[MD] Static latching & faith

[david buchanan]

Scott and all MOQers:

Scott said:
...There is no empirical evidence of aesthetic experience in the world of 
amoebas or atoms, etc. The only reply I've got from this (from DMB) is that 
the empirical data from quantum physics shows that the old Newtonian 
worldview of spatiotemporal value-free determinism is wrong, and that a 
'preference' model of the subatomic world is consistent with the empirical 
data. The fallacy here is that other models are also non-Newtonian, yet are 
consistent with the empirical data (e.g., a non-local determinism), and so 
selecting a preference model is based on a prior assumption, not on
empirical data.

dmb says:
Apparently, you are using a very strange definition of "empirical". It seems 
that its not enough for the perference model to be consistant with the 
empirical data. Somehow, you imagine that this model is NOT empirical 
because its not the ONLY consistant model. Somehow, you seem to think that 
"empirical" entails a kind of unique or exclusive exclusive truth. I mean, 
how does the consistancy of other models invalidate the consistancy of the 
preference model? And you're using this weird non-sense to point at a 
fallacy? The "preference" model is simply designed to describe the 
"behaviour" of subatomic particles as they are revealed in scientific 
experiments. I honestly don't recall anyone ever claiming that this is an 
exclusive truth. The selection of this model is not forced upon us over all 
the others by the data or anything like that and I honestly don't know where 
you got such an idea.

Scott said:
So I am waiting for responses to these arguments. Bear in mind, though, that 
I am not rejecting these claims. In fact, I agree with them, more or less. I 
am only  rejecting the claim that they have an empirical basis, and so the 
MOQ is not "pure empiricism" as Pirsig claims it to be.

dmb replies:
For a little clarity about the word "empiricism", I'll ask you to look at my 
reply to Ham on that topic. Here it seems your "arguments" are based on 
several misconceptions. I'm not sure how to untangle them, but here for 
example you seem to think that "pure empiricism" means that there is no 
theory at all. Hard to imagine a metaphysical system without moving beyond 
the empirical data itself and into some kind of theory about that data. You 
don't seem to get the simple idea that intellectual descriptions only need 
to be BASED on experience for us to call them empirical. Everything past 
that is debatable. A theory only needs to be consistant with the data, it 
does not have to be the one and ONLY consistant theory. It doesn't have to 
rule out all the others for it to be considered empirically valid. 
Ironically, all of this is in fact part of Pirsig's move to allow more than 
one construction, which is what happens when we assume experience begins 
with subjects and objects.  Sorry Scott, but I think your "arguments" make 
very little sense. I've noticed that whenever you're spreading the confusion 
around, it usually entails the use of strange definition.

So tell me Scott. What, in your world, does "empirical" mean? What does it 
mean for an idea to be consistant with empirical data? What do you think 
Pirsig is claiming by say saying that the MOQ is "pure empiricism"? And 
aren't you confusing that with the idea that radical empiricism is based on 
"pure experience" as its explained at the end of chapter 29?

Good luck!
dmb

_________________________________________________________________
Don’t just search. Find. Check out the new MSN Search! 
http://search.msn.click-url.com/go/onm00200636ave/direct/01/