[MD] Static latching & faith
david buchanan
dmbuchanan at hotmail.com
Sat Apr 29 11:28:15 PDT 2006
Scott and all MOQers:
Scott said to dmb:
I am quite aware of the distinction between "sensory experience" and "direct
awareness", and recognize that the latter is broader than the former. I am
also quite aware that "experience" does not presuppose some particular S/O
cause of experience. Pretending that I am not are strawmen of your making.
dmb replies:
You say that you are aware of this distinction, but your comments and
questions demonstrate an apparent inability to handle the two concepts
without getting confused. It just kills me that you deny this even while
you're doing it. I mean, maybe its all crystal clear to you in your mind,
but all I have to go on are you posts. Just look at yourself, for God's
sake...
Scott continued:
But here's the issue. What claims are you making that are based on "direct
awareness"? If they are sense-based then there is one way of justifying them
to someone else, and these ways are easily carried out. If they are not,
then how do you justify them to others?...
dmb replies:
You see? You've confused the narrow and broad meanings here. You keep asking
for justification of "direct awareness" as if it were the object of a
physics experiment. You say you understand the distinction but then demand
answers about one in terms of the other. Nobody is saying that "direct
awareness" can ever be justified in the same way that "objective" realites
are measured. And I keep trying to explain that Pirsig is not making any
such claims. You keep asking for the justification for claims that nobody
made. I'm not offering any such justification because I don't think there is
any. All I can do is try to explain why your questions are confused, why
your argument is non-sense and what Pirsig actually is claiming.
Scott said:
The traditional distinction between these two is to call the former
'empirical'. To extend the word to the latter is to imply that justification
is just as straightforward as with sense-based awareness, when it isn't.
dmb replies:
Who said it was "just as straightforward"? Isn't my repeated point just the
opposite? If the broader meaning were "just as straightforward" then in what
sense would it be broader? Again, you claim that you understand this
distinction, but here you demonstate that you are confused about the
difference.
Scott continued:
Northrop talks about an"undifferentiated aesthetic continuum". What is the
philosophical basis for talking about it, to respond to someone who says
"Whaaa?" To say that it is a matter of direct awareness, and therefore
empirical, does not help the skeptic, who will just say "Show me."
dmb replies:
Whats the philosophical basis? Whaaa? Show me the undifferentiated
continuum? Again, you say you get it, but these are clearly the utterances
of a confused person.
Scott continued:
In other words, with the old meaning of empirical, it is relatively
straightforward to back up an empirical claim ("You don't believe that
Jupiter has moons? Well, look through this telescope"). This is different
from the way one backs up a deductive claim ("You don't believe me that the
square of the sides of a right triangle add up to the square of the
hypotenuse? Well, here's the proof..."). And both of these are different
from the way one backs up a mystical claim (which can't really be backed up
-- and so can at best be taken by the non-mystic as an assumption. There are
ways to argue for them, but they are different from the traditional
empirical and the deductive). So by keeping the word 'empirical' restricted
to its traditional meaning, one knows what sort of arguments to expect to
back up a claim. By extending it to "direct awareness", one runs into
trouble. The mystic has direct awareness that everybody else does not have,
but we all have pretty much the same range of direct awareness that is
sense-based. That is why it is useful to keep the old meaning.
dmb says:
I should take this paragraph apart and scrutinize each sentence, but I
won't. Instead, let me just say that the moons of jupiter are seen with the
eye of flesh, the geometric proof with the eye of the mind and the mystical
experience is seen with a third kind of eye, and yes, each kind of
experience has its own rules. In each case, the observer only needs to be
competent in the ability to preform the "experiment" and report the results.
To confirm the moon, one only needs sense organs, but to confirm a logical
proof one needs to be able to "see" what that means. And so it is with
mystical experience. But this is epistemological pluralism. It goes along
quite nicely with radicial empiricism, but is not the same thing. But more
to the point, it seems that it is most definately NOT "useful to keep the
old meaning" of empiricism if your aim is to understand the MOQ. The "old
meaning" is exactly the thing we are trying to overcome with radical
empiricism. Its not useful at all. Its worse than useless. Its confusing and
counterproductive to disallow Pirsig's definitions when were discussing the
MOQ. And frankly, that's the polite way to put it.
Scott said:
Now there is something which is direct awareness that we do all share that
is not something known through the traditional senses (sight, hearing,
touch, smell, and taste), and that is an awareness of value. So I have no
objection to extending the word 'empirical' to include this, by, as Pirsig
says, saying we have a sense of value.
dmb replies:
If all we do is add a sixth sense to the five sense organs, then you're
seriously in danger of retaining the assumptions of SOM. The only difference
is that the pre-existing subjective self has a slightly increased power to
percieve the pre-existing objective world. This simply is NOT what Pirsig
says about his radical empiricism and would leave his object of attack in
tact. This reading would turn Pirsig into nothing more than a romantic
SOMer.
Scott continued:
...It is when one gets to claims for which there is no common direct
awareness (the claim of an "undifferentiated aesthetic continuum" and the
claim that there is value in the inorganic in the absence of life) that to
say these are empirical creates huge difficulties.
dmb says:
I think you are creating the "huge difficulties". You say you understand
that Pirsig is using a broader definition of "empirical" but then insist we
can only use the narrow definition. You see, the narrow definition and the
reductionist materialism that uses it is the very problem Pirsig is trying
to overcome. All that is based on SOM assumptions, which is what the MOQ is
attacking. He's not saying that the undifferentiated continuum is the CAUSE
of experience or that it is a pre-existing entity like a subject or an
object, he's only saying that it all begins with experience and any infered
"causes" or prerequisites are theories that come later. So, again you are
asking for the wrong kind of "empirical" evidence and you're asking for it
to justify a claim nobody made.
See, Pirsig's radical empiricism doesn't make any claims about experience so
much as attack the metaphysical assumptions of those who do. Unlike the
positivists and other SOMers, the MOQ asserts no assumptions about what is
required for experience to occur. It just begins with experience and any
causal explanations come later, as in the hot stove example, which is
another way to explain this same idea. But then, if memory serves, you
hacked that one up badly too.
Imagine if we could only use Newton's definition of "gravity" while
discussing Einstein's theory of "gravity". Wouldn't you object on the
grounds that such a restriction is confusing and kind of stupid? I would. I
would also be very suspicious of the scientific literacy of anyone who
insisted on such a restriction. I might even suggest that the restricter is
a bit confused about physics. That's pretty much what I think of your
fondness for the narrow definition of "empiricism" here.
Thanks for your time,
dmb
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