[MD] The Edge 2006 Annual Question

[Scott Roberts]

Ham,

[Scott to Ian]:

> Anyway, my model differs from yours in that I do not
> propose <no-thing> or > <difference> as two. That is,
> I consider them a contradictory identity, by which and
> from which there is needed a third term (such as consciousness,
> value, or intellect). This was hinted at in ZMM, when Phaedrus
> first said that Quality was "between" subject and object.
> But he later changed this to being "prior" to S and O.
> In this I think he took a wrong step. Shifting from S and O
> to a more generic contradictory idenity, like <no-thing> and
> <difference>, my model says that Quality causes/is caused by CI.
> Which is to say that my logic is inherently trinitarian. One cannot
> remove one or two pieces. One must have three, which are one.

Ham said:
I don't know the logic behind Ian's model, but this one works for me.  It
'takes three to tango' with metaphysical reality.  What you are proposing is
a unitary subjective reality whose finite differentiation is caused by
nothingness.  That's also the ontology I've laid out in my thesis.  However,
I take exception to your assertion that Conscious Intellect (I presume
that's CI) is the cause.  The cause is the One referred to in your closing
sentence.

Scott:
No, I am not proposing a "unitary subjective reality whose finite 
differentiation is caused by nothingness". I deny that there is a 
"subjective reality". Rather I say that subject and object are a 
contradictory identity. I deny that differentiation is caused by 
nothingness. Rather I say that nothingness (no-thingness) and 
differentiation (thingness, for example) are a contradictory identity. CI 
stands for contradictory identity. For more on it, see
http://www2.venus.co.uk/hypermail/moq_discuss/4798.html

(note that there should be a [Scott:] at the third large paragraph in that 
message, starting with "If by logic...")

And CI is not a cause of anything, though I do sometimes say that CI 
causes/is caused by consciousness (or value or intellect), but that's to 
avoid saying that consciousness (or, etc.) is CI. That is, one cannot say 
that CI causes consciousness, and one cannot say that consciousness causes 
CI. And one cannot say that CI does not cause consciousness, and one cannot 
say that consciousness does not cause CI. That is because any such saying 
violates the triunity of consciousness, nothingness, and differentiation.

> I would say that the <something> is not other than awareness
> of the interplay between <no-thing> and <difference>, and the
> interplay is not other than awareness (and one can substitute
> 'value' or 'intellect' for awareness). Or I might say that <no-thing>
> is meaningless (value-less) without <difference>, and <difference>
> is meaningless without <no-thing>, and both are meaningless
> without awareness.

Ham said:
John Sowa's essay on "Thirdness" begins with an analysis of Kantian logic
from which the triad concept comes:

"In every group, the number of categories is always the same,
namely, three. That is remarkable because elsewhere all _a
priori_ division of concepts must be by dichotomy. Furthermore,
the third category always arises from a combination (Verbindung)
of the second category with the first. Thus totality is plurality
considered as unity; limitation is reality combined with negation;
community is the causality of substances reciprocally determining
one another; finally, necessity is the existence that is given by
possibility itself. It must not be supposed, however, that the
third category is merely a derivative, and not a primary concept
of the pure understanding. For the combination of the first and
second categories in order to produce the third requires a special
act of the understanding, which is not identical with those which
produce the first and second."
         -- http://www-ksl.stanford.edu/onto-std/mailarchive/0162.html

Given that awareness is finitely limited subjective reality, and "no-thing"
is the negating factor that defines finitude, isn't Sowa's observation that
"limitation is reality combined with negation" another way of stating your
postulate that "awareness [is] the interplay between no-thing and
difference"?   If, as you say, no-thing and difference represent a
"contradictory identity" rather than "two", aren't we really describing a
dual-mode Reality in which negation is the primary differentiator?

Scott:
It's to avoid thinking in terms of a dual-mode Reality that I employ the 
logic of CI. One could as well say that differentiation is the primary 
negator and it is the primary affirmer (unifier).

Ham said:
Unlike you and Ian, "semiotic" sources have no value for me.  I maintain
that nothingness is the primary "cause" of physical existence, but that the
ultimate "source" is undivided Essence.  Nothingness and "somethingness"
defines the duality of finitude (physical existence), and awareness is
identified with nothingness.  I'll tentatively buy the proposition that
awareness is the differential "interplay" between not-other and other -- in
fact, I like it -- but I believe that this other must be the essential
source, that is, the One to which all this logic leads.

Where am I wrong, other than not being a semioticist?

Scott:
In my point of view, there is no non-negated without differentiation, which 
is what I oppose in your essentialism. There is no undivided source 
ontologically prior to differentiation or negation, nor is differentiation a 
source. There is, that is, no source above and beyond what is, which is CI, 
which is consciousness, value, and/or semiosis (or a bunch of other 
non-things), depending on the point one wants to make. Such a source is an 
idol. I like to think (but could be wrong) that CI avoids being turned into 
an idol because it cannot be thought through (cannot be "understood").

- Scott