[MD] Static latching & faith

[Scott Roberts]

DMB,

Scott replied to the Northrop quotes from Ant:
I see nothing but a spinning of arguments to convince oneself that something
that one is already convinced of can have the word 'empirical' attached to
it.

dmb said to Scott:
...its hard to see how you could miss the point or otherwise fail to
understand what "empirical" means here. Looking at the two quotes we see the
use of terms and phrases such as "colors, sounds, odors, pleasurs, pains,
aesthetic qualities, purely empirically given, immediately apprehended fact
and sense immpressions." How could anyone fail to see how all of these refer
to experience, to raw empirical data? And the terms and phrases refering to
raw empirical experience are contrasted with CONCEPTS about "theoretically
inferred objects" and "external material objects"

Scott repled:
I am not failing to see that. Where have I said they are not empirical? The
question at hand is whether the metaphysical system called the MOQ is "pure
empiricism".

dmb says:
Oh my God! You just said Northop's empircial claims were nothing but "spin",
self-convincing arguements to "attach" empiricism to one's beliefs. And now
you're asking "where" you denied it? You've got to be kidding!?

Scott:
This is a typical example of your creating confusion by not reading what I 
say. I am not denying that colors, sounds, odors, etc. are empirical data. I 
am questioning whether or not Northrop's talk of "undifferentiated aesthetic 
continuum" is empirical. He claims it is empirical, but that don't make it 
so. Can you not see the difference?

DMB continued:
And the
"question at hand" is NOT "whether a metaphysical system" is "pure
empiricism". That you put it that way only shows how thoroughly confused you
are about the basic point.

Scott:
It was Pirsig who said the MOQ is pure empiricism.

DMB said:
 Metaphysical systems are not raw empirical data,
they are full of concepts and theories. All a metaphyscial system can do is
explain the raw empirical data in a coherent way, but that comes after the
raw data and is to be distinguished from it. This is Ant's point. This is
Northrop's point. This is Pirsig's point. This is my point. This is the
point you don't get....

Scott:
I've never claimed that anybody considers metaphysical systems are raw 
empirical data, so why are you saying this? What I am objecting to is 
Pirsig's claim that the MOQ is pure empiricism. That means that the claims 
that the MOQ makes are supposedly free of any non-empirical assumptions. And 
that just isn't true. Hypothesizing an undifferentiated aesthetic continuum 
is not an empirical claim, nor is supposing that Quality applies in 
inorganic existence.

dmb had said:
...Within a SOM framework, the objects of material reality are supposed to
be the cause of that raw
empirical data, but Northrop and Pirsig are saying that this is backwards.

Scott replied:
Fine. They are saying that it is backwards. Does that make it an empirical
truth that it is backwards? No. It is a metaphysical claim. We call such
claims metaphysical to distinguish them from empirical claims.

dmb says:
Huh? The point is that "material objects" are metaphysical, theoretical
inferences. SOM, naive realism, common sense essentialism, the scientific
world view, etc, all assume that experience is caused by the existence of
subjects in an objective reality. This is the view that Pirsig and Northrop
are overturning. Didn't I already say all this?

Scott:
Yes, but that isn't the point I'm disputing.

DMB continued:
 Anyway, they are reversing
our metaphysical assumptions about subject and objects. This then would be a
metaphysical truth. And we say its "more empirical" because experience
begins with the raw data, as described above by extracts from the quotes,
instead of using those metaphysical assumptions as a starting point. But I
already explained this, didn't I?

Scott:
No metaphysical system can get anywhere without some metaphysical 
assumptions as a starting point. Husserl also claimed to be starting with 
the raw data. It didn't stop him from coming up with a system different from 
the MOQ. It is just that Pirsig and Northrop assumed certain mystical 
assumptions that Husserl didn't.

DMB continued:
 In any case, I think your rejection of
this reversal means your still working within a SOM framework.

Scott:
But I'm not rejecting this reversal. I'm just not claiming the reversal is 
purely empirical.

DMB continued:
 I think
that's why you've got it backwards with respect to the MOQ. Like I said
Pirsig and Northrop are overturning these materialist assumptions in favor
of a more "radical empiricism", one that does not assume that experience
depends upon pre-existing subjects in an objective physical reality.

Scott replied:
No I am not operating under those assumptions. I am only pointing out that
rejecting those assumptions is not based on empirical data, since the
empirical data is consistent with both accepting those assumptions and
rejecting them.  ...I am only trying to point out that *all* metaphysical
views go beyond the empirical to put together a theory.

dmb says:
Its really amazing how much you can confuse things in a single sentence. I'm
looking at the middle sentence. Man, is that a whopper. Oh, let me count the
ways. For starters, you contradict yourself by saying that the rejection is
"not based on empirical data" before the comma and after the comma you say
"the empirical data is consistant" with rejecting them.

Scott:
Apparently you don't know what 'consistent with the empirical data' means. 
It just means that no empirical data contradicts the theory. No empirical 
data contradicts SOM, and none contradicts the MOQ.

DMB continued:
 On top of that,
Pirsig and Northrop aren't rejecting these assumptions so much pointing out
that subjects and objects are "theoretically infered" from the raw empircal
data. So, if you think their rejection of those assumptions is not based on
empirical experience, then you really have no clue as to what they're
saying. But I already accused you of missing the point, didn't I? I really
love how you continue to miss the point even as you deny missing the
point...

Scott:
Is the inference so theoretical? Isn't there an empirical difference between 
a thought and a sensation? But that's a separate issue. One more relevant is 
that I don't see much difference between inferring subjects and objects and 
inferring an "undifferentiated aesthetic continuum". One goes with the 
latter if one has a prior commitment to a mystical overview.

Scott said to dmb:
Where I have confused intellectual descriptions with raw empirical data?
...I am questioning on what supposedly *empirical* basis Northrop has come
up with the concept "undifferentiated aesthetic continuum". ....why did
Northrop have to come up with a theory about it? Why does he have to tell us
about it? I'm not saying his theory is wrong, just pointing out that it is a
theory, not something we all know prior to theorizing, like we know what it
is like to be in pain.

dmb replies:
Where? All over the place. That's what I've trying to explain. And didn't
you JUST get done saying that the empirical data is "consistent" with either
model? And now you're gonna ask me what data after you just refered to it
yourself. And now you're gonna pretend that YOU are the one interested in
distinquishing theories from the empirical data upon which they're based, as
if Northrop and Pirsig were confused instead of you. Doesn't that just top
it all? Wow! Anyone who reads your posts would certainly know what its like
to be in pain - and that no theory. That's raw empircal truth, baby. Your
posts nver fail to miss the point and are so full of contradictory
non-sense, equivocatons and evasions that it actually hurts to read them.

Scott:
If I've been confusing intellectual descriptions with raw empirical data all 
over the place, it surely couldn't have been difficult to give an example. 
Since you didn't, I'll assume that I haven't been, and your accusation is 
just bluster.

- Scott