[MD] Static latching & faith

[Scott Roberts]

Ant,

Scott replied April 24th:
Well, I thought I was referring to what Pirsig referred to in ZAMM:
"undifferentiated aesthetic continuum". I can't perceive any practical
difference between "undivided aesthetic continuum", "undifferentiated
aesthetic continuum", and "indeterminate aesthetic continuum". Is there any?
Now here you mention the plain "aesthetic continuum". Since that
appears to be something that only Buddhas know about it, I think we can
safely leave it aside in any discussion of what is empirical. That is, if we
include the experience of mystics in the empirical, the word loses all
useful meaning.

Ant comments:

The aesthetic continuum is _everything_ that is immediately apprehended.  To
remind ourselves: "All other concepts by intuition derive from it by
abstraction. By 'abstraction' we mean. the consideration of certain
immediately apprehended factors apart from their immediately apprehended
context."

"There is:

(a) the field or continuum apart from the differentiations within it or the
definite properties which characterize it, and there are

(b) the differentiations or definite properties apart from the continuum
which runs through them and embraces them.

The former, (a), we shall call the indefinite or undifferentiated aesthetic
continuum,
the latter, (b), since they are many in number, the differentiations."

(Northrop, "Logic of the Sciences & Humanities", 1947, p.96)

Northrop then provided an answer to Scott's query for why "the
undifferentiated aesthetic continuum" isn't taken on faith (or at least as a
non-empirical assumption):

"The Concept of the Indefinite or Undifferentiated Aesthetic Continuum [is
the] most difficult of these. concepts for the Westerner to appreciate.
because of the influence of Berkeley and Hume.  They insisted that all
concepts are concepts by intuition but tended to regard the continuum as
nothing but an aggregation of secondary and tertiary qualities. That this is
false, an examination of what one immediately apprehends will indicate. We
directly inspect not merely the white and the noise but also these in a
field. The field is as immediately given as any specific quality, whether
secondary or tertiary, within it."

"Moreover, most of the directly experienced field is vague and indefinite.
Only at what William James termed its center is there specificity and
definiteness. Thus it is evident that the indefinite, indeterminate,
aesthetic continuum is as immediately apprehended as are the specific
differentiations within it. Hence, the concept of the indefinite or
undifferentiated continuum, gained by abstraction from the differentiated
aesthetic continuum, is a concept by intuition, not a concept by postulation
[or non-empirical assumption]. (Northrop, "Logic of the Sciences &
Humanities", 1947, p.97)

Scott said:
It is hardly a scientific theory to note that if I turn my head I stop
focusing on one thing and start focusing on another, that if I note
something vague in my peripheral vision I can turn my head to focus on it,
making it less vague.

Ant comments:

Agreed, the above is a hardly a scientific theory but _it is still a theory_
and therefore a concept by postulation.  Again, it is a concept by
postulation which would not have been thought of in the first place if the
indeterminate component of the aesthetic continuum hadn't been observed in
the first place.  You keep missing this important logical point (Don't worry
you're in good company with most Western philosophers such as Dennett).

Scott:
I fail to see why the field isn't also a concept by postulation. The 
difference between Northrop and Dennett is that Northrop says there is this 
unobserved field in addition to the variety of aesthetic experiences, while 
Dennett does not say there is such a field. How do we choose between these 
options? Not empirically, as far as I can see. Northrop says "Moreover, most 
of the directly experienced field is vague and indefinite.  Only at what 
William James termed its center is there specificity and definiteness.". 
Fine, there are more and less vague aesthetic experiences. But he then 
infers from this: "Thus it is evident that the indefinite, indeterminate, 
aesthetic continuum is as immediately apprehended as are the specific 
differentiations within it." But this does not logically follow, no more 
than the existence of the "best" follows from the existence of the better or 
worse. Thus his claim is not empirical. There is no empirical means for 
testing the difference between Northrop's view and Dennett's.


Ant commented April 24th:

Exactly.  However, Northrop is making the case that before us Westerners
rush off into Dennett's SOM-land (which is just like Lapland - cold and
largely colourless - but without the joie de vivre, reindeers or Santa's
grotto) we should also be aware that many East Asian philosophies give more
significance to the "indeterminate aesthetic continuum" - possibly with good
reason - than Westerners typically do.

Scott said:
But is this indeterminate aesthetic continuum just vague peripheral vision
or is it completely indeterminate: no form whatsoever? It has to be the
latter, or there is no point in even mentioning it as a philosophical big
deal. So I am assuming that what the East Asian philosophies are referring
to is something mystical -- a state of consciousness of complete absence of
form.

Ant comments:

>From what I can gather the indeterminate aesthetic continuum composes not
just vague peripheral vision, but also vague touch (is that pipe really very
hot or very cold), indeterminate sounds whether just very quiet or in the
distance, vague taste (the few seconds to decide you are drinking a high
quality French wine rather than a table wine) and smell (for instance,
deciding between a synthetic lavender or the real plant).

Scott:
Obviously. This makes no difference to the issue being debated.

Ant quoted Northrop:

"Concepts by intuition are especially and continuously important in the
traditional Orient. This happens because the Far Easterners have tended to
be pure empiricists restricting reality to the immediately apprehended.  In
fact, they identify the Divine with the timeless undifferentiated aesthetic
continuum.  Consequently, Far Eastern religion is a positivistic, empirical
and, hence, scientifically veridical religion." (Northrop, "Logic of the
Sciences & Humanities", 1947, p.100)

Scott said:
As I thought: the undifferentiated aesthetic continuum is Divine, which is
to say, it is not part of the experience of everyday, non-mystically
Awakened people.

Ant comments:

I think it would be better to say that _for Northrop_ the Divine is
associated with the undifferentiated component of the aesthetic continuum
(from a static everyday perspective) and _is_ a logical move made by him
because as the Divine is meant to be indeterminate, it can't reside in the
determinate components of experience/the aesthetic continuum.

However, in correspondence, Pirsig has reservations about locating the
Divine (if equated with Dynamic Quality) with the indeterminate aesthetic
continuum.  If nothing else, I think this is because it starts sounding like
a definition for DQ.  I think Pirsig would relate the Dynamic more to the
aesthetic nature of the immediately apprehended.

"From an everyday world Dynamic Quality is like an undefined perfume which
attaches in different ways to the objects of the world."  (Pirsig to McWatt,
December 1994)

Scott:
This raises two possibilities. One is that this undefined perfume is being 
hypostasized, which is to say it is being postulated. The other is that it 
is just a fact that we value the objects of the world. This second is also a 
postulation. How, empirically, do we choose between them?

Ant continued:
Everyone can get "turned on" by the beauty of a sunset if they only become
mindful of their immediate surroundings (which is where the aesthetic
resides in both the determinate and indeterminate).

Scott:
One gets turned on by the beauty of a sunset. Full stop. What, where, how, 
is this "resid[ing] in both the determinate and indeterminate"? Looks like 
more postulating to me.

Ant quotes:
"Some people know that they know it, and other people, particularly Freshman
rhetoric students, don't know that they know it.  This is in accord with the
Soto Zen Buddhist doctrine that everyone is enlightened.  What occurs at
"enlightenment" is the falling away of the illusion that one is not
enlightened.  But the enlightenment has been there all along."  (Pirsig to
McWatt, August 1997)

Scott:
For the non-mystic this is more postulating.

Scott said:

So to base a philosophy on it is to base a philosophy on faith (faith that
the mystics who report such experience are reporting authentically),

Ant comments:

No, the beauty of a sunset isn't anything to do with faith; it's just the
way it is (as Elvis would say).  Moreover, you're making mysticism sound too
esoteric and mysticism.  Nirvana is the here and now.

Scott:
Of course the beauty of a sunset has nothing to do with faith. It just is. 
It is getting from that beauty to the notion of an "undifferentiated 
aesthetic continuum" and to the proposition that the beauty of the sunset is 
not subjective that has to do with faith. Or at least one gets to these 
postulations non-empirically.

Ant said:
Scott had then noted (despite stating later in the same post: "I have no
experience of an undifferentiated continuum"!!!):

>It seems to me that [indeterminate aesthetic continuum] can be replaced by
>the word 'subject' in its intentional sense (not in its Cartesian sense) -- 
>that which is aware of all objects, including mental objects.

Scott said:
No contradiction here. I have no experience *of* the intentional subject. It
cannot be an object of experience. It is postulated (by me) and Realized by
some mystics (e.g., Merrell-Wolff, who calls it Pure Subject, and also calls
that state of consciousness Nirvana), and in his description it sounds just
like a Realization of the undifferentiated aesthetic continuum
("Consciousness of absence of objects is Nirvana", as he puts it in his
aphorisms).

Ant comments:

The intentional subject (in the above context) sounds like a re-introduction
of the traditional theistic Christian God through the back door while the
undifferentiated aesthetic continuum is noted by immediate apprehension.

Scott:
No, it has nothing to do with theism. This is a red herring if I ever saw 
one. The intentional subject is just a postulated "that which is aware" of 
all the objects, notions, feelings, thoughts, beauty of which there is 
awareness. It is not immediately apprehended. Neither is the 
undifferentiated aesthetic continuum, another postulated notion.

Ant said:
Northrop might have put more emphasis on its indeterminacy and Pirsig on its
aesthetic nature but it's a concept by intuition (part of which needs to be
directly apprehended as in noticing the orange colour in a sunset) not a
concept by postulation (i.e. a theory which is related to concepts by
intuition via hypothesis e.g. the immediately apprehended sunset relates to
a theoretical three-dimensional sphere in public space so many miles away
from the Earth - which, of course, is another theoretical concept by
postulation).

Scott:
I notice the orange color. I don't notice an undifferentiated aesthetic 
continuum. Can't you understand the difference? You (or rather Northrop) 
admitted above that the undifferentiated aesthetic continuum is an 
inference. Thus it is theooretical, like the theoretical three-dimensional 
sphere, rather than like the orange color.

Scott said:

What I mean is that I can say "there is a somewhat (called an intentional
subject) which is aware of all objects", in the same way that I can
postulate that "since
there is a continual awareness of changing objects, I can postulate that
there is an undifferentiated aesthetic continuum".

What I am getting at is that both of these -- for me and I assume for any
non-mystic -- are just postulations. They are not intuitive experiences,
except for the mystic.
Hence neither is empirical, except for the mystic.

Ant comments:

As I mentioned before, the term "intentional subject" has so many
traditional SOM connotations that's absolutely no way I would use it in the
context of the Divine.

Scott:
Those "traditional SOM connotations" are a problem only because one is not 
distinguishing between the intentional subject and the Cartesian subject. 
Merrell-Wolff had no problems with it, but then M-W was a much more careful 
thinker than Pirsig.

Ant continued:
Regarding the issue about the indeterminate aesthetic continuum being aware.
  Again, that _is_ theorising about a component of the immediately
apprehended and therefore a concept by postulation.  Hence, my comment above
that it sounds like your re-introducing a theistic god.

Scott:
Yes, for a non-mystic it is postulation. But so is the undifferentiated 
aesthetic continuum. And neither has any relation to a theistic god.

Scott continued April 22nd:

It is a pity that Pirsig did not distinguish between the intentional subject
and the Cartesian subject. Only the latter is capable of being
conceptualized. The former bears a strong resemblance to DQ.

Ant McWatt commented:

Well, remember that Pirsig was primarily concerned with understanding the
essential nature of Quality rather than addressing the number of forms that
SOM can take.  (I presume he centred on Cartesian SOM as it just happens to
be the most common and well known form in philosophology).  Moreover, if
Pirsig had used SOM terminology it would have made it more difficult to
understand the differences between the MOQ and SOM.  I don't think awareness
is a great word to use as a central term in a metaphysics either due to the
numerous connotations it has e.g. it can imply that things such as rocks and
atoms have self-consciousness.

Scott said:
Perhaps. The problem with the MOQ (one of them) is that Pirsig doesn't say
anything about (choose a word: consciousness, awareness, self-awareness,
etc.).

Ant comments:

Yes, he does though these comments about awareness, consciousness, etc.,
aren't necessarily found in ZMM or LILA.

Scott said:

That is, he offers nothing with which to discuss philosophical
problems which use these terms.

Ant comments:

Most of these philosophical problems found in the traditional Anglo-American
philosophy department which use these terms are SOM problems.  It's nearly
always a incorrect fundamental SOM assumption (such as confusing concepts by
intuition with concepts by postulation) which leads to metaphysical problems
further up the logical track.

Scott:
But closer analysis shows that the MOQ does not actually dissolve these 
problems. That, though, is an essay for another day. Here I am just 
concerned with the MOQ's claim to be "pure empiricism".

Scott said:

That is how he could get away with not making the distinction,

Ant comments:

What distinction?

Scott:
The distinction between intentional subject and Cartesian subject. All the 
dissolving of the problems raised by the S/O division just dissolve problems 
raised by the Cartesian division. They do not work, or do not work as well, 
when confronted with the intentional subject. The notion of DQ in the MOQ is 
actually very similar to the notion of the intentional subject.

Scott said:

but as a consequence there is a good deal of confusion in trying to compare
the MOQ with other philosophies.

Ant comments:

I'll think you'll find "the confusion" in trying to compare the MOQ with
other philosophies is usually with these "other philosophies"!  (Hope I
don't sound too biased!)

Scott:
You are. But this is the philosophology debate. Because the MOQ has not been 
confronted in the professional philosophical arena, there are a lot of weak 
arguments in the MOQ that haven't been challenged. The "pure empiricism" 
claim is one of them.

Ant had asked April 22nd:

Well, where else do you think the aesthetic resides?

Scott replied:

As far as I can tell *empirically* it might reside in the impressionist
painter, or in the biological SQ of the infant.

Ant commented:

Really?   I'll keep this answer in mind the next time I see a sunset or
visit an art gallery. Anyway, I have this infant in front of me.  How can I
tell *empirically* whether the aesthetic is in its biological SQ or not?

Scott said:
Precisely. We can't tell, empirically. So to claim that the aesthetic is not
"just subjective" (that is, just a property of people and higher animals
with the requisite nervous systems) is not an empirical claim.

Ant comments:

The idea that the aesthetic "is just a property of people and higher animals
with the requisite nervous systems" is a concept by postulation and would
not have arisen in the first place if the aesthetic had not been noticed in
immediate experience in the first place.

Scott:
Agree -- but it is a pretty obvious postulate to make. It sure is not 
obvious how there can be aesthetic experiences without sense organs or the 
ability to feel or think. Yet the MOQ claims there are. On what empirical 
basis, I ask.

Scott said:

As I see it, the MOQ has adopted it either because Pirsig has had personal
mystical experience (in which case for us to adopt it requires faith in
Pirsig) or because Pirsig has faith in mystics. Either way, for us
non-mystics, the MOQ is based on faith, not empirical data.

Ant comments:

Well, the aesthetic is immediately apprehended whether it's manifested in a
sunset, the other parts of the natural world (such as a flower or a tiger)
or in a damn good piece of art.  It's part of experience, right here and now
that does not require faith.  I'm afraid there's too much else I can say
about this issue other than "see for yourself".

Scott:
Of course the aesthetic is immediately apprehended and does not require 
faith. I'm not denying that. It's the undifferentiated aesthetic continuum, 
or a hypostasized "undefined perfume which attaches in different ways to the 
objects of the world" that is not immediately apprehended and does require 
faith.

- Scott