[MD] Static latching & faith

[david buchanan]

Scott:

Man, you never fail to miss the point. I just don't have the time or 
inclination to offer further comments right now, but let me just say that 
you really need to look at the difference between the dictionary's 
scientific empiricism and the MOQ's radical empiricism. Otherwise, this 
whole issue will remain hopelessly confused.

dmb


>From: "Scott Roberts" <jse885 at localnet.com>
>Reply-To: moq_discuss at moqtalk.org
>To: <moq_discuss at moqtalk.org>
>Subject: Re: [MD] Static latching & faith
>Date: Sun, 23 Apr 2006 16:31:38 -0700
>
>DMB,
>
>Scott said:
>...There is no empirical evidence of aesthetic experience in the world of
>amoebas or atoms, etc. The only reply I've got from this (from DMB) is that
>the empirical data from quantum physics shows that the old Newtonian
>worldview of spatiotemporal value-free determinism is wrong, and that a
>'preference' model of the subatomic world is consistent with the empirical
>data. The fallacy here is that other models are also non-Newtonian, yet are
>consistent with the empirical data (e.g., a non-local determinism), and so
>selecting a preference model is based on a prior assumption, not on
>empirical data.
>
>dmb says:
>Apparently, you are using a very strange definition of "empirical".
>
>Scott:
>I am using the definitions Ham supplied ("(1): "relying on experience or
>observation alone, without regard for system or theory," and (2): "capable
>of being verified or disproved by observation or experiment.") though
>including a sense of value as empirical. Aren't you the one who insists on
>using dictionary definitions?
>
>DMB continued:
>  It seems
>that its not enough for the perference model to be consistant with the
>empirical data. Somehow, you imagine that this model is NOT empirical
>because its not the ONLY consistant model.
>
>Scott:
>It is the act of *selecting* it over other models that are also consistent
>with the empirical data that  is not empirical, since the justification for
>selecting it was not as described in definition (2). That is, there is no
>empirical test to select it over the other models. The selection was made 
>to
>stay with the prior assumption that Quality applies everywhere, which
>violates definitions (1) and (2).
>
>DMB continued:
>  Somehow, you seem to think that
>"empirical" entails a kind of unique or exclusive exclusive truth. I mean,
>how does the consistancy of other models invalidate the consistancy of the
>preference model?
>
>Scott:
>No, I don't think "empirical" entails a kind of unique or exclusive truth.
>Where did you get that notion from? And where did I imply that the
>consistency of other models invalidates the consistency of the preference
>model? All these models are consistent with the empirical data. The 
>question
>is: why is one of them selected? Answer: it was selected by the MOQ to be
>consistent with an assumption, namely, that Quality applies everywhere.
>
>DMB continued
>  And you're using this weird non-sense to point at a
>fallacy? The "preference" model is simply designed to describe the
>"behaviour" of subatomic particles as they are revealed in scientific
>experiments.
>
>Scott:
>There is no scientific experiment that shows that the behavior of subatomic
>particles is better described with the preference model than with a
>non-local deterministic model, or the many-worlds model, etc. That is why
>the selection of the preference model over the others is non-empirical.
>
>DMB continued:
>  I honestly don't recall anyone ever claiming that this is an
>exclusive truth. The selection of this model is not forced upon us over all
>the others by the data or anything like that and I honestly don't know 
>where
>you got such an idea.
>
>Scott:
>If the preference model were rejected, then so would the MOQ be rejected. 
>So
>the selection of the preference model on the part of the MOQist is forced.
>To put it another way, if the non-local deterministic model were someday
>shown to be true, then the MOQ's assumption that Quality applies everywhere
>would become highly dubious. In that case, it would be better to revert to
>the idea that Quality is just a property of human beings and higher 
>animals.
>
>Scott said:
>So I am waiting for responses to these arguments. Bear in mind, though, 
>that
>I am not rejecting these claims. In fact, I agree with them, more or less. 
>I
>am only  rejecting the claim that they have an empirical basis, and so the
>MOQ is not "pure empiricism" as Pirsig claims it to be.
>
>dmb replies:
>For a little clarity about the word "empiricism", I'll ask you to look at 
>my
>reply to Ham on that topic. Here it seems your "arguments" are based on
>several misconceptions. I'm not sure how to untangle them, but here for
>example you seem to think that "pure empiricism" means that there is no
>theory at all.
>
>Scott:
>Not at all. There are empirical theories, most of them being what we call
>science. For example, the theory that the inorganic is, at the subatomic
>level, non-local, is an empirical theory. The economic theory that increase
>in supply will drive down price is empirical.
>
>DMB continued:
>Hard to imagine a metaphysical system without moving beyond
>the empirical data itself and into some kind of theory about that data.
>
>Scott:
>Correct. But that is a key difference between most metaphysical theories 
>and
>most scientific theories. Metaphysical theories tend to have non-empirical
>features. The only metaphysical theory I can think of that is strictly
>empirical is Hume's, which is to say, skepticism. Bear in mind that I do 
>not
>think it a fault of metaphysical theories that they are, by and large,
>non-empirical.
>
>DMB continued:
>  You
>don't seem to get the simple idea that intellectual descriptions only need
>to be BASED on experience for us to call them empirical.
>
>Scott:
>But that's my point. The preference model is not *based* on any empirical
>data. It is conjecture, and is conjectured to be consistent with a
>metaphysical assumption. All the data shows is that the jump from the
>quantum to the macroscopic cannot be accounted for within Newtonian
>determinism. Any conclusion beyond that is not based on empirical data.
>
>DMB continued:
>  Everything past
>that is debatable. A theory only needs to be consistant with the data, it
>does not have to be the one and ONLY consistant theory. It doesn't have to
>rule out all the others for it to be considered empirically valid.
>
>Scott:
>In that case, every metaphysical theory that is not explicitly rejected by
>some empirical data would be considered empirical. This would include most
>varieties of SOM, solipsism, Ham's essentialism,  and so on. If that's all
>you mean by 'empirical', then it is better to drop the word entirely.
>Descartes' rationalism would be considered empirically valid. After all, he
>didn't assume his own subjective existence, he considered it demonstrated.
>He didn't assume God's existence, but gave an argument for it. These
>arguments are consistent with the data, just not convincing to us.
>
>DMB continued:
>So tell me Scott. What, in your world, does "empirical" mean?
>
>Scott:
>Ham's dictionary definition serves, expanded by including the sense of
>value.
>
>DMB continued:
>  What does it
>mean for an idea to be consistant with empirical data?
>
>Scott:
>As I told you in my last post to you, an idea is consistent with the
>empirical data if the data does not contradict the idea. For example, the
>idea that everything is describable in Newtonian, spatiotemporal
>determinisitic model is contradicted by the empirical data. On the other
>hand, the idea that there is nothing but my experiences is not contradicted
>by the empirical data. So solipsism is consistent with the empirical data.
>That doesn't mean it is a good theory, of course.
>
>
>DMB continued:
>What do you think
>Pirsig is claiming by say saying that the MOQ is "pure empiricism"?
>
>Scott:
>I took the phrase "pure empiricism" from a quote that Ant provided: "I 
>think
>it is extremely important to emphasize that the MOQ is pure empiricism.
>There is nothing supernatural in it."  (Pirsig, 2000e in "A Critical
>Analysis of the MOQ" by Anthony McWatt, p.50)". I take this to mean that 
>the
>MOQ does not include any non-empirical assumptions, that is assumptions
>which make no empirical predictions (definition 2 above). My objection to
>this is: on what empirical data is the assumption that Quality applies
>everywhere based? What empirical test can be made to verify or falsify it?
>
>DMB continued:
>  And
>aren't you confusing that with the idea that radical empiricism is based on
>"pure experience" as its explained at the end of chapter 29?
>
>Scott:
>Pirsig said (from your quote): "So in the MOQ experience comes first,
>everything else comes later. This is pure empiricism, as opposed to
>scientific empiricism, which, with its pre-existing subjects and objects, 
>is
>not really so pure." Well, I suppose one can take this to mean that I can
>assume anything I please as long as I do so "later". But obviously, that is
>not what Pirsig meant. Hence, I assume what he means by "pure empiricism" 
>is
>that all assumptions are based on experience, or can be tested by
>experience. And that, as I have argued, is not the case with the MOQ. It is
>not enough to be consistent with the empirical data. Claiming that God
>exists is consistent with the empirical data (the empirical data does not
>contradict it). But such a claim is not based on empirical data (assuming 
>no
>mystical "presence of God" experience), nor is it empirically testable. The
>same goes for the postulation of an "undifferentiated aesthetic continuum"
>and the claim that Quality applies in the inorganic.
>
>- Scott
>
>
>moq_discuss mailing list
>Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc.
>http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org
>Archives:
>http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/
>http://moq.org.uk/pipermail/moq_discuss_archive/

_________________________________________________________________
Express yourself instantly with MSN Messenger! Download today - it's FREE! 
http://messenger.msn.click-url.com/go/onm00200471ave/direct/01/