[MD] Static latching & faith

[david buchanan]

Scott, DM and all MOQers:

Scott said to DMorey:
We all here (Pirsig, Wilber, you, me, and DMB) consider it a crime to ignore 
the transcendental. And I'm not saying that the transcendental is beyond 
experience. I'm only saying that certain claims
in the MOQ depend on the experience of a mystical few, and so according to 
Pirsig's usage of 'empiricism', those claims are empirical, but according to 
standard usage, they are seen as being taken on faith (in the mystics who 
produce these claims).

dmb says:
Its a crime to ignore the transcendental and the transcendental is not 
beyond experience. OK, I'm with you so far. And you're only saying what? You 
object to certain claims that depend on the experience of a mystical few. 
Why? Didn't we all just agree that it was a crime to ignore the 
transcendental experience, like one sentence ago? And why does it matter 
that standard useage disagrees that such things count as empirical when the 
whole point is to get rid of that very useage for the very reason that it 
does not allow such things to be counted as empirical? Why do we care that 
standard useage disagrees and calls it faith when the whole point of the 
MOQ's expansion of rationality is to reject that standard usage and faith? I 
think you have bascially contradicted yourself in the space of two 
sentences. But that doesn't even begin to cover it...

Scott continued:
...What's more, if we try to bracket out those claims, the MOQ falls apart 
(as an 'empirical' metaphysics). Here's what I mean: Pirsig argues *without* 
appeal to mystical revelation that inorganic patterns are patterns of value. 
This claim is "justified" in the following paragraph (from chapter 8):

dmb replies:
Before we get to the quote I have to ask a question or two. What does it 
mean to bracket out those claims. And which claims are you refering to? The 
"certain" claims that rely on "the experience of a mystical few" that you 
didn't identify above either? And how does this ?bracketing of ?claims make 
the MOQ fall apart? How do these bracketed mystical claims relate to this 
preference model, which, as you say, argues without resort to mysticism? And 
weren't you saying the opposite of that just yesterday? And which claim is 
"justified" in this quote? See, I think you're talking about mysticism, 
physics and epistemology all at the same time and its all mixed up. I think 
you're pretty much lost in the woods here. Ah, you are a paragon of clarity. 
  Here's the quote for easy reference, but there is more exciting debate 
below that...

>"The only difference between causation and value is that the word "cause"
>implies absolute certainty whereas the implied meaning of "value" is one of
>preference. In classical science it was supposed that the world always 
>works
>in terms of absolute certainty and that "cause" is the more appropriate 
>word
>to describe it. But in modern quantum physics all that is changed. 
>Particles
>"prefer" to do what they do. An individual particle is not absolutely
>committed to one predictable behavior.What appears to be an absolute cause
>is just a consistent pattern of preferences. Therefore, when you strike
>"cause" from the language and substitute "value" you are not only replacing
>an empirically meaningless term with a meaningful one; you are using a term
>that is more appropriate to actual observation."

Scott said:
First (minor) point. Pirsig claims that "cause" is an empirically 
meaningless term, since we have no "direct awareness" of it -- that is, it 
is a word employed in our conceptual framework. On the other hand, one can 
note its usefulness in distinguishing certain patterns we understand in 
terms of "A causes B" from patterns of the form "We don't know why there is 
B". One has found out why a bug in a computer program is occurring when one 
traces its cause. Fix that cause, and the bug is fixed. To say that "the bug 
caused the problem " is not empirical is ludicrous. But onward to the major 
point.

dmb says:
Trouble shooting a computer is one thing and quantum mechanics is another, 
so I'm not buying your analogy here at all. Looking for causes and reasons 
when a machine breaks down only makes sense. I think Pirsig is just saying 
that it makes no sense to explain the behaviour of particles in terms of 
causation because the word implies "absolute certainty". He's only saying 
that it makes no sense to describe what particles do when they "do what they 
do" in such certain terms because what "they do" is not certain at all. He's 
only saying that, when it comes to the observed behaviour of particles, 
causation doesn't work whereas value does. (And yes, I know the particles 
are not observed making prefereces and they aren't observed with the naked 
eye, but this is still just sensory empiricism insofar as scientific 
instruments are considered extensions of the senses and the explanation is 
seperate from the observed behaviour that it seeks to explain.) I think 
you're making a huge, complicated deal out of a small and simple thing.

Scott continued:
The last clause in the quoted paragraph is simply not true ("[using 'value'] 
is more appropriate to actual observation"). Pirsig just states that 
"Particles 'prefer' to do what they do", but there is no evidence for that 
claim. All the evidence shows is that we do not know why (for example) a 
particle shows up in a particular place. We do know that they show up in 
consistent patterns, but we cannot predict for a particular particle where 
it will show up. To jump from this to saying that they show "preference" is 
non-empirical. There are other possibilities: that where they show up is 
purely random, or that there are "hidden variables" that determine where 
they will show up (that is, where they show up is determined, but we don't 
know why). The only empirical thing one can say (leaving out mystical 
revelation) is that we don't know.

dmb says:
Wow. What a mess! Simply not true! Dude, you're just not getting it and its 
really not that hard. You say that we can't predict where a particle will 
show up AND yet saw there is no evidence for the preference model. But the 
unpredictable behaviour is the very evidence you deny. And so what if there 
are other possibilities. As long as its a coherent explanation about the 
actual observation, then it is empirically based. It only has to make sense 
and agee with experience to be empirically valid and its quite all right if 
there are rival theories. Its inevitiable and lovely too.

Scott said:
Thus, if we leave out mystical revelation, there is no *empirical* 
justification for claiming that there is value in the inorganic. That means 
that there is no empirical obstacle to claiming that value is an emergent 
property in complex biological creatures, which claim of course leads us 
back into SOM. The two metaphysics (MOQ and SOM -- the latter patched up so 
it doesn't ignore value entirely as in logical positivism) are equally 
adequate and coherent. Thus, the only reason to accept the MOQ over SOM is 
because one has faith in mystical revelation (or, of course, if one has such 
revelation of one's own).

dmb says:
If we leave out mystical experience there is no empirical justification of 
the preference model of subatomic particles?! Um, don't you suppose the 
empirical justification for "value in the inorganic" will be found by 
observing THE INORGANIC - in this case the non-lawlike behaviour of 
particles. And likewise, empirical justification for the mystical will be 
found in the observation of states of consciousness, not subatomic particles 
or any other sensory reality. And now you're offering a patched-up SOM over 
the MOQ? Oh jeez, take up the inadequacies of SOM in another thread. That'll 
keep you busy for a few months. I mean, there are tons of reason to prefer 
the MOQ over SOM, even a patch up one. Your patched-up SOM gets absolutely 
no respect from me. Yuk!

Scott said:
There is a further issue, of course, and that is which mystics one listens 
to, but that's a whole 'nother topic.

dmb says:
I'd say the important thing is to listen well and listen broadly. I think 
the MOQ's philosophical mysticism is fundamentally inclusive and the more 
the merrier. But, Scott, here is the point DM made, the one that you managed 
to avoid through that whole mess...

DM said:
...I think the whole point about recognising DQ in experience is that the 
doors of perception can be opened, that the mystical can be recognised in 
ordinary experience, that experience has first rights over the reductions of 
experience that enable science to get on with its business. Let's not ignore 
the transcendental or forget that the reality of the transcendental is 
entirely apparent in experience, if you can see the movement of DQ which 
declares the existence of borders and border crossings.

dmb says:
You sorta lost me somewhere near the border crossing, but otherwise I agree 
emphatically. The MOQ is meant to accomodate everything quantum mechanics to 
mysticism. It wants to include a broader range of experience than SOM's 
scientifiic, sensory empiricism would allow. I'll give you a million dollars 
if you can make Scott see this point.

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