[MD] Static latching & faith

[Scott Roberts]

David M,

Isn't that what I'm saying? We all here (Pirsig, Wilber, you, me, and DMB) 
consider it a crime to ignore the transcendental. And I'm not saying that 
the transcendental is beyond experience. I'm only saying that certain claims 
in the MOQ depend on the experience of amystical few, and so according to 
Pirsig's usage of 'empiricism', those claims are empirical, but according to 
standard usage, they are seen as being taken on faith (in the mystics who 
produce these claims). What's more, if we try to bracket out those claims, 
the MOQ falls apart (as an 'empirical' metaphysics). Here's what I mean: 
Pirsig argues *without* appeal to mystical revelation that inorganic 
patterns are patterns of value. This claim is "justified" in the following 
paragraph (from chapter 8):

"The only difference between causation and value is that the word "cause" 
implies absolute certainty whereas the implied meaning of "value" is one of 
preference. In classical science it was supposed that the world always works 
in terms of absolute certainty and that "cause" is the more appropriate word 
to describe it. But in modern quantum physics all that is changed. Particles 
"prefer" to do what they do. An individual particle is not absolutely 
committed to one predictable behavior.What appears to be an absolute cause 
is just a consistent pattern of preferences. Therefore, when you strike 
"cause" from the language and substitute "value" you are not only replacing 
an empirically meaningless term with a meaningful one; you are using a term 
that is more appropriate to actual observation."

First (minor) point. Pirsig claims that "cause" is an empirically 
meaningless term, since we have no "direct awareness" of it -- that is, it 
is a word employed in our conceptual framework. On the other hand, one can 
note its usefulness in distinguishing certain patterns we understand in 
terms of "A causes B" from patterns of the form "We don't know why there is 
B". One has found out why a bug in a computer program is occurring when one 
traces its cause. Fix that cause, and the bug is fixed. To say that "the bug 
caused the problem " is not empirical is ludicrous. But onward to the major 
point.

The last clause in the quoted paragraph is simply not true ("[using 'value'] 
is more appropriate to actual observation"). Pirsig just states that 
"Particles 'prefer' to do what they do", but there is no evidence for that 
claim. All the evidence shows is that we do not know why (for example) a 
particle shows up in a particular place. We do know that they show up in 
consistent patterns, but we cannot predict for a particular particle where 
it will show up. To jump from this to saying that they show "preference" is 
non-empirical. There are other possibilities: that where they show up is 
purely random, or that there are "hidden variables" that determine where 
they will show up (that is, where they show up is determined, but we don't 
know why). The only empirical thing one can say (leaving out mystical 
revelation) is that we don't know.

Thus, if we leave out mystical revelation, there is no *empirical* 
justification for claiming that there is value in the inorganic. That means 
that there is no empirical obstacle to claiming that value is an emergent 
property in complex biological creatures, which claim of course leads us 
back into SOM. The two metaphysics (MOQ and SOM -- the latter patched up so 
it doesn't ignore value entirely as in logical positivism) are equally 
adequate and coherent. Thus, the only reason to accept the MOQ over SOM is 
because one has faith in mystical revelation (or, of course, if one has such 
revelation of one's own).

There is a further issue, of course, and that is which mystics one listens 
to, but that's a whole 'nother topic.

- Scott


----- Original Message ----- 
From: "David M" <davidint at blueyonder.co.uk>
To: <moq_discuss at moqtalk.org>
Sent: Sunday, April 30, 2006 10:35 AM
Subject: Re: [MD] Static latching & faith


Hi Scott

I wonder about this. I see your point but push it in this direction and you
have another problem.
If the transcendental is so special, so beyond experience, what is it? how
can we ever know anything
of it? I think the whole point about recognising DQ in experience is that
the doors of perception
can be opened, that the mystical can be recognised in ordinary experience,
that experience has
first rights over the reductions of experience that enable science to get on
with its business.
Let's not ignore the transcendental or forget that the reality of the
transcendental is entirely
apparent in experience, if you can see the movement of DQ which declares the
existence of
borders and border crossings.

regards
David M


> Evolution is hindered if one does that which Wilber (and most of us here)
> considers a crime: to ignore the transcendental. Calling the
> transcendental
> the empirical just adds a red herring.
>
> - Scott
>


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