[MD] Static latching & faith

[Joseph Maurer]

On 26 April 2006 11:14 AM Scott Roberts writes to SA

<snip>

So one can say that the mystics' experience of an undifferentiated aesthetic
continuum is valid knowledge for them, and your blissing out on birds is
valid knowledge for you. But it is not transferable to me in the way that
traditionally-described empirical knowledge is. So I agree with Wilber that
it is useful to keep to the traditional meaning of empirical to avoid
confusion. As he says, and I agree, this does not make the MOQ wrong. Just 
that it is a mistake to label it empirical.


Hi Scott and SA,

IMO language games require rules. I do not think that Wikipedia is a good 
umpire. For mathematics, and the physical sciences Gravity has been a better 
umpire.

IMO at one point you chose L of CI (Logic of Contradictory Identity) as an 
umpire. IMO one fork of that trident was empirical. If only one fork of the 
MOQ is empirical, can the whole MOQ be called empirical by analogy, if a 
trident is a real umpire? If the Metaphysics of DQ/SQ, where SQ is 
apprehended mystically, implies that the mystical component is material, 
then IMO the MOQ is empirical, and a good umpire.  To hold the mystical 
apart from the material, hinders evolution.

Joe

----- Original Message ----- 
From: "Scott Roberts" <jse885 at localnet.com>
To: <moq_discuss at moqtalk.org>
Sent: Wednesday, April 26, 2006 11:14 AM
Subject: Re: [MD] Static latching & faith


> SA,
>
>     Scott said:  "This is why I made the distinction
> between intentional subject and Cartesian subject -- a
> distinction which Pirsig unfortunately seems to be
> unaware of.  The latter is human mentality. The former
> is that which takes *anything* as an object, including
> human mentality. Merrell-Wolff describes it as the
> thread on which all objects --including thoughts,
> feelings, the idea of oneself, and of course perceived
> objects -- are strung. Now M-W holds that this thread
> is more or less like Northrop's field, and I agree
> with that.  But *empirically*, there is no way to
> choose between this view and a view
> such as Dennett's that this thread is just a
> convenient fiction."
>
> SA said:
>     Is your argument about the 'thread' dealing with
> (a) the world is connected together [by this 'thread']
> or (b) the world is actually separated [and the
> 'thread' is a human concept]?
>
> Scott:
> Yes. My argument is that one can't argue (a) over (b) (or vice versa) on 
> the
> basis of empirical evidence.
>
> SA said:
>     Scott said in the most recent post of his:  "the
> undifferentiated aesthetic continuum is Divine, which
> is to say, it is not part of the experience of
> everyday, non-mystically Awakened people. So to base a
> philosophy on it is to base a philosophy on faith
> (faith that the mystics who report such experience are
> reporting authentically), and such a philosophy is not
> empirical."
>
>     The undifferentiated aesthetic continuum is
> ordinary life.  Ordinary life is mystical, but if
> mystical becomes something non-empirical then it is
> not ordinary life.  The ordinary life of me walking
> outside of the house listening to the birds sing or
> sitting here at the computer listening to the birds
> sing is a sound I cannot talk or type to you. You
> have to hear the songs with your own ear.  It is both
> breathtaking, awe-inspiring, and yet ordinary life.
> DQ is here in this quiet moment, and then I try to
> discuss this with you and the empirical world that I
> experience transforms via ordinary human mind into a
> topic about birds singing that we humans could
> question, describe, and not fully sing to each other,
> thus, the experience is not of my wording and I could
> theorize about these birds and bring out the
> instruments of science to record their songs.  I still
> also experience just sitting here and listening,
> letting all the questions and wonderings of this
> moment pass on by as the song goes from note to note.
>     To notice the empirical or if something is not
> empirical is to notice DQ then put it into static
> patterns of non-empiricality.  The empirical of DQ
> conceptualized by values that conceptualize SQ.  I
> think this is how empirical could be used in a MOQ
> discussion.
>     I could listen to the bird, draw the bird,
> scientifically measure the bird, but what is this bird
> really, that so much can come of it by us human beings
> on this earth?  What is this ordinary life so within
> reach scientifically, yet, at the same time so
> conceptually out of reach by such events that go on
> and on each new day to put the sun in such a
> conceptual position that has changed for humans over
> and over again?  DQ I would say.
>
> Scott:
> What is your response to someone who says "Gee that's poetic, but
> philosophically not worth a damn to anyone but yourself"? One might ask: 
> "If
> you've got birds and computers, isn't your experience differentiated?" And
> so on. Here's the point I am trying to make: in the modern age (since the
> 17th century) the word 'empirical' has been used to distinguish 
> information
> gathered from the senses from information produced through reason alone 
> (for
> example, mathematics), and from information with no apparent source at all
> (e.g., superstition). Now Pirsig is making a rhetorical move in saying 
> that
> the MOQ is empirical. Here's what Ken Wilber had to say about this
> rhetorical move: [Eye to Eye, p. 43]
>
> "Let me repeat that one of the reasons that ambiguity can and does occur 
> is
> that "experience" can be used in the broad sense ("direct awareness"), but
> then also given a common and much narrower meaning: *sensory* perceptions.
> By consciously or unconciously juxtaposing  those meanings, the modern-day
> empiricist can ridicule the idea of knowledge outside experience (so far, 
> so
> good), but then *limit* experience to the sensory-empiric modes
> (reductionistic fallacy, category error, etc.). And so to completely
> confound matters, many of the new humanistic and transpersonal
> psychologists, working mostly with intelligibilia and transcendentalia, 
> and
> correctly realizing that their data is indeed experiential (in the broad
> sense), and wishing equal recognition as "real sciences", simply *call*
> their endeavors and their data "empirical", only to find that strict
> empirical scientists simply reject their results, sometimes with 
> undisguised
> mocking."
>
> "To avoid these ambiguities, I will restrict the term "empirical" to its
> original meaning: knowledge grounded in sensory experience (sensibilia). I
> suggest humanistic and transpersonal psychologists do the same. Classical
> empiricism was an attempt to reduce all higher knowledge and experience to
> sensory knowledge and experience. The emphasis on direct experience (in 
> the
> broad sense) was the great and enduring contribution of the empiricists; 
> the
> reduction of experience to sensory experience was their great and enduring
> crime."
>
> So one can say that the mystics' experience of an undifferentiated 
> aesthetic
> continuum is valid knowledge for them, and your blissing out on birds is
> valid knowledge for you. But it is not transferable to me in the way that
> traditionally-described empirical knowledge is. So I agree with Wilber 
> that
> it is useful to keep to the traditional meaning of empirical to avoid
> confusion. As he says, and I agree, this does not make the MOQ wrong. Just
> that it is a mistake to label it empirical.
>
> - Scott
>
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