[MD] The Edge 2006 Annual Question

Sun Feb 5 04:43:57 PST 2006

Scott,

First point ...
One thing you say gives me a problem (turning back on where we'd got to)
You said "I consider physicalism to be fundamentally wrong"

I thought we'd pragmatically agreed that any metaphysics was "not
fundamentally right (or wrong)" in any sense.

There are always speculative holes with speculative explanations. I
was just playing the Occam idea that the metaphysics with the least
incredible holes was probably better. No more no less.

Second point ...

Whatever the quality of my physicalism and your
"mystical-consciousness-ism" (equally based on contracdictory
identity, etc) ... I'd agree that time, causation and explanation, are
far from certain concepts in our framework(s).

Given a common sense view of the passage of time (from whichever
direction we view its arrow) and the clear evolutionary sense in the
MoQ framework - progress over time, and dynamism (things changing at a
base level in this world-view) - I'd say MoQ was hung on a pretty
common sense view of time (eastern or western).

Now if you want to develop a whole new metaphor where everything can
exist everywhere all at once (space and time losing any fundamental
axes in our world-view), then I have no in-built reason to deny this
choice of metaphor - in fact I'm sympathetic about where many worlds
and non-locality / entanglement might take us (somewhere pretty
weird), even from my (acknowledged) physicalist perspective. (My
"perspective" may be physicalist, but it's not exclusive of any aspect
of reality that can be seen from any other perspective.)

All I would say, is that if that is your goal, Occam might have a lot
more to say, not just about the complexity of the plug in the hole in
your metaphysics, but also about the millenia of other eastern and
western metaphors for time and causation you're going to have to work
out new metaphors for as well, before you have a consistent view.

Again I have no fundamental objection to your approach - just a
pragmatic one - my physicalist world-view of MoQ has smaller holes,
*and* fewer inconsistencies with existing metaphors.

My world view is more pragmatic than yours, that's all.
At that point of agreement - I want to move on to practical
exploitation of the MoQ, with that "currently best pragmatic
interpretation". Dead simple.

Ian

On 2/3/06, Scott Roberts <jse885 at localnet.com> wrote:
> Ian,
>
> Ian said:
> Then Scott, just like my "proto-consciousness" I kind of agree with you ...
>
> IF ...
>
> ... this "first-cause" metaphor could be seen as "proto-metaphor".
>
> ie It's the germ of metaphors - very simplest - needing only the
> simplest of "proto-consciousness" to interpret it's semantics - not
> necessarily highly evolved humans. For me thses things all co-evolve
> from the same first existence of "difference" - the tinyiest hole in
> my (pragmatic) metaphysics.
>
> My hole's tinier than yours :-)
>
> (I remember I chickened out of a better definition of "proto", and I
> do agree "first-cause" is entirely metaphorical, and not an absolute
> concept anyway - but I'm OK if we keep it in scare quotes.)
>
> Scott:
> But I see this sort of "proto" thinking (however defined) as incorrect. It
> assumes a temporal progression, while I hold as a "fundamental principle"
> that space and time are contingent, that there was no time when
> "proto"-anything was around and the full-fledged-anything wasn't ("thing"
> here being consciousness, metaphor, etc.). Now we can say that in the shared
> dream known as physical reality we can say there was a time when all that
> appeared in physical reality was "proto", but that just means that those
> proto-things are not the whole of the things in question: they are partial
> projections, as it were. That is, they are seen as "proto" because they are
> not fully seen. And they are not fully seen because they are seen
> spatio-temporally, while their full reality is not spatio-temporal.
>
> Ian said:
> My point was to agree and move on.
> What was yours ?
>
> Scott:
> To clarify the disagreement. That is because I consider physicalism to be
> fundamentally wrong, that it is a hindrance to the larger purpose of
> salvation (e.g., Awakening). Because of that fundamental wrongness, I don't
> see where we *could* move on to. Whatever we say (in re metaphysics) will
> have different connotations, because you are a physicalist and I am not. But
> I could be wrong, for we certainly do agree on some things, like the value
> of a pragmatic attitude. Where do you want to move on to?
>
> - Scott
>
> On 2/3/06, Scott Roberts <jse885 at localnet.com> wrote:
> > Ian,
> >
> > Scott said
> > "Right. In my model, the first-cause *is* metaphor (semiosis)"
> >
> > Ian said
> > "And in *my model* too first-cause *is* metaphor."
> > It's all metaphors all the way down - in any world view.
> >
> > But my model didn't pre-exist first-cause, and neither did yours, or
> > any other world view for that matter (by definition of first-cause).
> > First cause is the quality event.
> >
> > Scott:
> > You left out my modification to what I said, namely "... not just
> > metaphorically viewed". Which is to say that my model is metaphorical (as
> > are all), but what I model in my model is also metaphor. That is, I don't
> > think you would agree with me when I say that there is metaphor in the
> > absence of people. No? You do say that -- in the absence of people --
> > there
> > is information, which of course I agree with, but isn't our difference
> > that
> > in my model, information implies an interpretant (which gets consciously
> > "carried across", that is, metaphor-ed) while in yours there is sometimes
> > an
> > interpretant and sometimes not?
> >
> > (And, I would like to junk the phrase "first-cause", for the same reason I
> > would like to junk the idea that an ultimate Source is necessary to any
> > metaphysics, but that's a somewhat separate issue.).
> >
> > - Scott
> >
> > On 1/25/06, Scott Roberts <jse885 at localnet.com> wrote:
> > > Ian,
> > >
> > > Ian said:
> > > Metaphor - I mean it when I (often) say "it's metaphors all the way
> > > down", right down to the micro-first-cause level - but that is of
> > > course from our macro perspective of having an evolved intellect. (I
> > > have a bone to pick with Baggini on that point too - we need to
> > > distinguish live metaphors from dead ones - but that's for another
> > > day) So at the first-cause event there is no metaphor (though we can
> > > only ever have a metaphorical "view" of it). In your Peician model
> > > there is no "interpretant" I guess, no evloved intellect in my model.
> > > So ...
> > >
> > > Scott:
> > > Right. In my model, the "first-cause" *is* metaphor (semiosis), not just
> > > metaphorically viewed. (When I said that "awareness is not a metaphor" I
> > > meant that because it *is* metaphor, it is not a metaphor for *something
> > > else* -- though of course the word 'awareness' is a dead metaphor.)
> > >
> > > Ian said:
> > > First-cause, Significance ?
> > > (my triplets are not Peircian Tryads)
> > > The first difference looks like this.
> > >
> > > <no-thing><difference><some-thing>
> > >
> > > I'd call that a triplet, you call it a dyad.
> > > What's in a name ? If this really is "first-cause" then there are no
> > > other resources to add to my argument - no third "object", just this
> > > triplet. So ..
> > >
> > > Q1- What is "aware" of that difference ?
> > > A1 - only the triplet itself.
> > >
> > > Scott:
> > > I'm not averse to saying that what is aware of the triplet is the
> > > triplet
> > > itself, but argue that that is what makes the triplet a Peircean triad.
> > > Or
> > > I
> > > could go from your triplet and ask: what is that <difference> if not
> > > awareneness of the difference between <some-thing> and <no-thing>. More
> > > below.
> > >
> > > Ian said:
> > > Q2 - What makes this difference "significant" ?
> > > A2 - only the triplet, there is nothing else to need to distinguish it
> > > from
> > >
> > > Scott:
> > > But there is distinguishing within it (the distinction between no-thing
> > > and
> > > difference to produce a some-thing), and that is what makes it
> > > significant.
> > > So as I see it you already have semiosis.
> > >
> > > Q3 - What does it take to be "aware of this significant difference" ?
> > > A3 - nothing more than the triplet, see A2. Intellect is needed to
> > > evolve pattern recognition skills, etc, only when there are many
> > > difference triplets to distinguish between.
> > >
> > > Scott:
> > > This, I would agree, amounts to our differing on how we want to use
> > > 'intellect'. The argument would then proceed based on which usage is
> > > more
> > > fruitful for some purpose or other.
> > >
> > > Ian said:
> > > Reality, awareness, triplets (quality), intellect all evolve from
> > > these small beginnings. (You do of course realise I'm being
> > > speculative - as we've both already agreed any metaphysics has a hole
> > > in it at this point, that we can only plug with speculation that is
> > > consistent with the rest of our model.)
> > >
> > > Scott:
> > > Right on the speculation, which is why I'm not sure we should say that
> > > "reality, ... all evolve from these small beginnings" since I do not
> > > want
> > > to
> > > claim that our respective models are "first causes". Rather they are
> > > more
> > > like "the simplest form our limited intellects can come up with that do
> > > justice to the reality we seem to be in." First logical principles,
> > > maybe.
> > >
> > > Anyway, my model differs from yours in that I do not propose <no-thing>
> > > or
> > > <difference> as two. That is, I consider them a contradictory identity,
> > > by
> > > which and from which there is needed a third term (such as
> > > consciousness,
> > > value, or intellect). This was hinted at in ZMM, when Phaedrus first
> > > said
> > > that Quality was "between" subject and object. But he later changed this
> > > to
> > > being "prior" to S and O. In this I think he took a wrong step. Shifting
> > > from S and O to a more generic contradictory idenity, like <no-thing>
> > > and
> > > <difference>, my model says that Quality causes/is caused by CI. Which
> > > is
> > > to
> > > say that my logic is inherently trinitarian. One cannot remove one or
> > > two
> > > pieces. One must have three, which are one. (Don't take this as a plug
> > > for
> > > the Christian Trinity, since I don't know how my three pieces match
> > > up --
> > > if
> > > they do at all -- to Father, Son, and Spirit. But it is the case that
> > > both
> > > require trinitarian logic.)
> > >
> > > Hence, what I object to in your model is that one can see each piece of
> > > your
> > > triplet as an entity. I would say that the <something> is not other than
> > > awareness of the interplay between <no-thing> and <difference>, and the
> > > interplay is not other than awareness (and one can substitute 'value' or
> > > 'intellect' for awareness). Or I might say that <no-thing> is
> > > meaningless
> > > (value-less) without <difference>, and <difference> is meaningless
> > > without
> > > <no-thing>, and both are meaningless without awareness.
> > >
> > > - Scott
> > >
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