[MD] Ham on Esthesia

[Ham Priday]

Greetings, Mark --

I don't believe we've talked before.

> Hello Ham. I could not help butting in - i am attracted by your
> arguments. May i ask a couple of questions of you please?
> Are the following synonyms?
> 1. Consciousness as the primary source.
> 2. The One, nonderivative Reality.
> 3. Root Consciousness.
> 4. The Undifferentiated.
> (The MoQ calls the undifferentiated Dynamic Quality.)
> So, Quality, Value and DQ are synonyms:
> 5. DQ.
> 6. Quality.
> 7. Value.

You realize, of course, that I'm not speaking for the MoQ, and any answers I
provide are on behalf of my own philosophy which is somewhat unwelcome here.
(That's my "liability clause".)

That said, and since you are a numbers person, my answer is that 2, 4, and
(possibly) 7 qualify as synonyms for what I call Essence.  Consciousness (1)
presupposes an object, as does Root Consciousness (3), Quality (6), and -- 
depending on how you define it -- Value (7).  In terms of Value I do not
recognize DQ as distinguishable from SQ.  And I'm apprehensive about
defining Value as an absolute.  We only know Value "differentially", as
experienced in finite phenomena.

That would seem to eliminate your "expanded" list of synonyms.

Mark:
> You theorise that x.
> a. Is x a component of the theory or
> b. Is x outside the theory?
> Ham from below: 'we are at the outer fringe of reality
> when we try to describe Essence and its primary
> divisions in finite terms.'
> If x is outside the theory, it is unconceptual and
> therefore a synonym to be included with 1-9:

Assuming that x = Essence, it is part of my theory.  However, I'm not sure
what you mean by "unconceptual".  Even if it means "incomprehensible" or
"inexperiencable", it can still be part of the theory.  Essence is
incomprehensible to the finite mind.  Does that place it "outside the
theory"?  Surely, there are many aspects to Einstein's Theory of Relativity
that remain incomprehensible; yet it is considered a valid theory.  If I
labeled my philosophy a "hypothesis" instead of a theory, (I do in my
thesis) would it be more acceptable?

Let me be clear on my definitions for the above:
The Primary Source [Essence] is the absolute, sensible One from which
difference and all otherness are derived.  (It is logically posited as the
"not-other".)
Existence is the experience of Essence differentiated by nothingness.
Value is the (the individual's) psycho-somatic response to this experience.

Mark:
> 1. Consciousness as the primary source.
> 2. The One, nonderivative Reality.
> 3. Root Consciousness.
> 4. The Undifferentiated.
> 5. DQ.
>
> 6. Quality.
> 7. Value.
>
> 8. Essence. (replacing esthesia)
> 9. a state of pure feeling characterized by the absence of conceptual and
> interpretational elements.
> Esthesia divides into Human experience: Sensibility - subjectivity which
has
> an objective content.

If I follow your number scheme correctly, only 2, 4, 8, and 9 (with
reservations)are valid for me.  I reject Consciousness and Value as synonyms
for Essence because they are relative to proprietary awareness.  I also
prefer the term "awareness" for differentiated cognizance, reserving
"Sensibility" for the perception of value or the "esthesis" of Essence, as I
explained to Platt.

Mark:
> Subjectivity is privileged over the objective:
> Ham from below: 'the awareness potential of "selfness" may  not require an
> objective referent.'
> Thus, selfness can differentiate without an objective referent.
> Therefore, selfness is a differentiation of 1-9 without subject or object.
> This is very close to the MoQ position which replaces som with a DQ/sq
> division.

One correction: Only Value can be differentiated by the self without an
objective referent.

Mark:
> Quality and Value are synonyms Ham.
> Therefore, esthesia and value are synonyms.
> This is going to become important:

Yes, I am quite aware of my difference with official MoQ doctrine.  But the
difference is more than a choice of terms.  Let me ask you this, Mark: If
Quality (or Value) is relative to the experiencing subject, how can Esthesia
be absolute and non-derivative as a synonym?  You avoided naming Essence,
which I assume you regard as a synonym for Quality.  So I'll rephrase the
question: How can Quality be both absolute (DQ) and derivative (SQ)?   Or,
as a logical premise, how can Quality (or Value) be the SOURCE of anything?
My dispute with Pirsig isn't about choosing Quality over Value, it's that he
posits an esthetic reality without a source.

Ham said:
> Value, even though experienced differentially, is directly
> derived  from Essence, and MAY fill the void of nothingness
> that I call the awareness potential of "selfness" without
> requiring an objective referent.

Mark:
> This can be unpacked as following:
> Sensibility distinguishes (undifferentiated) value
> from (differentiated) value.
> The MoQ has 2 terms: DQ and sq.
> You have 3 terms: That which is sensible, The undifferentiated, The
> differentiated.

That is correct.  I have three terms; but they are One in Essence.

Mark:
> Yes i see.
> There is something, as yet unaccounted for, but which
> is denoted as 'Nothingness' or 'the awareness potential
> of selfness' which:
> a. Is sensible of differentiation's.
> b. Realises differentiation's.
> (At this point i wish to emphasise that, 'Nothingness' is
> a synonym for 1-9 + esthesia.)
> Were does the 'Potential' stand in relation to the
> undifferentiated and the differentiated Ham?

Nothingness is introduced by the negation of Essence.  It is the
differentiator of all existents.  It is also the primordial subject
(negate).  That is, I maintain that pure awareness -- the potential for
cognizance -- is nothingness.  To be aware is to fill this nothingness with
objective experience.

Mark:
> I am reading this as follows: The potential realises and
> is sensible of differentiation's.
> We seem to be dealing with causation here?

Yes, Causation in the sense of Creation.

Mark:
> The MoQ replaces cause with Value:
> 'In the Metaphysics of Quality "causation" is a
> metaphysical term that can be replaced by "value".
> To say that "A causes B" or to say that "B values
> precondition A" is to say the same thing.
> The difference is one of words only.' (Lila. Chapter 8.)

I can accept Pirsig's general premise, but not as a time sequence.
I would say that sensibility to value is the cause of intellection (i.e.,
creating the appearance of finite beingness that represents the particular
values sensed.)

 Ham said:
> As you see, we (Platt and Ham) are at the outer fringe
> -- or, to use Pirsig's expression, the "cutting edge" -- 
> of reality when we try to describe Essence and its
> primary divisions in finite terms.

 Mark:
> I think this clearly places Essence in the list of
> synonyms Ham.  **

I looked for a reference to your asterisks, but there were none.  You'll
have to explain how you arrive at this conclusion, Mark.

Ham:
>I feel safe in using Cusa's "not-other" as a logical
> expression for Essence;

Mark:
> But Logic is conceptual Ham. The only logical system
> i know which may express, 'not other' is the tetralemma.

You are referring to the logic of contradictory identity. Nicholas of Cusa
(15th c.) used it as the basis for his "not-other" principle.  Check out how
I used his logic in the Creation section (#3) of my thesis at
www.essentialism.net/mechanic.htm .

Ham:
> I am not that secure in defining the metaphysical nature
> of proprietary awareness and the primary (undifferentiated)
> object of that awareness.

Mark:
> But you've give it a good go? You should be applauded for that.

I don't hear any applause, do you?

Mark:
> I'm not sure you can get away with this Ham, but it's a bold try.
> I wonder if you are aware of the existential ramifications?

Thanks, Mark.  Not sure of what you mean by "existential" ramifications.
I'm certainly aware of the MoQ ramifications, and I won't get away from
them.

 Mark:
> I am wondering how the individual is constructed
> from your own philosophy Ham?

I suggest that you read the complete thesis, then get back to me with your
questions.  For your analytical mind, there will be many.

Your interest and comments on this subject are much appreciated, Mark.

Essentially yours,
Ham