[MD] Static latching & faith

[Ham Priday]

SA, Ant, and Scott --


SA complains:
> There seems to be on the one hand Ant talking and
> on the other hand Scott talking and two paradigms
> are talking as a crosswind where something behind
> the assumptions of both are being missed by the other.
> Not to say one is wrong or right, at this moment,
> it just seems that Scott and Ant are bringing up
> something that are somehow in the same dialogue,
> and at the same time in a different dialogue."

Ant replied to SA:
> SA, I would certainly agree with that.  Possibly it's
> because I stick fairly closely to clarifying Pirsig's work
> (which is partly derived from Northrop's philosophy)
> while Scott puts more emphasis on introducing other
> writers ...

Scott replied to Ant:
> But of course more germane is the question:
> just because I have a concept by intuition,
> doesn't make it empirical (or true).

To which Ant replied:
> On the contrary, Scott.  Concepts by intuition are
>  the only things which are purely empirical and we
>  know to be true ...
> They are ineffable, aesthetic qualities, the kind of
> thing which the impressionistic artist rather than
> the physicist gives one. Thus again we come to
> the same conclusion. Pure fact is a continuum of
>  ineffable aesthetic qualities, not
> an external material object."

To which Scott replied:
> I see nothing but a spinning of arguments to
> convince oneself that something that one is
> already convinced of can have the word 'empirical'
> attached to it. I see nothing here that rules out the
> old mechanistic Newtonian worldview.

DMB then says:
> Nothing but spin? Its almost had to believe that
> you're sincere, Scott.  I mean, its hard to see how
> you could miss the point or otherwise fail to
> understand what "empirical" means here.
> Looking at the two quotes we see the use of terms
> and phrases such as "colors, sounds, odors,
> pleasures, pains, aesthetic qualities, purely empirically
> given, immediately apprehended fact and sense
> impressions." How could anyone fail to see how all
> of these refer to experience, to raw empirical data?

In "Language, Truth and Logic", Alfred Jules Ayer, argued for the
verification principle of logical positivism in philosophy.  According to
Ayer, analytic statements are tautologies because they are true by
definition, and thus their validity does not depend on empirical testing.
He also claims that a proposition is analytic if its validity depends only
on the definitions of the symbols it contains; it is synthetic if its
validity is determined by the facts of experience.

But what are "the facts of experience"?  My dictionary defines 'empirical'
both as (1): "relying on experience or observation alone, without regard for
system or theory," and (2): "capable of being verified or disproved by
observation or experiment."  It seems to me that there is sufficient
contradiction in these two definitions to make 'empirical' an ambiguous
word.

Thus, David's understanding of sense impressions as "raw empirical data,"
and Ant's assertion that "concepts by intuition are the only things which
are purely empirical" are correct by definition #1.  On the other hand,
Scott's argument for "the old mechanistic Newtonian worldview" on the ground
that to just "have a concept by intuition doesn't make it empirical (or
true)" is correct by definition #2.

As a former Science student, I lean toward Scott on this issue; but I would
also avoid using 'empirical' in any philosophical context where
subjectivity or phenomenalism is the underlying epistemology.  For one
thing, the term is commonly associated with verifiable "facts" that are the
bread & butter of experimental investigation.

I just watched a re-run of "The Nuremburg Trial" in which Spencer Tracy, in
the judge's role, says to a Nazi he has just sentenced: "Just because
something is logical doesn't make it right."  I think we can all agree that
no matter how logical our metaphysical proposition or belief-system may be,
it hasn't stood the test of empirical verification.  And
while I can appreciate the MoQer's need to convince 'physicalists' that
reality is more than atoms and energy, it is pushing the line a bit to call
something as ineffable [to use Ant's term] as esthetic quality "raw
empirical data".

Essentially,
Ham