[MD] Ham on Esthesia

Ham Priday hampday1 at verizon.net
Thu Aug 24 12:37:49 PDT 2006


Greetings Joe, also SA, Case  --

Glad to hear from you.  It's been a long time.

Joe:

> On Wednesday 23 August 2006 5:36 PM Ham writes to SA and Case:
>
> The root of consciousness is self-awareness. Tnis can no more be
> universalized than can the experience of love, joy, or contentment.
> The fact that subjectivity is inimical to Science does not mean that it
> does not exist.  Rather, it demonstrates the fact that Science is
> incapable of dealing with subjective phenomena. The scientist is
> bound to the objectivist approach to knowledge, which is to
> disregard or remove subjective influences from the objects of
> investigation. The "meat" analogy of conscious awareness is not
> only grossly disgusting, it is a total misconception of proprietary
> awareness.

Joe:
> This is an excerpt from P.D. Ouspensky's book In Search of the Miraculous.
>
> Gurdjieff asks Ouspensky:
>
> How do you define consciousness?

[SNIP]

> ...............In reality consciousness is a property which is continually
> changing. Now it is present, now it is not present. And there are
different
> degrees and different levels of consciousness. Both consciousness and
> the different degrees of consciousness must be understood in oneself by
> sensation, by taste. No definitions can help you in this case and no
> definitions are possible so long as you do not understand what you have
> to define. And science and philosophy cannot define consciousness because
> they want to define it where it does not exist. It is necessary to
distinguish
> consciousness from the possibility of consciousness. We have only the
> possibilities of consciousness and rare flashes of it. Therefore we cannot
> define what consciousness is. [pps116-117 In Search of the Miraculous by
> P.D. Ouspensky. Paperback edition.]

Back in the '80s, an acquaintance of mine, who was heavily into New Age
philosophy, recommended that I read both Ouspensky and Gurdjieff.  I
remember being fascinated with their imaginative approach to the universe,
but could not buy into the multi-dimensional cosmology.

I think too much has been made of the so-called "discontinuity" of
consciousness. While it is true that we infrequently focus in on our
thoughts and feelings, this does not suggest that we are unaware of our
"selfness" in our less introspective moments.  We don't lose our
self-identity when engaged directly in tasks and interpersonal activities,
and we certainly don't confuse our experience with that of someone else.
Everything we think, feel and do is perceived as part of our proprietary
being-in-the-world.  Therefore, I think Gurdjieff's assertion that "We have
only the possibilities of consciousness and rare flashes of it" is
unfounded.

Joe:
> IMO Pirsig emphasizes this approach by dividing Quality into DQ/SQ,
> our experience.

I think you're right, Joe, and it disturbs me.  The tendency of our
materialistic age is to study and investigate man in terms of his behavior
and history.  We've all but rejected the less accessible subjective aspects
of conscious experience and are seduced by the notion that intellect and
experience are something innate in the universe that we "reach out and
attach ourselves to".  The idea that there is an intellectual (i.e.,
"collective") dimension to which man evolves by the laws of Nature is
fraught with problems and foreign to my epistemology.

I agree with Pirsig that "Value is pre-intellectual", which gives it
universality.  But the intellect that "objectifies" the values perceived is
proprietary to each individual.  And while I understand that neurons and
nerve energy are the organic instruments of sensation, I strongly disagree
that proprietary awareness is a byproduct of biological complexity.  The New
Age idea that technology will eventually develop microchips that will
replace and upgrade cerebral functioning is absurd.  Man will never create
himself, and no computer ever designed will possess conscious awareness.

Thanks for the quote.

Best regards,
Ham





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