[MD] The Edge 2006 Annual Question

[Scott Roberts]

Ham,

Scott said:
> No, I am not proposing a "unitary subjective reality
> whose finite differentiation is caused by nothingness".
> I deny that there is a "subjective reality". Rather I say
> that subject and object are a contradictory identity.

Ham said:
Then I guess my question is: IS this contradictory identity -- which I
assume to be Pirsig's Quality -- a real identity and not just some semiotic
expression.

Scott:
Why do you assume that? It isn't.

Within the logic of CI, the phrase "real identity" becomes very problematic, 
and why isn't a semiotic expression as much of an identity (and difference) 
as anything else?

Ham said:
Thanks for clarifying CI.  I reviewed your referenced discussion with Paul
and find myself siding more closely with him.  It seems to me that your
ontology lacks a causal source; at least, I don't see that you've identified
one.

Scott:
Correct.

Scott said:
> ...one cannot say that CI causes consciousness,
> and one cannot say that consciousness causes CI.
> And one cannot say that CI does not cause consciousness,
> and one cannot say that consciousness does not cause CI.
> That is because any such saying violates the triunity of
> consciousness, nothingness, and differentiation.

Ham said:
Does anything cause anything in your triunity?  Doesn't this violate the ex
nihilo principle?

Scott:
Causation, and hence the ex nihilo principle, are contingent truths. More 
below.

Ham said:
Nicholas of Cusa postulated a first principle that is the "coincidence of
all opposition".  This would support your concept of contradictory
identities.  For Cusa, all contrariety is the polarized [my word]
manifestation of the primary source which is absolute potentiality.
Instead of a triad, you would have Oneness actualized (i.e., differentiated)
as subject/object, self/other, beginning/ending, here/there, then/now,
good/bad, and so forth, by the intellect.  The system might be described
metaphysically as Oneness vs. multiplicity, with nothingness as the
differentiating agent.

By virtue of this scenario you have a primary source and a causal agent.
Does such an ontology have anything in common with the one you're proposing?
Or are you adamant in rejecting a primary cause?

Scott:
I much admire Cusa, but I think his coincidence of opposites is not quite 
CI, for the differences you mention.

Scott said:
> In my point of view, there is no non-negated without
> differentiation, which is what I oppose in your essentialism.
> There is no undivided source ontologically prior to
> differentiation or negation, nor is differentiation a
> source. There is, that is, no source above and beyond
> what is, which is CI...,

Ham said:
If I understand you correctly, your first statement does not conflict with
Essentialism.  The second one does, unless by "ontologically" you mean in
the context of a divided existence.
I do not define differentiation as the Source; rather, it is the finite
intellectual perspective of the undifferentiated whole (Essence).  Stated
another way, the Source is Essence, the cause is negation, and the result is
differentiated experience.

What fallacy do you see in this hypothesis?

Scott:
That you are assuming causation in order to explain causation. Causation is 
a category of our contingent spatio-temporal world. But that world is not 
fundamental (because: (a) consciousness does not operate according to 
spatio-temporal laws, (b) neither does quantum reality, and (c) mystics say 
so). As such you are attempting to describe the absolute in analogy with the 
contingent, by postulating an origin (the undifferentiated whole, which for 
some unexplained reason you call Essence) and a cause. CI, instead, is about 
expressing the ineffability of the ineffiable, as opposed to describing 
something assumed to lie beyond the realm of expression, and so I consider 
it a better pragmatic choice for one's metaphysics. (As Buddhists say, it is 
more of a deconstructive skillful means than a description or explanation).

- Scott