[MD] The Edge 2006 Annual Question

[Scott Roberts]

Ian,

Ian said:
Then Scott, just like my "proto-consciousness" I kind of agree with you ...

IF ...

... this "first-cause" metaphor could be seen as "proto-metaphor".

ie It's the germ of metaphors - very simplest - needing only the
simplest of "proto-consciousness" to interpret it's semantics - not
necessarily highly evolved humans. For me thses things all co-evolve
from the same first existence of "difference" - the tinyiest hole in
my (pragmatic) metaphysics.

My hole's tinier than yours :-)

(I remember I chickened out of a better definition of "proto", and I
do agree "first-cause" is entirely metaphorical, and not an absolute
concept anyway - but I'm OK if we keep it in scare quotes.)

Scott:
But I see this sort of "proto" thinking (however defined) as incorrect. It 
assumes a temporal progression, while I hold as a "fundamental principle" 
that space and time are contingent, that there was no time when 
"proto"-anything was around and the full-fledged-anything wasn't ("thing" 
here being consciousness, metaphor, etc.). Now we can say that in the shared 
dream known as physical reality we can say there was a time when all that 
appeared in physical reality was "proto", but that just means that those 
proto-things are not the whole of the things in question: they are partial 
projections, as it were. That is, they are seen as "proto" because they are 
not fully seen. And they are not fully seen because they are seen 
spatio-temporally, while their full reality is not spatio-temporal.

Ian said:
My point was to agree and move on.
What was yours ?

Scott:
To clarify the disagreement. That is because I consider physicalism to be 
fundamentally wrong, that it is a hindrance to the larger purpose of 
salvation (e.g., Awakening). Because of that fundamental wrongness, I don't 
see where we *could* move on to. Whatever we say (in re metaphysics) will 
have different connotations, because you are a physicalist and I am not. But 
I could be wrong, for we certainly do agree on some things, like the value 
of a pragmatic attitude. Where do you want to move on to?

- Scott

On 2/3/06, Scott Roberts <jse885 at localnet.com> wrote:
> Ian,
>
> Scott said
> "Right. In my model, the first-cause *is* metaphor (semiosis)"
>
> Ian said
> "And in *my model* too first-cause *is* metaphor."
> It's all metaphors all the way down - in any world view.
>
> But my model didn't pre-exist first-cause, and neither did yours, or
> any other world view for that matter (by definition of first-cause).
> First cause is the quality event.
>
> Scott:
> You left out my modification to what I said, namely "... not just
> metaphorically viewed". Which is to say that my model is metaphorical (as
> are all), but what I model in my model is also metaphor. That is, I don't
> think you would agree with me when I say that there is metaphor in the
> absence of people. No? You do say that -- in the absence of people --  
> there
> is information, which of course I agree with, but isn't our difference 
> that
> in my model, information implies an interpretant (which gets consciously
> "carried across", that is, metaphor-ed) while in yours there is sometimes 
> an
> interpretant and sometimes not?
>
> (And, I would like to junk the phrase "first-cause", for the same reason I
> would like to junk the idea that an ultimate Source is necessary to any
> metaphysics, but that's a somewhat separate issue.).
>
> - Scott
>
> On 1/25/06, Scott Roberts <jse885 at localnet.com> wrote:
> > Ian,
> >
> > Ian said:
> > Metaphor - I mean it when I (often) say "it's metaphors all the way
> > down", right down to the micro-first-cause level - but that is of
> > course from our macro perspective of having an evolved intellect. (I
> > have a bone to pick with Baggini on that point too - we need to
> > distinguish live metaphors from dead ones - but that's for another
> > day) So at the first-cause event there is no metaphor (though we can
> > only ever have a metaphorical "view" of it). In your Peician model
> > there is no "interpretant" I guess, no evloved intellect in my model.
> > So ...
> >
> > Scott:
> > Right. In my model, the "first-cause" *is* metaphor (semiosis), not just
> > metaphorically viewed. (When I said that "awareness is not a metaphor" I
> > meant that because it *is* metaphor, it is not a metaphor for *something
> > else* -- though of course the word 'awareness' is a dead metaphor.)
> >
> > Ian said:
> > First-cause, Significance ?
> > (my triplets are not Peircian Tryads)
> > The first difference looks like this.
> >
> > <no-thing><difference><some-thing>
> >
> > I'd call that a triplet, you call it a dyad.
> > What's in a name ? If this really is "first-cause" then there are no
> > other resources to add to my argument - no third "object", just this
> > triplet. So ..
> >
> > Q1- What is "aware" of that difference ?
> > A1 - only the triplet itself.
> >
> > Scott:
> > I'm not averse to saying that what is aware of the triplet is the 
> > triplet
> > itself, but argue that that is what makes the triplet a Peircean triad. 
> > Or
> > I
> > could go from your triplet and ask: what is that <difference> if not
> > awareneness of the difference between <some-thing> and <no-thing>. More
> > below.
> >
> > Ian said:
> > Q2 - What makes this difference "significant" ?
> > A2 - only the triplet, there is nothing else to need to distinguish it
> > from
> >
> > Scott:
> > But there is distinguishing within it (the distinction between no-thing
> > and
> > difference to produce a some-thing), and that is what makes it
> > significant.
> > So as I see it you already have semiosis.
> >
> > Q3 - What does it take to be "aware of this significant difference" ?
> > A3 - nothing more than the triplet, see A2. Intellect is needed to
> > evolve pattern recognition skills, etc, only when there are many
> > difference triplets to distinguish between.
> >
> > Scott:
> > This, I would agree, amounts to our differing on how we want to use
> > 'intellect'. The argument would then proceed based on which usage is 
> > more
> > fruitful for some purpose or other.
> >
> > Ian said:
> > Reality, awareness, triplets (quality), intellect all evolve from
> > these small beginnings. (You do of course realise I'm being
> > speculative - as we've both already agreed any metaphysics has a hole
> > in it at this point, that we can only plug with speculation that is
> > consistent with the rest of our model.)
> >
> > Scott:
> > Right on the speculation, which is why I'm not sure we should say that
> > "reality, ... all evolve from these small beginnings" since I do not 
> > want
> > to
> > claim that our respective models are "first causes". Rather they are 
> > more
> > like "the simplest form our limited intellects can come up with that do
> > justice to the reality we seem to be in." First logical principles, 
> > maybe.
> >
> > Anyway, my model differs from yours in that I do not propose <no-thing> 
> > or
> > <difference> as two. That is, I consider them a contradictory identity, 
> > by
> > which and from which there is needed a third term (such as 
> > consciousness,
> > value, or intellect). This was hinted at in ZMM, when Phaedrus first 
> > said
> > that Quality was "between" subject and object. But he later changed this
> > to
> > being "prior" to S and O. In this I think he took a wrong step. Shifting
> > from S and O to a more generic contradictory idenity, like <no-thing> 
> > and
> > <difference>, my model says that Quality causes/is caused by CI. Which 
> > is
> > to
> > say that my logic is inherently trinitarian. One cannot remove one or 
> > two
> > pieces. One must have three, which are one. (Don't take this as a plug 
> > for
> > the Christian Trinity, since I don't know how my three pieces match 
> > up --
> > if
> > they do at all -- to Father, Son, and Spirit. But it is the case that 
> > both
> > require trinitarian logic.)
> >
> > Hence, what I object to in your model is that one can see each piece of
> > your
> > triplet as an entity. I would say that the <something> is not other than
> > awareness of the interplay between <no-thing> and <difference>, and the
> > interplay is not other than awareness (and one can substitute 'value' or
> > 'intellect' for awareness). Or I might say that <no-thing> is 
> > meaningless
> > (value-less) without <difference>, and <difference> is meaningless 
> > without
> > <no-thing>, and both are meaningless without awareness.
> >
> > - Scott
> >
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