[MD] Some Abominable Beliefs-Part 2
Case
Case at iSpots.com
Sun Aug 20 15:03:13 PDT 2006
dmb says:
I'd agree with your complaints about "muddy thinking," "the supernatural,"
and the lack of "standards". That pretty well sums up my criticisms of
theism. But I don't think we can rightly say the same thing about
philosophical mysticism, especially the philosophical mysticism of the MOQ.
As the name suggests, the "primary empirical reality" is not something one
believes in or conjures up in the imagination. Its an experience. On the
other end of the spectrum, there are enlightenment experiences, which is
really a wide ranging category of experience. But these can be reported and
analyzed just like anything else. I mean, THEE difference between mysticism
and theism is the difference between experience and unrestrained
metaphysical speculation. It the difference between knowing an experience
and having faith in a belief. In fact, the mystics say that this experience
can't rightly be expressed in words, as an intellectual proposition or a
belief of any kind, that it can only be known through non-intelllectual
means. This is what it means to say, "The name that can be named is not the
true name." Lao Tzu
[Case]
So am I to take it the rest of what is said in that fairly lengthy post was
ok? Super!
We are once again at this sticking point over mysticism versus theism versus
materialism. Here is my problem and if you can help me out with it I would
be grateful. I read ZMM shortly after it was published and have read it at
least twice since. I have read Lila six or eight times. I just don't think
it is about mysticism and was very disappointed in joining these forums to
find out that this is the received view. What incarnation of mysticism are
we talking about here? Dan seems to espouse a kind of orthodox Hinduism were
the illusion is all and there is nothing outside it. Mark and gav talk about
oneness with the infinite which seems a bit more Buddhist. Which brand of
philosophical mysticism is the MoQ alleged to favor?
The idea that theism does not offer up genuine mystical experience seems
just wrong to me. While there are the Sufis and the Kabbalists out there, I
am more familiar with garden variety holy rollers. They are grounded in
having members experience a personal relationship with the infinite.
Speaking in tongues, faith healing and handling snakes are direct personal
mystical experiences. Theology aside, what makes this different from
philosophical mysticism in terms of its experiential Quality? Practitioners
of these arts will say their beliefs are confirmed by direct experience and
they will invite you share in these experiences.
While you have expressed one meaning of Lao Tzu's opening words I don't
think that is the only reading. Taoism holds that the fundamental Quality of
the world is change. We can not name something because what we have named
has ceased to exist and is now something else. This is Heraclitus on
steroids. I see Taoism as metaphysical but not necessarily mystical. I have
never regarded Pirsig's work as being especially mystical. Everything he
says has a common sense everyday meaning. Values are Quantities as well as
Qualities. Static and Dynamic are Yin and Yang, wave and particle, certainty
and uncertainty... But I ramble. What I am looking for is a clearer
statement of why you think Pirsig is to be read as mysticism rather than
metaphysics.
Case concluded:
I choose to value materialism and I choose to devalue theism and mysticism.
dmb says:
That's funny because Pirsig's work is all about attacking that view. That
pretty well describes common sense reality among educated Westerners.
Scientific materialism equates religion and mysticism and dismisses them
both. That's the problem. The MOQ is an attempt to solve that problem, is a
solution to that problem and you have simply chosen to value the problem
over its solution. And of course I think a person could make such a choice
only if they were operating with some rather substantial misunderstandings
about what's going on with the MOQ. See, the metaphysics of substance is
what you get when valid empirical data is limited to sensory experience, but
Pirsig's system expands the notion of empiricism to include a wider range of
experience so that mystical experience can no longer be dismissed quite so
easily. The MOQ does not take sides in the war between science and religion
so much as it expands rationality so that they both fit into a larger
context.
[Case]
If what you are saying is that looking at science and empiricism through the
lens of the MoQ changes our view of it, that is well and good. What I am not
seeing in any of these conversations is how that lens changes the way one
looks at mysticism and esthetics. Platt for example sees the MoQ as
validating his views on politics and beauty without really changing them.
The mystics here proceed along fairly orthodox lines as though the MoQ
simply confirms previously held beliefs. It seems to me the MoQ should alter
either perspective. For example Pirsig says that iron filings behave in
particular way because they "value" a particular relationship to a magnet.
You take this to be simple anthropomorphism or you can note that this
"value" is measurable and quantifiable. Perhaps esthetic "values" are also
quantifiable. To find common cause between science and religion the terms
have to change from both perspectives.
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