[MD] Static latching & faith

Sat Apr 29 09:12:49 PDT 2006

DMB,

I am quite aware of the distinction between "sensory experience" and "direct 
awareness", and recognize that the latter is broader than the former. I am 
also quite aware that "experience" does not presuppose some particular S/O 
cause of experience. Pretending that I am not are strawmen of your making.

But here's the issue. What claims are you making that are based on "direct 
awareness"? If they are sense-based then there is one way of justifying them 
to someone else, and these ways are easily carried out. If they are not, 
then how do you justify them to others? The traditional distinction between 
these two is to call the former 'empirical'. To extend the word to the 
latter is to imply that justification is just as straightforward as with 
sense-based awareness, when it isn't. Northrop talks about an 
"undifferentiated aesthetic continuum". What is the philosophical basis for 
talking about it, to respond to someone who says "Whaaa?" To say that it is 
a matter of direct awareness, and therefore empirical, does not help the 
skeptic, who will just say "Show me." Now Ant gave Northrop's argument, but 
it contained this step: "Thus it is evident..." when it is not at all 
evident.

In other words, with the old meaning of empirical, it is relatively 
straightforward to back up an empirical claim ("You don't believe that 
Jupiter has moons? Well, look through this telescope"). This is different 
from the way one backs up a deductive claim ("You don't believe me that the 
square of the sides of a right triangle add up to the square of the 
hypotenuse? Well, here's the proof..."). And both of these are different 
from the way one backs up a mystical claim (which can't really be backed 
up -- and so can at best be taken by the non-mystic as an assumption. There 
are ways to argue for them, but they are different from the traditional 
empirical and the deductive). So by keeping the word 'empirical' restricted 
to its traditional meaning, one knows what sort of arguments to expect to 
back up a claim. By extending it to "direct awareness", one runs into 
trouble. The mystic has direct awareness that everybody else does not have, 
but we all have pretty much the same range of direct awareness that is 
sense-based. That is why it is useful to keep the old meaning.

Now there is something which is direct awareness that we do all share that 
is not something known through the traditional senses (sight, hearing, 
touch, smell, and taste), and that is an awareness of value. So I have no 
objection to extending the word 'empirical' to include this, by, as Pirsig 
says, saying we have a sense of value. It is when one gets to claims for 
which there is no common direct awareness (the claim of an "undifferentiated 
aesthetic continuum" and the claim that there is value in the inorganic in 
the absence of life) that to say these are empirical creates huge 
difficulties.

- Scott

----- Original Message ----- 
From: "david buchanan" <dmbuchanan at hotmail.com>
To: <moq_discuss at moqtalk.org>
Sent: Friday, April 28, 2006 8:07 PM
Subject: Re: [MD] Static latching & faith

Scott and all MOQers:

scott said to dmb:
I quoted two paragraphs from Wilber, of which you repeated only the first.
It is the second that shows the difference between Pirsig and Wilber. ...The
key sentence is "To avoid these ambiguities, I [Wilber] will restrict the
term "empirical" to its original meaning: knowledge grounded in sensory
experience (sensibilia)."

"To avoid these ambiguities, I will restrict the term "empirical" to its
original meaning: knowledge grounded in sensory experience (sensibilia). I
suggest humanistic and transpersonal psychologists do the same. Classical
empiricism was an attempt to reduce all higher knowledge and experience to
sensory knowledge and experience. The emphasis on direct experience (in the
broad sense) was the great and enduring contribution of the empiricists; the
reduction of experience to sensory experience was their great and enduring
crime." Ken Wilber

dmb says:
No, this does not show the difference between Pirsig and Wilber. Like I
already said, you're using Wilber to attack Pirsig but Pirsig makes the same
distinction. I understand that Wilber wants to avoid ambiguities and that,
at least in this case, he's going to use the word "empirical" in the
traditional way. But I also happen to know that he uses the word "empirical"
in the broader sense in his largest and most recent work. I happen to know
that Wilber most certainly does NOT limit himself to the traditional use of
the word in Sex, Ecology, Spirituality where he works out his
epistemological pluralism and develops some ideas toward a science of
mysticism. But this is all beside the point, which you failed to miss once
again. The point is that Wilber and Pirsig both make a distinction between
"sensory experience" and "direct awareness", between the narrow meaning and
the broader meaning of "experience". Wilber is trying to be clear about the
difference. In (at least) this one particular case he is doing so by
limiting himself to the narrow meaning. Pirsig and I might want to remove
the ambiguity in some other way, like explaining the difference between
regular empiricism and radical empiricsim for example, doesn't mean we
disagree with Wilber on that distinction. This is the distinction that seems
so confused in your questions about the "pure empiricism" of the MOQ. You
seemed to read Pirsig as if he never made that distinction and you seem to
be posting Wilber quotes as if this were a new idea. But this is the very
point you seem to keep missing - even when you quote someone who is making
that point!

Scott said to dmb:
...Wilber is ALSO saying, is that it is useful to restrict the word
'empirical' to knowledge gained from sensory experience "to avoid these
ambiguities". That is what Wilber says, and that is what I say, and in this
we differ from Pirsig. It's that simple.

dmb says:
I would suggest that there are much better ways to "avoid ambiguity". I
would even suggest that use of the traditional definition of "empirical"
makes sense in this context only when we are explaining what the MOQ is not
saying. We're talking about "radical empiricism" and "the primary empirical
reality" here, neither of which make any sense if the word "empirical" is so
restricted. Those phrases can not be rightly understood when the word
"empirical" is restricted in that way.

You missed this point last time when I said, "the MOQ's radical empiricism
is an attack on that
definition. It is an attack on sensory experience as its understood by
positivistic science and common sense.  ...you're trying to understand
Pirsig claims in terms of what he is attacking..." He explains radical
empiricims BY CONTRAST with the postivists, who are using this restricted
definition too. But instead of exploring the difference you want to write it
all off as Pirsig merely "making a rhetorical move in saying that the MOQ is
empirical." But, again, they only disagree about a rhetorical tactic, the
means of being unambiguous. They agree that the distinction is important and
are careful not to confuse one with the other. Compare....

"...one of the reasons that ambiguity can and does occur is that
"experience" can be used in the
broad sense ("direct awareness"), but then also given a common and much
narrower meaning: *sensory* perceptions." Wilber

"I think the trouble is with the word, "experience." ...In a subject-object
metaphysics, this experience is between a pre-existing object and subject,
but in the MOQ, there is no pre-existing subject or object....So in the MOQ
experience comes first, everything else comes later. This is pure
empiricism, as opposed to scientific empiricism,..." Pirsg

Scott said:
..I agree with Wilber that it is useful to keep to the traditional meaning
of empirical to avoid confusion. As he says, and I agree, this does not make
the MOQ wrong. Just that it is a mistake to label it empirical.

dmb says:
Well, you already missed this point last time when I said, "pure empiricism"
is a criticism of scientific empiricism and a rejection of its metaphysical
assumptions. The MOQ begins with experience,
but not with sensory experience, not with sense data. It begins with "direct
awareness" instead of sensory experience because sensory experience depends
on a pre-existing subject with sense organs. The MOQ's empiricism is "pure"
in the sense that it does not assert some kind of CAUSE behind experience.
It does not assert an unseen theoretical reality behind experience. It
asserts no Platonic forms, no Aristotelean Prime Mover, no Kantian
things-in-themselves, and no pre-existing subjects and objects. Instead, it
begins with experience.

See my point? I seriously doubt it.

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