[MD] Static latching & faith

[david buchanan]

Scott and all MOQers:

scott said to dmb:
I quoted two paragraphs from Wilber, of which you repeated only the first. 
It is the second that shows the difference between Pirsig and Wilber. ...The 
key sentence is "To avoid these ambiguities, I [Wilber] will restrict the 
term "empirical" to its original meaning: knowledge grounded in sensory 
experience (sensibilia)."

"To avoid these ambiguities, I will restrict the term "empirical" to its 
original meaning: knowledge grounded in sensory experience (sensibilia). I 
suggest humanistic and transpersonal psychologists do the same. Classical 
empiricism was an attempt to reduce all higher knowledge and experience to 
sensory knowledge and experience. The emphasis on direct experience (in the 
broad sense) was the great and enduring contribution of the empiricists; the 
reduction of experience to sensory experience was their great and enduring 
crime." Ken Wilber

dmb says:
No, this does not show the difference between Pirsig and Wilber. Like I 
already said, you're using Wilber to attack Pirsig but Pirsig makes the same 
distinction. I understand that Wilber wants to avoid ambiguities and that, 
at least in this case, he's going to use the word "empirical" in the 
traditional way. But I also happen to know that he uses the word "empirical" 
in the broader sense in his largest and most recent work. I happen to know 
that Wilber most certainly does NOT limit himself to the traditional use of 
the word in Sex, Ecology, Spirituality where he works out his 
epistemological pluralism and develops some ideas toward a science of 
mysticism. But this is all beside the point, which you failed to miss once 
again. The point is that Wilber and Pirsig both make a distinction between 
"sensory experience" and "direct awareness", between the narrow meaning and 
the broader meaning of "experience". Wilber is trying to be clear about the 
difference. In (at least) this one particular case he is doing so by 
limiting himself to the narrow meaning. Pirsig and I might want to remove 
the ambiguity in some other way, like explaining the difference between 
regular empiricism and radical empiricsim for example, doesn't mean we 
disagree with Wilber on that distinction. This is the distinction that seems 
so confused in your questions about the "pure empiricism" of the MOQ. You 
seemed to read Pirsig as if he never made that distinction and you seem to 
be posting Wilber quotes as if this were a new idea. But this is the very 
point you seem to keep missing - even when you quote someone who is making 
that point!

Scott said to dmb:
...Wilber is ALSO saying, is that it is useful to restrict the word 
'empirical' to knowledge gained from sensory experience "to avoid these 
ambiguities". That is what Wilber says, and that is what I say, and in this 
we differ from Pirsig. It's that simple.

dmb says:
I would suggest that there are much better ways to "avoid ambiguity". I 
would even suggest that use of the traditional definition of "empirical" 
makes sense in this context only when we are explaining what the MOQ is not 
saying. We're talking about "radical empiricism" and "the primary empirical 
reality" here, neither of which make any sense if the word "empirical" is so 
restricted. Those phrases can not be rightly understood when the word 
"empirical" is restricted in that way.

You missed this point last time when I said, "the MOQ's radical empiricism 
is an attack on that
definition. It is an attack on sensory experience as its understood by 
positivistic science and common sense.  ...you're trying to understand 
Pirsig claims in terms of what he is attacking..." He explains radical 
empiricims BY CONTRAST with the postivists, who are using this restricted 
definition too. But instead of exploring the difference you want to write it 
all off as Pirsig merely "making a rhetorical move in saying that the MOQ is 
empirical." But, again, they only disagree about a rhetorical tactic, the 
means of being unambiguous. They agree that the distinction is important and 
are careful not to confuse one with the other. Compare....

"...one of the reasons that ambiguity can and does occur is that 
"experience" can be used in the
broad sense ("direct awareness"), but then also given a common and much 
narrower meaning: *sensory* perceptions." Wilber

"I think the trouble is with the word, "experience." ...In a subject-object 
metaphysics, this experience is between a pre-existing object and subject, 
but in the MOQ, there is no pre-existing subject or object....So in the MOQ 
experience comes first, everything else comes later. This is pure 
empiricism, as opposed to scientific empiricism,..." Pirsg

Scott said:
..I agree with Wilber that it is useful to keep to the traditional meaning 
of empirical to avoid confusion. As he says, and I agree, this does not make 
the MOQ wrong. Just that it is a mistake to label it empirical.

dmb says:
Well, you already missed this point last time when I said, "pure empiricism" 
is a criticism of scientific empiricism and a rejection of its metaphysical 
assumptions. The MOQ begins with experience,
but not with sensory experience, not with sense data. It begins with "direct 
awareness" instead of sensory experience because sensory experience depends 
on a pre-existing subject with sense organs. The MOQ's empiricism is "pure" 
in the sense that it does not assert some kind of CAUSE behind experience. 
It does not assert an unseen theoretical reality behind experience. It 
asserts no Platonic forms, no Aristotelean Prime Mover, no Kantian 
things-in-themselves, and no pre-existing subjects and objects. Instead, it 
begins with experience.

See my point? I seriously doubt it.

_________________________________________________________________
On the road to retirement? Check out MSN Life Events for advice on how to 
get there! http://lifeevents.msn.com/category.aspx?cid=Retirement