[MD] Static latching & faith

[Scott Roberts]

Ant,

Scott said:
Since I corrected myself in the next and all succeeding posts, I thought it
was obvious that when I said "undivided" I meant to be saying
"undifferentiated". Frankly, I don't see much of a difference between the
two terms, but if there is one, let me know.

Ant comments April 24th:

The difficulty with Scott being initially careless with the terminology is
that it was unclear whether he was referring to Northrop's "aesthetic
continuum" (more or less, Dynamic Quality from the Dynamic "world of
Buddhas" perspective of the MOQ) or the "indeterminate aesthetic continuum"
(more or less, Dynamic Quality from the static "everyday world" perspective
of the MOQ).

Scott:
Well, I thought I was referring to what Pirsig referred to in ZAMM: 
"undifferentiated aesthetic continuum". I can't perceive any practical 
difference between "undivided aesthetic continuum", "undifferentiated 
aesthetic continuum", and "indeterminate aesthetic continuum". Is there any? 
Now here here you mention the plain "aesthetic continuum". Since that 
appears to be something that only Buddhas know about it, I think we can 
safely leave it aside in any discussion of what is empirical. That is, if we 
include the experience of mystics in the empirical, the word loses all 
useful meaning.

So can I safely go on using "undifferentiated aesthetic continuum" as DQ 
from the static "everyday world" perspective? Or do I need to distinguish it 
from "indeterminate aesthetic continuum", and if so, what is the 
distinction?

Ant had quoted F.S.C. Northrop April 23rd:

"Most of the directly experienced field [of the aesthetic continuum] is
vague and indefinite.  Only at what William James termed its center is there
specificity and definiteness. Thus it is evident that the indefinite,
indeterminate, aesthetic continuum is as immediately apprehended as are the
specific differentiations within it. Hence, the concept of the indefinite or
undifferentiated continuum, gained by abstraction from the differentiated
aesthetic continuum, is a concept by intuition, not a concept by postulation
[or non-empirical assumption]. (Northrop, "Logic of the Sciences &
Humanities", 1947, p.97)

Scott noted April 23rd:

That which is vague is so just because one isn't focused on it.

Ant comments April 24th:

Again, just like the scientific theory you previously mentioned that seeks
to explain the indeterminate nature of the visual field (i.e. "more photons
are processed by the central fovea area of the retinal field") the focusing
of the eye is just another theoretical concept by postulation (if a high
quality one) that would _not_ have arisen if the indeterminate aesthetic
continuum hadn't been observed in the first place.

Scott:
It is hardly a scientific theory to note that if I turn my head I stop 
focusing on one thing and start focusing on another, that if I note 
something vague in my peripheral vision I can turn my head to focus on it, 
making it less vague.

Ant said:
And, as I mentioned before, even Daniel Dennett ("Consciousness Explained",
1991, pp.53-55) confirms Northrop's and William James' observation, at least
as far as the visual field is concerned:

"The visual field seems to naïve reflection to be uniformly detailed and
focused from the center out to the boundaries, but a simple experiment
[moving a playing card from the center to the boundary of the visual field]
shows that this is not so."

Scott also noted April 23rd:

Again, this just indicates that some things are experienced in more detail
than others.

Ant comments April 24th:

Exactly.  However, Northrop is making the case that before us Westerners
rush off into Dennett's SOM-land (which is just like Lapland - cold and
largely colourless - but without the joie de vivre, reindeers or Santa's
grotto) we should also be aware that many East Asian philosophies give more
significance to the "indeterminate aesthetic continuum" - possibly with good
reason - than Westerners typically do.

Scott:
But is this indeterminate aesthetic continuum just vague peripheral vision 
or is it completely indeterminate: no form whatsoever? It has to be the 
latter, or there is no point in even mentioning it as a philosophical big 
deal. So I am assuming that what the East Asian philosophies are referring 
to is something mystical -- a state of consciousness of complete absence of 
form.

Ant said:
"Concepts by intuition are especially and continuously important in the
traditional Orient. This happens because the Far Easterners have tended to
be pure empiricists restricting reality to the immediately apprehended.  In
fact, they identify the Divine with the timeless undifferentiated aesthetic
continuum.  Consequently, Far Eastern religion is a positivistic, empirical
and, hence, scientifically veridical religion." (Northrop, "Logic of the
Sciences & Humanities", 1947, p.100)

Scott:
As I thought: the undifferentiated aesthetic continuum is Divine, which is 
to say, it is not part of the experience of everyday, non-mystically 
Awakened people. So to base a philosophy on it is to base a philosophy on 
faith (faith that the mystics who report such experience are reporting 
authentically), and such a philosophy is not empirical. Using this logic of 
Northrop's, one can say "Christian mystics have throughout the ages have 
reported an ecstatic, timeless experience of being in the presence of God, 
consequently Christianity is a positivistic, empirical and, hence, 
scientifically veridical religion".

In an earlier post, Ant had stated April 22nd:

According to Northrop ("The Meeting of East & West", 1946, p.450) .it is
with Plato that the undifferentiated aesthetic continuum (given the Platonic
term 'the indeterminate dyad') was first deemed to be untrustworthy and,
therefore, secondary to the static Forms:

"Thereby, the aesthetic and emotional factors in man's nature, and in the
nature of things, were designated as mere appearances and trivial; and the
emotional and aesthetic foods which the nature of man needs for its
sustenance were deprecated and ignored.  The Greek and medieval Roman
Catholic cultures had somewhat the same effect, when following Democritus
and Plato they branded the sense world as giving spurious knowledge, and
when following Plato and Aristotle they identified the undifferentiated
aesthetic continuum. with the principle of evil: restricting trustworthy
knowledge and the idea of the good and the divine to the unseen theoretic
component.  This had the effect also of making the cultures of East and West
incompatible."

Scott confidently noted:

This is bad philosophology. Few paid any attention to Democritus, and no
Catholic philosopher would consider the sense world as evil (God made it, so
it couldn't be evil). In any case, Shankara of the East was just as
emphatic, if not more, on seeking wisdom in the permanent, non-sensible, as
Plato was.

Ant McWatt comments:

Bad philosophology is not citing any evidence (either texts or internet
articles) for your assertions in the above paragraph.  In any case,
following your logic, because God made Satan, the latter couldn't be evil.

Scott:
Sorry. But what I said is the case. If you don't believe me, ignore it, as 
its not relevant to this thread.

Ant said:
Scott had then noted (despite stating later in the same post: "I have no
experience of an undifferentiated continuum"!!!):

>It seems to me that [indeterminate aesthetic continuum] can be replaced by
>the word 'subject' in its intentional sense (not in its Cartesian sense) -- 
>that which is aware of
>all objects, including mental objects.

Scott:
No contradiction here. I have no experience *of* the intentional subject. It 
cannot be an object of experience. It is postulated (by me) and Realized by 
some mystics (e.g., Merrell-Wolff, who calls it Pure Subject, and also calls 
that state of consciousness Nirvana), and in his description it sounds just 
like a Realization of the undifferentiated aesthetic continuum 
("Consciousness of absence of objects is Nirvana", as he puts it in his 
aphorisms).

Ant had stated April 22nd:

No it can't.  A "subject" is a concept by postulation (i.e. purely
theoretical) and is logically derived at a later point in Northrop's
conceptual "train of thought".

Scott replied April 22nd:

How can one conceptually postulate that which has no form? By intentional
subject I mean that which is aware of all objects, including the
objectivized self.

Ant McWatt comments:

Again, this just strikes me as another form of SOM (a subject being aware of
an object).

Scott:
It looks like I've contradicted myself (since above I said I postulate the 
intentional subject). So I retract what I said April 22.What I mean is that 
I can say "there is a somewhat (called an intentional subject) which is 
aware of all objects",  in the same way that I can postulate that "since 
there is a continual awareness of changing objects, I can postulate that 
there is an undifferentiated aesthetic continuum".  What I am getting at is 
that both of these -- for me and I assume for any non-mystic -- are just 
postulations. They are not intuitive experiences, except for the mystic. 
Hence neither is empirical, except for the mystic.

Scott continued April 22nd:

It is a pity that Pirsig did not distinguish between the
intentional subject and the Cartesian subject. Only the latter is capable of
being conceptualized. The former bears a strong resemblance to DQ.

Ant McWatt comments:

Well, remember that Pirsig was primarily concerned with understanding the
essential nature of Quality rather than addressing the number of forms that
SOM can take.  (I presume he centred on Cartesian SOM as it just happens to
be the most common and well known form in philosophology).  Moreover, if
Pirsig had used SOM terminology it would have made it more difficult to
understand the differences between the MOQ and SOM.  I don't think awareness
is a great word to use as a central term in a metaphysics either due to the
numerous connotations it has e.g. it can imply that things such as rocks and
atoms have self-consciousness.

Scott:
Perhaps. The problem with the MOQ (one of them) is that Pirsig doesn't say 
anything about (choose a word: consciousness, awareness, self-awareness, 
etc.). That is, he offers nothing with which to discuss philosophical 
problems which use these terms. That is how he could get away with not 
making the distinction, but as a consequence there is a good deal of 
confusion in trying to compare the MOQ with other philosophies.

Ant had asked April 22nd:

Well, where else do you think the aesthetic resides?

Scott replied:

As far as I can tell *empirically* it might reside in the impressionist
painter, or in the biological SQ of the infant.

Ant comments:

Really?   I'll keep this answer in mind the next time I see a sunset or
visit an art gallery. Anyway, I have this infant in front of me.  How can I
tell *empirically* whether the aesthetic is in its biological SQ or not?

Scott:
Precisely. We can't tell, empirically. So to claim that the aesthetic is not 
"just subjective" (that is, just a property of people and higher animals 
with the requisite nervous systems) is not an empirical claim. As I see it, 
the MOQ has adopted it either because Pirsig has had personal mystical 
experience (in which case for us to adopt it requires faith in Pirsig) or 
because Pirsig has faith in mystics. Either way, for us non-mystics, the MOQ 
is based on faith, not empirical data.

- Scott