[MD] Static latching & faith

[Scott Roberts]

SA,

     Scott said:  "This is why I made the distinction
between intentional subject and Cartesian subject -- a
distinction which Pirsig unfortunately seems to be
unaware of.  The latter is human mentality. The former
is that which takes *anything* as an object, including
human mentality. Merrell-Wolff describes it as the
thread on which all objects --including thoughts,
feelings, the idea of oneself, and of course perceived
objects -- are strung. Now M-W holds that this thread
is more or less like Northrop's field, and I agree
with that.  But *empirically*, there is no way to
choose between this view and a view
such as Dennett's that this thread is just a
convenient fiction."

SA said:
     Is your argument about the 'thread' dealing with
(a) the world is connected together [by this 'thread']
or (b) the world is actually separated [and the
'thread' is a human concept]?

Scott:
Yes. My argument is that one can't argue (a) over (b) (or vice versa) on the 
basis of empirical evidence.

SA said:
     Scott said in the most recent post of his:  "the
undifferentiated aesthetic continuum is Divine, which
is to say, it is not part of the experience of
everyday, non-mystically Awakened people. So to base a
philosophy on it is to base a philosophy on faith
(faith that the mystics who report such experience are
reporting authentically), and such a philosophy is not
empirical."

     The undifferentiated aesthetic continuum is
ordinary life.  Ordinary life is mystical, but if
mystical becomes something non-empirical then it is
not ordinary life.  The ordinary life of me walking
outside of the house listening to the birds sing or
sitting here at the computer listening to the birds
sing is a sound I cannot talk or type to you. You
have to hear the songs with your own ear.  It is both
breathtaking, awe-inspiring, and yet ordinary life.
DQ is here in this quiet moment, and then I try to
discuss this with you and the empirical world that I
experience transforms via ordinary human mind into a
topic about birds singing that we humans could
question, describe, and not fully sing to each other,
thus, the experience is not of my wording and I could
theorize about these birds and bring out the
instruments of science to record their songs.  I still
also experience just sitting here and listening,
letting all the questions and wonderings of this
moment pass on by as the song goes from note to note.
     To notice the empirical or if something is not
empirical is to notice DQ then put it into static
patterns of non-empiricality.  The empirical of DQ
conceptualized by values that conceptualize SQ.  I
think this is how empirical could be used in a MOQ
discussion.
     I could listen to the bird, draw the bird,
scientifically measure the bird, but what is this bird
really, that so much can come of it by us human beings
on this earth?  What is this ordinary life so within
reach scientifically, yet, at the same time so
conceptually out of reach by such events that go on
and on each new day to put the sun in such a
conceptual position that has changed for humans over
and over again?  DQ I would say.

Scott:
What is your response to someone who says "Gee that's poetic, but 
philosophically not worth a damn to anyone but yourself"? One might ask: "If 
you've got birds and computers, isn't your experience differentiated?" And 
so on. Here's the point I am trying to make: in the modern age (since the 
17th century) the word 'empirical' has been used to distinguish information 
gathered from the senses from information produced through reason alone (for 
example, mathematics), and from information with no apparent source at all 
(e.g., superstition). Now Pirsig is making a rhetorical move in saying that 
the MOQ is empirical. Here's what Ken Wilber had to say about this 
rhetorical move: [Eye to Eye, p. 43]

"Let me repeat that one of the reasons that ambiguity can and does occur is 
that "experience" can be used in the broad sense ("direct awareness"), but 
then also given a common and much narrower meaning: *sensory* perceptions. 
By consciously or unconciously juxtaposing  those meanings, the modern-day 
empiricist can ridicule the idea of knowledge outside experience (so far, so 
good), but then *limit* experience to the sensory-empiric modes 
(reductionistic fallacy, category error, etc.). And so to completely 
confound matters, many of the new humanistic and transpersonal 
psychologists, working mostly with intelligibilia and transcendentalia, and 
correctly realizing that their data is indeed experiential (in the broad 
sense), and wishing equal recognition as "real sciences", simply *call* 
their endeavors and their data "empirical", only to find that strict 
empirical scientists simply reject their results, sometimes with undisguised 
mocking."

"To avoid these ambiguities, I will restrict the term "empirical" to its 
original meaning: knowledge grounded in sensory experience (sensibilia). I 
suggest humanistic and transpersonal psychologists do the same. Classical 
empiricism was an attempt to reduce all higher knowledge and experience to 
sensory knowledge and experience. The emphasis on direct experience (in the 
broad sense) was the great and enduring contribution of the empiricists; the 
reduction of experience to sensory experience was their great and enduring 
crime."

So one can say that the mystics' experience of an undifferentiated aesthetic 
continuum is valid knowledge for them, and your blissing out on birds is 
valid knowledge for you. But it is not transferable to me in the way that 
traditionally-described empirical knowledge is. So I agree with Wilber that 
it is useful to keep to the traditional meaning of empirical to avoid 
confusion. As he says, and I agree, this does not make the MOQ wrong. Just 
that it is a mistake to label it empirical.

- Scott