[MD] Ham thinks the MOQ is a form of phenomenology

[Ham Priday]

 Hi David --


> I would agree that it is possible to argue with reason that the MOQ
> is a form of phenomenlogy, i.e. a way of describing experience
> (existentialism is a bit different I'd suggest). Would anyone
> see a case against this?

I appreciate your willingness to consider this viewpoint, and it will be
most interesting to see how the group responds.  I don't think it is
detrimental or derogatory to the MoQ to regard it as a form of
phenomenalism.  Indeed, many scientific luminaries have presented similar
views of Reality.

The major difference in Existentialism is that existentialists regard
"Being" as the Source.  Thus, Heidegger's "being-in-the-world [Dasein] and
Sartre's "Being-in-itself/being-for-itself" dichotomy.  I view this as
turning Reality inside out, making substantive "otherness" the Source.
Regrettably, by "externalizing" Intellect and Consciousness, Pirsig also
leads in this direction, while at the same time making the Source
non-substantive Quality.  I would say that his ontology is that of a
phenomenalist but his epistemology is existentialist.  But I'm sure that
we'll see other interpretations here.

Thanks, and best regards,
Ham