[MD] Static latching & faith

[Ant McWatt]

Scott, DMB, Gav, Ham, Platt et al.

Ant commented April 23rd:

Just a quick observation, I thought _the_ question of Scott’s (from April 
20th) was actually:

“What is the empirical basis for postulating DQ as an ‘undivided continuum’?
All experience comes to us divided (e.g., into pleasurable and painful, red
and black, etc.) Why can’t all reality ‘in itself’ be divided (pluralism),
and so why isn’t DQ-as-undivided-aesthetic-continuum being taken on faith
(or at least as a non-empirical assumption)? - Scott”

Ant continued April 23rd:

As I mentioned at the time “undivided continuum” is not a phrase used by
Northrop, Pirsig or myself (i.e. it’s partly a strawman as no-one is saying
that the aesthetic continuum is “undivided”) so the central issue that I’ve
been addressing recently with Scott is that Northrop’s “undifferentiated
aesthetic continuum” (which can be abstracted from the “aesthetic continuum”
in the same way that other particular elements such as colours, sounds etc
are) isn’t just a non-empirical assumption because it’s also directly
observed.

Scott replied April 23rd:

Since I corrected myself in the next and all succeeding posts, I thought it
was obvious that when I said “undivided” I meant to be saying
“undifferentiated”. Frankly, I don’t see much of a difference between the
two terms, but if there is one, let me know.

Ant comments April 24th:

The difficulty with Scott being initially careless with the terminology is 
that it was unclear whether he was referring to Northrop’s “aesthetic 
continuum” (more or less, Dynamic Quality from the Dynamic “world of 
Buddhas” perspective of the MOQ) or the “indeterminate aesthetic continuum” 
(more or less, Dynamic Quality from the static “everyday world” perspective 
of the MOQ).

Ant had quoted F.S.C. Northrop April 23rd:

“Most of the directly experienced field [of the aesthetic continuum] is
vague and indefinite.  Only at what William James termed its center is there
specificity and definiteness. Thus it is evident that the indefinite,
indeterminate, aesthetic continuum is as immediately apprehended as are the
specific differentiations within it. Hence, the concept of the indefinite or
undifferentiated continuum, gained by abstraction from the differentiated
aesthetic continuum, is a concept by intuition, not a concept by postulation
[or non-empirical assumption]. (Northrop, “Logic of the Sciences &
Humanities”, 1947, p.97)

Scott noted April 23rd:

That which is vague is so just because one isn’t focused on it.

Ant comments April 24th:

Again, just like the scientific theory you previously mentioned that seeks 
to explain the indeterminate nature of the visual field (i.e. “more photons 
are processed by the central fovea area of the retinal field”) the focusing 
of the eye is just another theoretical concept by postulation (if a high 
quality one) that would _not_ have arisen if the indeterminate aesthetic 
continuum hadn’t been observed in the first place.

And, as I mentioned before, even Daniel Dennett (“Consciousness Explained”, 
1991, pp.53-55) confirms Northrop’s and William James’ observation, at least 
as far as the visual field is concerned:

“The visual field seems to naïve reflection to be uniformly detailed and 
focused from the center out to the boundaries, but a simple experiment 
[moving a playing card from the center to the boundary of the visual field] 
shows that this is not so.”

Scott also noted April 23rd:

Again, this just indicates that some things are experienced in more detail 
than others.

Ant comments April 24th:

Exactly.  However, Northrop is making the case that before us Westerners 
rush off into Dennett’s SOM-land (which is just like Lapland – cold and 
largely colourless - but without the joie de vivre, reindeers or Santa’s 
grotto) we should also be aware that many East Asian philosophies give more 
significance to the “indeterminate aesthetic continuum” - possibly with good 
reason - than Westerners typically do.

“Concepts by intuition are especially and continuously important in the 
traditional Orient. This happens because the Far Easterners have tended to 
be pure empiricists restricting reality to the immediately apprehended.  In 
fact, they identify the Divine with the timeless undifferentiated aesthetic 
continuum.  Consequently, Far Eastern religion is a positivistic, empirical 
and, hence, scientifically veridical religion.” (Northrop, “Logic of the 
Sciences & Humanities”, 1947, p.100)

In an earlier post, Ant had stated April 22nd:

According to Northrop (“The Meeting of East & West”, 1946, p.450) …it is 
with Plato that the undifferentiated aesthetic continuum (given the Platonic 
term ‘the indeterminate dyad’) was first deemed to be untrustworthy and, 
therefore, secondary to the static Forms:

“Thereby, the aesthetic and emotional factors in man’s nature, and in the 
nature of things, were designated as mere appearances and trivial; and the 
emotional and aesthetic foods which the nature of man needs for its 
sustenance were deprecated and ignored.  The Greek and medieval Roman 
Catholic cultures had somewhat the same effect, when following Democritus 
and Plato they branded the sense world as giving spurious knowledge, and 
when following Plato and Aristotle they identified the undifferentiated 
aesthetic continuum. with the principle of evil: restricting trustworthy 
knowledge and the idea of the good and the divine to the unseen theoretic 
component.  This had the effect also of making the cultures of East and West 
incompatible.”

Scott confidently noted:

This is bad philosophology. Few paid any attention to Democritus, and no 
Catholic philosopher would consider the sense world as evil (God made it, so 
it couldn’t be evil). In any case, Shankara of the East was just as 
emphatic, if not more, on seeking wisdom in the permanent, non-sensible, as 
Plato was.

Ant McWatt comments:

Bad philosophology is not citing any evidence (either texts or internet 
articles) for your assertions in the above paragraph.  In any case, 
following your logic, because God made Satan, the latter couldn’t be evil.

Scott had then noted (despite stating later in the same post: “I have no 
experience of an undifferentiated continuum”!!!):

>It seems to me that [indeterminate aesthetic continuum] can be replaced by 
>the word ‘subject’ in its intentional sense (not in its Cartesian sense) -- 
>that which is aware of
>all objects, including mental objects.

Ant had stated April 22nd:

No it can’t.  A “subject” is a concept by postulation (i.e. purely
theoretical) and is logically derived at a later point in Northrop’s
conceptual “train of thought”.

Scott replied April 22nd:

How can one conceptually postulate that which has no form? By intentional
subject I mean that which is aware of all objects, including the
objectivized self.

Ant McWatt comments:

Again, this just strikes me as another form of SOM (a subject being aware of 
an object).

Scott continued April 22nd:

It is a pity that Pirsig did not distinguish between the
intentional subject and the Cartesian subject. Only the latter is capable of
being conceptualized. The former bears a strong resemblance to DQ.

Ant McWatt comments:

Well, remember that Pirsig was primarily concerned with understanding the 
essential nature of Quality rather than addressing the number of forms that 
SOM can take.  (I presume he centred on Cartesian SOM as it just happens to 
be the most common and well known form in philosophology).  Moreover, if 
Pirsig had used SOM terminology it would have made it more difficult to 
understand the differences between the MOQ and SOM.  I don’t think awareness 
is a great word to use as a central term in a metaphysics either due to the 
numerous connotations it has e.g. it can imply that things such as rocks and 
atoms have self-consciousness.

Ant had asked April 22nd:

Well, where else do you think the aesthetic resides?

Scott replied:

As far as I can tell *empirically* it might reside in the impressionist
painter, or in the biological SQ of the infant.

Ant comments:

Really?   I’ll keep this answer in mind the next time I see a sunset or 
visit an art gallery. Anyway, I have this infant in front of me.  How can I 
tell *empirically* whether the aesthetic is in its biological SQ or not?

================================

I think DMB and Platt have largely addressed the other important points that 
Scott has raised (e.g. about defining empiricism) so I’m afraid that will 
have to do for now.

Best wishes,

Anthony.



www.robertpirsig.org


.

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