[MD] Food for Thought

Dan Glover daneglover at hotmail.com
Sat Dec 23 16:43:38 PST 2006


Hello everyone

>From: "Case" <Case at iSpots.com>
>Reply-To: moq_discuss at moqtalk.org
>To: <moq_discuss at moqtalk.org>
>Subject: Re: [MD] Food for Thought
>Date: Sat, 23 Dec 2006 14:57:29 -0500
>
>Dan said to Case:
>I find I do not share your vision of the MOQ so it's difficult to follow 
>the
>
>above passage. You seem fixated on systems, situations, events, and things
>which is all very SOMish.
>
>dmb says:
>Henry Gurr's website has a long list of links to all sorts of projects in
>which the MOQ was practically applied to everything from physics to dance.
> >From what I've gathered here, the recently published book applies the MOQ 
>to
>
>education, for example. Also, the distinction between social and
>intellectual static quality is used extensively to perform a kind of
>sociological diagnosis of the West's recent history. I mean, its not very
>hard to make a case that this distinction is supposed to serve as an
>explanatory tool that was invented with real world problems in mind. But I
>don't think that any of that has much to do with Dan's complaint...
>
>[Case]
>Dan charge seems to imply that fixation on the tangible is SOM.

[Dan]
In the MOQ, the tangible is made up of inorganic and biological level 
patterns of value, while the intanglible are made up of social and 
intellectual patterns of value. What I was criticizing you for was fixating 
on a thing being one thing.

>[Case]
>Now you are
>saying the MoQ is plenty tangible. I know I have the unfortunate habit of
>lumping your positions together but it's hard to avoid this when being
>double teamed.

[Dan]
I have to say I pretty much agree with dmb's posts. But I'm not double 
teaming you. If I'm not mistaken, it was you who wrote to me, not visa 
versa. But go ahead and think what you will...

....it looks like a Case of laziness from my point of view. At least I admit 
to being lazy. And please stop whining.

>[Case]
>As for Gurr's site unless I missed something, his list is of
>people and courses that include ZMM on their list of great books or in the
>course reading list. It certainly is on mine. But one of the exciting 
>things
>about Granger's book on Dewey and Pirsig was it rarity as an academic work.
>So far by my count we have a thesis, a dissertation, lots of book reports
>and not much more in the form of academic credibility. Even Wilbur from his
>vantage point in the New Age section can point to more success in academia,
>as you are quick to point out.

[Dan]
I think Wilbur is great. But after going to a website purporting to be 
aligned with his philosophy, I was amazed at the insane posts in the forum! 
If anyone ever thought that moq.discuss has had some weird contributors 
during its history, just check out some of that goofiness.

>
>dmb says:
>Before I get to your reply, let me say I agree with Dan here. Like I said,
>your view is sane and reasonable but it all seems to be standard SOM stuff.
>I can understand why a guy might cling to Kant's TiTs, but its contrary to
>the MOQ and so it is with this debate about the levels. Its kinda like
>you've paid no attention to the MOQ's criticism of these sorts of views.
>Thus my analogy. Selling SOM here is like trying to sell a V-8 to the most
>famous advocate of the electric car.
>
>[Case]
>You did a fine job in the Kant's Motorcycle thread of stating what you saw
>as the difference between Pirsig's bike and Kant's scooter but it all just
>looked like a paint job to me. Throughout the thread I became increasingly
>convince the Pirsig's Quality is indistinguishable from Kant's TITs. I 
>don't
>recall you doing much to disabuse me of this view.

[Dan]
This is only so from an everyday common sense sort of perspective, or from a 
subject and object outlook on reality. As I noted to you previously, it 
would take going all the way to the beginning to "disabuse" you of this view 
and even then I doubt anything I write would change your mind.

>
>Case replied to Dan:
>I am not sure specifically what it is we disagree about.

[Dan]
The MOQ for starters.

>[Case]
>I have been trying
>for some time now to show that whether the MoQ is about philosophical
>mysticism or not, it also applies directly to the everyday world.

[Dan]
Good. At least we agree on something.

>[Case]
>
>It transcends application to four or five or any number of levels.

[Dan]
The MOQ is a metaphysics, a way of ordering reality. The levels, while they 
are provisional, order reality in a better fashion than thinking in terms of 
subjects and objects. If you mess with the interpretation of the levels I 
don't see how you can still call the result the MOQ.

>[Case]
>It is the
>Tao where opposites unite.

[Dan]
You know what they say about the tao.

>[Case]
>It is Chaos from which order emerges.

[Dan]
I would say it's order from which chaos emerges. Remember, in the MOQ ideas 
come first.

>[Case]
>It's potency lies not in a warm fuzzy feeling of goodness but in the growth 
>and
>dispersal of complex relationships.

[Dan]
Partly. I think it could be better put as awareness of the growth and 
dispersal of complex relationships, however.

>
>dmb says:
>As I see it, the disagreement is at the very start. If we're talking about
>the MOQ and you are rebutting that with SOM positions, then the 
>disagreement
>
>stems for differing metaphysical assumptions. In any case, I don't think
>mysticism, Taoism or "warm fuzzy feelings" are particularly relevant to the
>distinction between social and intellectual static quality. We might 
>rightly
>
>get into a little philosophy of science and some political science,
>sociological analysis, a reading of history and stuff like that. See, I
>think the big idea here, if one can call it that, is that the type of
>rationality that we've inherited has a flaw in it such that there is a 
>great
>
>deal of confusion in these areas. When the scientific method is transfered
>from physics, from the examination of inorganic nature and we attempt to
>apply it to the humanities something weird happens. Pirsig talks about how
>screwy this view is when its applied to anthropology via Dunesberry, etc..
>In areas of science where we study people instead of rocks the notion of
>value-free objectivity shows its shortcomings and things get really warped.
>The MOQ's attack on SOM is aimed at this problem and a whole cluster of
>similar problems. Your quasi-Behaviorism, for example, strikes me as one of
>those warped things.
>
>[Case]
>What Pirsig is doing is extending an evolutionary perspective into the 
>world
>of esthetics. Evolution is after all about how static equilibrium is
>achieved and sustained in a dynamic environment.
>
>The pragmatic stance that all of experience is worthy of consideration is
>valuable indeed. As I pointed out in a post earlier today social sciences,
>especially in the last century and extending into the present have an
>inferiority complex. What Pirsig points out in the early history of
>anthropology is the tendency to try to out objectifying the physicists. The
>fault permeates all of the social sciences. But it is dissipating 
>especially
>as the hard science move towards a view where determinism does not equate
>with prediction and control. And it does not mean that the social science 
>do
>not have something to teach us.

[Dan]
I haven't even the foggiest what "hard science" is. In fact, this last 
paragraph seems nothing more than gross generalization. How do you know any 
of this? I mean, at least Robert Pirsig named names and quoted quotes to 
support his thesis. All I see here is speculation.

[snip]

>[Case]
>More to the point at hand I have voiced my skepticism about the usefulness
>of static levels but I regard them as totally secondary to the central
>points of the MoQ.

[Dan]
Yes I get that impression.

>[Case]
>Aw hell, I have disagree with lots of what you guys seem
>to think is central to the MoQ and I have offered alternative views that as
>far as I can tell can only be dismissed by slapping SOM on their bumpers.

[Dan]
As I said before, it would take too much time and effort on my part to 
debunk your alternative views.

>[Case]
>I really don't think the MoQ is ONLY about mystical monism or mysticism in 
>any
>form.

[Dan]
Who said it was?

>[Case]
>I really don't think the MoQ is anti-theistic.

[Dan]
How can you say that? Can you offer any support for this point of view?

>[Case]
>But so what. Even
>Pirsig said dissenters are welcome here. Is this not true. Are you two
>saying that dissent is unwelcome and can be simply dismissed with "He's 
>SOM,
>oh well."

[Dan]
Dissenters are always welcome as far as I'm concerned. I doubt there's a 
person here who doesn't respect a well-reasoned argument. And I would truly 
love to be able to spend inordinate amounts of time here explaining the 
nuances of the MOQ to the uninitiated. But real life gets in the way. I'm 
not a teacher; I haven't the patience. So I point and get out of the way.

>[Case]
>Because if you are comfortable browsing the New Age section, fine. Have
>another mocha and pretend it's philosophy, if it suits you. I think the MoQ
>belongs in the science section.

[Dan]
See. This is a real problem. Here I've been arguing that science and 
religion are in no way shape or form on the same footing -- that science 
(like the MOQ) is based on falsification. It would stand to reason that I am 
identifying science and the MOQ as both being high quality intellectual 
patterns of values. So where on earth do you get the notion that I believe 
the MOQ to be New Age?

Oh. I get it. You're just lumping me together with someone else.

>
>Case said:
>I could give more examples but I am told they are irrelevant. Appeals to
>sanity, reason and contact with any supposed "reality" are, according to
>some, not part of the MoQ. Whether I understand the MoQ or not is certainly
>an open question but I sure don't understand that.
>
>dmb says:
>It seems I am the unnamed defendent in this case. Not that I'm advocating
>insanity, unreason or unreality. I'm just saying that the MOQ is a critique
>of the West's most basic metaphysical assumptions, the commonly held
>worldview of scientists and even guys with TiTs, like Kant. Pirsig's
>critique takes issue with lots of perfectly smart and sane people, from
>Plato to Descartes and beyond. He even calls Aristotle and asshole. I mean,
>even if you want to take this critcism as an insult you'd still  be in
>pretty good company there, fractal breath.
>
>[Case]
>If I left your name off it was an oversight, Buddha Boy. As I have stated
>many, many times I think the first cut of metaphysics into stasis and
>dynamics is a brilliant move. But mystifying the terms is a big step in the
>wrong direction.

[Dan]
I don't understand how anyone familar with the MOQ can make a statement like 
this and I haven't a clue as to how I should go about debunking it.

[Case]
>How saying this make me SOM remains a mystery but I will
>readily admit to being a bigger asshole than Aristotle ever thought about
>being.

[Dan]
I don't see how this makes you SOM or an asshole for that matter but if you 
insist on insisting...

>[Case]
>This is the first party I have been to where anyone has accused me of
>being smart or sane. It really is hard to know how to take that. I guess I
>really just dropped in to drop a steamer in the punchbowl.

[Dan]
I never drink... punch.





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