[MD] Food for Thought

[ian glendinning]

Hi Arlo,

I should have read the whole thread ...
(I picked agreat day to be off-line)

You sum it up - the problem is ...

You simply see some patterns of belief as social patterns and some as
intellectual patterns. But you are making that judgement on the basis
of an intellectual pattern you hold.

I think the "authority is a social concept" .... is going to prove a key point.
(I just don't think you'll have such an easy time saying this maps
easily to a simplistic religion vs science conclusion - they are all
belief systems.)

I think the key thing will prove to be whether the control / freedoms
of those belief systems are phsyical (action by authority) or mental
(communication)

In the later case, an "authority" on a subject can make all the
pronouncements he likes, but it is intellectual if I am physically
allowed to ignore him and follow my own thoughts. THIS IS THE KEY. It
is social if society's arrangements for governance allow him to
"impose" that authority.

Freedom of thought and individual action.
I knew JSMill was ahead of his time.

The key subject is the system of governance.
Ian


On 12/15/06, ian glendinning <psybertron at gmail.com> wrote:
> Arlo, et al ...
>
> Glad to hear your views on this.
>
> Firstly I like the idea that each level is about "individuals", and
> the idea that "emergence from the collective" drives the evolution of
> the layer above .... but did you see any evidence this was what Pirisg
> intended ? It would be great to find that confirmed.
>
> I also like your social vs intellectual distinction being actions vs
> thoughts ... ie the level is about where this kind of activity takes
> place - body or mind ... trouble is thought is evident through
> behaviour (inlcuding discourse), the usual body - mind debates surely
> ?
>
> When you say
> But this is not without its pitfalls. For example, we consider the "belief in
> god" to be a social pattern, but the "belief in physics" to be an intellectual
> pattern.
>
> I say "we" do not. I certainly don't, and this is the crux of
> resolving this issue.
> believing (faith-based belief) in a religious god, is just as mental
> an activity as having faith in other forms of rationality. The thought
> patterns are thought patterns the social behaviours are the social
> behaviours in both religion and science. (Which isn't to say DMB, that
> I consider them equally good patterns of thought ... that would be
> crass .... just that they are both patterns of thought.)
>
> The thought / action division is not two layers (3 & 4 on top of 1 &
> 2), but a division of the 3plus4 (cultural) layer on a different axis
> with their evolutions interlinked, rather than the evolution of
> thought evolving on top of the evolution of action.
>
> I think what you are doing with your view is making some distinction
> between mental activity in general, and the kind of mental activity
> you wish to call "intellectual". In your defintion theology say, would
> not be considered an intellectual (mental) pursuit ?
>
> Regards
> Ian
>
>
> On 12/14/06, ARLO J BENSINGER JR <ajb102 at psu.edu> wrote:
> > Ian, Dan, DMB, Dave M, anyone else...
> >
> > Regarding demarking the division between "social" and "intellectual" levels, I
> > too must confess some haziness. It is perhaps, of all aspects of the MOQ, the
> > one that is most troublesome to me personally. So let me play devil's advocate,
> > think outloud, and toss out some informal and unstructured musings.
> >
> > Before I start, however, I hope we can dispell the "social-collective versus
> > intellectual-individual" stuff. Its evident to me that Pirsig's MOQ consists of
> > "individuals" on every layer, and it from the "collective activity" of these
> > individuals that individuals on the next higher level are able to emerge. From
> > individual inorganic patterns working collectively are individual biological
> > patterns able to emerge. Then, when these individual biological patterns behave
> > collectively, individual social patterns emerge. Etc.
> >
> > So... I have, for the most part, adopted the following distinction. Social
> > patterns are patterns of human activity, intellectual patterns are patterns of
> > human thought. (Note, I disagree with the restriction of these levels to
> > humans, but will save that for later). Thus, driving around a racetrack or
> > forming a family unit are "social patterns", the law of gravity and free speech
> > are "intellectual patterns".
> >
> > But this is not without its pitfalls. For example, we consider the "belief in
> > god" to be a social pattern, but the "belief in physics" to be an intellectual
> > pattern.
> >
> > Now, I could say that it is "from where" a belief originates that differentiates
> > its placement. Thus, a belief informed by "authority" is a social pattern. A
> > belief informed by "science" is intellectual. But then I'd have to conclude
> > that my belief in astrophysics is social, because it rests on authority.
> >
> > Is it "falsifiability"? Are intellectual patterns ones that can be falsified?
> > But how do I falsify "free speech"?
> >
> > I could, perhaps, go to the idea that intellectual patterns are "above" or
> > "outside" cultural forces, but (as Pirsig quotes) "we are suspended in
> > language". In ZMM, Pirsig describes the Indian ghosts as being as "real" a
> > pattern to them as the law of gravity is to us.
> >
> > The option I generally side with is this. One would be to excise "believing in"
> > from the pattern description. "Believing" as a "human activity" is always a
> > social pattern. The object of belief, the thought, is always an intellectual
> > pattern. In this way BOTH "god" and "law of gravity" are intellectual patterns,
> > but vary in their Quality. God is a low-quality intellectual pattern because it
> > stifles DQ. Science is a high-quality intellectual pattern because it preserves
> > (in much the same way as the "free market") an open door to DQ. "God" is the
> > socialist market of Eastern Europe. "Science" is the capitalist economy of the
> > West. (I like the analogy because, I feel, BOTH "science" and "capitalism" can
> > be similarly criticized as adhereing to an SOMist paradigm).
> >
> > So that brings me back to "activity" and "thought", but takes me somewhat away
> > from the MOQs conventional langauge. Here the "battle" between religion and
> > science is not a battle of social versus intellect, but of two social
> > institutions (the church and the Academy) fighting for the dominance of
> > intellectual patterns (the idea of God versus the idea of science), and what
> > the MOQ does is illuminate which of these intellectual patterns is of higher
> > Quality (science, because of its openness to DQ, correlation with experience,
> > etc.). In addition, the MOQ can criticize science for not being "as high
> > Quality as it could be" because of its neglect of "morals".
> >
> > Regarding vegetarianism, hunger is a biological pattern, how we organize our
> > farms, distribute our food and the like are "social patterns". This is informed
> > by intellectual patterns. Vegetarianism is a higher Quality intellectual
> > pattern than ambivorism (or carnivorism) because it recognizes that a cow is a
> > higher life form than an ear of corn (and I'd add that the cow also partakes of
> > social patterns, albeit ones of minimal complexity, while an ear of corn does
> > not. It is in this sense that I'd personally differentiate the eating of a cow
> > versus a dolphin Both are biologically complex, but the social (and
> > intellectual) patterns engaged by the dolphin (although primative by human
> > standards) are of greater complexity than the cow.)
> >
> >
> >
> >
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