pirsig are saying that this is backwards. 
The are overturning these materialist assumptions in favor of a more 
"radical empiricism", one that does not assume that experience depends upon 
pre-existing subjects in an objective physical reality. See, I think Scott 
is operating on the very assumptions that the MOQ is designed to replace. 
This is why I think SA and Ant are being too generous in characterizing this 
as an "alternative" view or whatever. I think its just a lack a 
comprehension. I think its just scatter-brained confusion.

Ant said to Scott.
I think quantum physics is only “odd” for SOM ingrained people.  What is 
actually “odd” is the clinging to old “metaphysical maps” when the physics 
shows that they are now out-of-date (at least, in certain contexts, usually 
the very small or the very large).

Scott said:
Now there are arguments (I've advanced some) for rejecting [the Newtonian] 
worldview, but those arguments by themselves do not imply that "there is" an 
undifferentiated continuum beyond the human subject -- much less that it 
deserves the characterization "aesthetic".

dmb says:
Beyond the human subject? I think Scott is rejecting a Newtonian world view 
without rejecting the SOM framework in which it exists and has missed the 
whole point as a result. I think this is why he continues to confuse 
intellectual descriptions with raw empirical data. Also, this is why Scott 
seems to be taking the phrase "undifferentiated aesthetic continuum" 
literally, as if it refered to some kind of entity or territory or realm 
which can be located and measured like a material object. Boy, is that ever 
missing the point. Double Yikes!

As Ant said, "the following account of a sunset by Northrop might finally 
clarify this"...

“What the astronomer sees as pure fact is the beauty of the sunset. This is 
an aesthetic continuum ablaze with ineffable, indescribable colors of subtle 
shades, differentiated by a two dimensional circular yellow patch of color. 
This differentiated continuum alone is the immediately apprehended fact.” 
[and is the concern of the fine artist]  ...  [On the other hand] “the 
scientific object, the star called the sun, which is a three dimensional 
spherical mass composed of molecules with a mean free path between them 
defining an exceedingly high interior temperature, is a theoretically 
inferred object [i.e. a concept by postulation].  In short, the astronomer's 
sun is not an empirically immediate pure fact, but a highly complicated 
theoretical inference from pure fact.  Furthermore, the existence of this 
astronomical ball of matter is - only indirectly verified, through its 
deductive consequences checked against immediately inspected data such as 
those in the beauty of the sunset; the existence of the scientific object 
which is the sun is not directly observed as pure fact.”  (Northrop, “Logic 
of the Sciences & Humanities”, 1947, p.43)

dmb says:
I think its particularly useful to use the sun as an example because of the 
wildly different ways this raw empirical data has been interpreted. Before 
the Sun was a "spherical mass composed of molecules", a "ball of matter" or 
a "theoretically infered object" it was a God. You see, in the modern 
mythos, matter is the new God. Within the metaphysics of substance, it is 
sheer blasphemy to deny the existence of a pre-exisiting material reality. 
Its just crazy to deny that we are subjects in an objective reality, one 
object among many. Its just insane. And yet, that's what the MOQ does. Well, 
not exaclty. But the point here is that "subject" and "objects" are not 
primary. They are not the cause of experience. As Ant said to Scott, that's 
backwards. The MOQ and Northrop are saying that subjects and objects are 
"theoretically infered" whereas aesthetical qualities are apprehended 
directly and are prior to all such theories. This is called the primary 
empirical reality because it is prior to intellectual theories about 
subjects and objects, not because it is the first objective thing 
encountered by a subject.

Like I said, I wish I had the time to untangle all the wacky Scottisms here, 
but maybe these few examples will help a little. Right now I really have to 
go. I'm scheduled to sacrifice a hairless goat to the sun god this evening 
and I haven't even shaved him yet.

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