[MD] Ham on Esthesia

[Ham Priday]

Hi Mark  -- 


Okay.  Here's Pt. II of my comments on your twin communications of 8/25.
(It deals with your first post which is mostly in Pirsigian.)

> 'DQ and sq are experienced differently, sq is the known and
> dead in a creative sense while DQ is always new.'

I take it that "dead" refers to our experience of something that is already
created or established -- even something like a symphony or opera that
progresses in time but whose final destination in known.  Would you say that
this applies also to evolution whose ultimate outcome is unknown?  (Or is
that DQ?)

Later, in the music analogy, you describe hearing an exceptional performance
of a known work as "experiencing DQ."  Since the piece being played is
familiar to me, it must be the performer's "fresh" interpretation, or my
response to it, rather than the composition, that accounts for my
experiencing DQ.  It that correct?  This would mean that my first hearing of
a piece is always a DQ experience, but that my seond hearing (unless it is
an extraordinary performance) would always be sq. because it is "dead in a
creative sense".

Now I know that Pirsig says Quality does not reside in the subject or the
object, but cites the source as a "Value event".  "...The very existence of
subject and object themselves is deduced from the Value event.  The Value
event is the cause of the subjects and objects...".  If the subject and
object are "deduced"(?) from the event, Value must precede existence.  Is
that the logic behind his insistence that value or DQ is the primary
reality?   In that case, neither value nor experience would be
differentiated; they would both be "unified" in the Oneness of Dynamic
Quality.  Is that the author's ontology for a Primary Source?   And does
that source include the (subjective) experience and (objective) existence
that are differentiated by the value event?

> DQ is experienced in the instant. sq is after the event.

If I understand you correctly, DQ turns into sq following the experience.
I'm confused.  Doesn't this infer that a phenomenal performance in
retrospect becomes ordinary?  In other words, do I remember the experience
as DQ or sq?

> In a Substance ontology your question is valid.
> I would have to use the language of Substance ontology
> in order to address it to your satisfaction.
> The MoQ is not a Substance based ontology.
> The MoQ includes DQ and sq - with sq divided into 4
> evolutionary related levels.
> Substances are re-describe in terms of patterns of sq
> left in the wake of Dynamic Quality.
> Now to answer your question using DQ and sq:
> As all sq patterns share the same Dynamic source,
> the violinist and you have the same Dynamic source.

Yet, she is playing a piece that is "dead" to her, that is, her performance
is the culmination of repeatedly practicing a score she knows by heart.  How
can that still be DQ?

> It is only after the Dynamic experience that static
> differentiations are set up.  So, If the violinist is exceptional,
> you both merge in the cutting edge of DQ - you lose all sense
> of time and space and later you say, 'That performance
> was sublime.'

So, what is remembered (by me) as DQ, having been once performed, may be
only sq from the violinist's perspective.  Or does that shift from DQ to sq
only occur on the next night when she gives another spectacular performance?
Forgive me if I'm taking your analogy too literally, but I'm having trouble
following it as an "event".

When all is said and done, the soloist has packed up her instrument, and
I've returned home -- are you saying that the DQ we both shared during the
performance is forever gone?  Is it, perchance, "stored" somewhere -- in the
realm of Quality, Value, or some sensible Source?  Otherwise, I see no point
in either of us having experienced the DQ event at all.

> Your perspective is founded on a Substance based
> ontology within the Western philosophical tradition.
> You are analysing the situation after the event.
> Fundamental to your analysis is a Substance ontology
> of 'things' not 'events'.  The MoQ may be said to be
> more of a process ontology where you and the violinist
> are emerged in one process rather than two separate
> 'things' which are causally linked.
[snip]
 > DQ is experienced as the cutting edge of NOW from which
> old sq patterns are extruded.  Understand the magnitude of
> what this is saying: You ARE nothing but static quality patterns
> being extruded from the immediate DQ cutting edge of
> experience, Ham.

I speak of objective phenomena in terms of both "things" and "events", so I
don't see that I am any more "traditional" than Pirsig.  My philosophy is
not "substance based" but valuistic, as is Pirsig's.  It is true that I do
not describe substance (i.e., matter) as "patterns of sq left in the wake of
Dynamic Quality."  I describe it as forms of beingness objectivized by the
intellect from values perceived by the subject.  And, while my epistemology
is different, we are both positing a differentiated reality derived from a
non-differentiated (if not absolute) source.

> Perhaps, and this is not a dig at you or anything, but
> perhaps you are the eternal mechanic who strives to invent
> names and new relationships between things? For you, in
> order for there to be sense, you enjoy the aesthetic of the
> eternal mechanic; austere, clean, well proportioned, economical.
> And yet, at bottom, what you need more than anything else is
> that sense of  aesthetic.

Guess who's more of a "mechanic"; the author of "The Art of Motorcycle
Maintenance" or the author of a "Philosophy of Essence"?   As for "striving
to invent names and new relationships between things", believe me, I would
only wish that there were less relationships to define in this world!  It is
Mr. Pirsig, the cyclist and boating enthusiast, who seems more concerned
with evolutionary processes and societal solutions than with individuals and
their aesthetic values.

Not to toot my own horn or demean Pirsig's literary talents, but as a lover
of fine music and the arts, I've been called an epicurean.  My philosophy
begins with the individual, explores the values that drive him, and links
him metaphysically with the source of Reality.  Your favorite author speaks
of man anthropologically, as an evolutionary species that draws its
intellect and cognizance from a collective wellspring.  His loyal followers
seem suspicious of the term "individualism", regard religion as
"supernaturalism", and have no compunctions about relegating everything
traditionally considered to be the essence of man -- his self-awareness,
intellect, creativity, and spirituality -- to borrowed property.

> Language is a social patterns.
> You speak US English.
> This is a good example of your social patterns as the
> imitation of your parents' behaviour.
> Philosophy is intellectual patterns.
> You enjoy philosophy.
> This is a good example of your intellectual patterns
> manipulating the patterns you encountered in your culture.
> So, in the social and intellectual sense you are influenced
> by recent patterns.

Yes, we are all influenced by familial precepts, societal trends, and the
intellectual achievements of our forbearers.  At the same time, we are all
unique human beings, capable of realizing the values of our variegated
world, and free to make the choices that will determine its future.  A few
of us living now will use these assets to discover cures for cancer and
diabetes, develop strategies for dealing with the tribal mentality of
religious extremists, fly to the moons of Jupiter, and even compose
exquisite works of music.  The rest will say: "That's great!  Make sure I
get MY share of that stuff.  I'd be where you are if I weren't socially
disadvantaged."

That may be too Randian for you, but I thought it nicely tied in all the
topics we've covered above.  And, since I can't think of anything more to
say at the moment, I'll make it my closing statement.

Thanks for a stimulating discussion, Mark.  You've lost me on the DQ/sq
split, but I hope I've addressed the most important issues as I understand
them.

Essentially yours,
Ham